Ben Tenzer and Jon Wallace had taken a measured and conservative approach in the draft. Instead of selecting a player 26th overall, they had traded back nine spots to acquire two future second-round picks, prioritizing asset accumulation over an immediate gamble on late first-round talent. They were walking away with two new rookies, but the real prize was their mini-stash of draft capital. New trade pieces to be used later. Patience for the sake of future aggression.

Meanwhile, it was time to talk about Peyton Watson.

“We feel good about where that’s at,” Tenzer told reporters, reiterating a recent stance. “And we hope Peyton is here a long time.”

As it turned out, Denver’s draft strategy foreshadowed the eventual outcome for Watson, a restricted free agent whose seven-week stalemate with the Nuggets ended in a sign-and-trade to Cleveland on Aug. 19. Denver relinquished the rights to Watson in exchange for a 2031 unprotected first-round pick and a 2032 second-rounder. The Cavaliers signed a four-year, $88 million contract agreement with the 23-year-old wing, who was drafted 30th overall in 2022.

After four years of gradual development and one brilliant month of exploding star potential, Watson’s time in Denver was over. And the Nuggets hadn’t received a player back in the trade, controversially eroding their roster depth ahead of a pivotal 2026-27 season. After feeling out the market, they viewed Cleveland’s first-round pick as a more valuable asset than any player available to them, team sources told The Denver Post. It’s intended as a trade piece to be cashed in well before 2031. Patience for the sake of future aggression.

But what changed between January, when keeping Watson skyrocketed up the Nuggets’ priority list, and August, when their homegrown success story was cut short? Behind the scenes, several factors contributed to the most significant move of Denver’s 2026 offseason — painting a nuanced picture of why the team decided to move on from Watson after a negotiation that was nearly dead on arrival.

“Stan Kroenke is a shark in the water,” as one league source familiar with the sign-and-trade put it. “So is Rich Paul.”

A salary cap crunch

The Nuggets were always prepared for the likelihood that they would lose at least one starter-level player this summer, as The Post previously reported.

The first time they firmly chose a different player over Watson was Oct. 20, 2025. It was the day before a new season tipped off, and the deadline for teams to sign contract extensions with their 2022 draftees. Watson and Christian Braun were entering the final year of their respective rookie-scale contracts. The Nuggets had enough room for only one of them to be added to the 2026-27 payroll. They were anticipating a salary cap crunch, with four starters already under contract and one of them, Aaron Gordon, set for a $9 million raise.

Signing both Braun and Watson would push Denver’s payroll over the projected second apron ($222 million), triggering not only a historic luxury tax bill for owner Stan Kroenke but also a series of roster-building penalties that would render it immensely difficult to negotiate with other teams and make changes. The front office was already concerned by its shortage of trade-eligible draft capital; finishing 2026-27 in the second apron would cause Denver’s 2034 pick to be “frozen” by rule, temporarily forbidden from being traded.

And so it was Braun or Watson. Braun was far more established — a playoff rotation piece on the 2023 championship team, an NBA Most Improved Player candidate in 2025, a durable 15-point-per-game starter. Watson was a work in progress three years into his career, an upside bet whose role on offense remained ambiguous. Was he a secondary ball-handler? A corner spot-up shooter? A dunker spot heir to Gordon? A screener and roller? The Nuggets were hesitant to offer him an average annual value north of $10 million to $12 million at the time.

They focused instead on their negotiations with Braun. With a vote of approval from Nikola Jokic, they signed the guard to a five-year, $125 million deal, planning to take Watson to restricted free agency — a process that traditionally allows teams to squeeze their incumbent young players. The snub left a sour taste for Watson’s camp.

Watson, who had started his career as a client of the same agency as Jokic, geared up for the offseason by hiring new representation: Klutch Sports founder and super-agent Rich Paul, most famous for representing LeBron James. Then came injuries to Jokic, Braun, Gordon and Cam Johnson. Dismal luck for Denver. Opportunity for Watson. He seized it, amassing stats worthy of an All-Star for one tantalizing month: 22 points per game on 49% shooting.

An injury dispute

As Watson erupted, Denver’s offseason outlook shifted. A starter’s salary would need to be sacrificed if the Nuggets were going to re-sign their young wing and stay out of dreaded second-apron territory. Johnson was widely considered most likely to go at first, because of his relatively modest contract commitment: one more year at $23 million.

But the final memory of a crushing playoff defeat in April was that of Johnson amassing 27 points and eight rebounds in a road elimination game, desperate to save Denver’s season. Watson was watching from the bench, ruled out with a lingering right hamstring injury.

Whether he could have played is still disputed.

The injury first emerged in February, during a thriller at Madison Square Garden. Watson limped off the court and underwent an MRI later in the week, revealing a grade 2 strain, according to league sources. Denver announced he would be reevaluated in four weeks. He missed 19 games over a 45-day absence. In a recent appearance on ex-teammate Michael Porter Jr.’s podcast, Watson claimed that he returned too soon. “I feel like we kind of rushed it,” he said, “and didn’t take the right approach.” He reaggravated the hamstring after five games back in the lineup. April 1 in Utah was his last game as a Nugget.

The playoffs arrived, and then they ended, far sooner than Denver had ever expected. A 54-win team crash-landed in the first round against Minnesota. Over the six-game series, Denver never publicly ruled out the possibility that Watson might return.

Privately, Watson’s camp had decided he wouldn’t play. The exact state of his health might forever remain murky, as it depends on who you ask. The Nuggets felt strongly that Watson could’ve suited up by the end of the series but was slow-playing his return to protect his contract value, five league sources told The Denver Post both during the playoffs and afterward.

Another source close to Watson, however, said that he was in no position to return at any point during the series, and that Paul had intervened to tell Watson it would be unsafe to play on a bad hamstring with free agency on the horizon. Injury reports suggesting that he might be available throughout the series, the source contends, were merely an example of gamesmanship by Denver in a tightly contested series against a rival. Watson’s plan was to return during a potential second-round series if Denver had advanced, he said on Porter’s podcast.

“I just knew I hadn’t progressed far enough in my rehab,” he explained. “I knew that this is the most intense level of basketball.”

In either case, the upcoming contract negotiation was very much a consideration, leaving people at every level of the Nuggets organization frustrated with how the situation was handled, sources told The Post. It stood in contrast to other recent examples of Denver’s players attempting to play through injuries in the playoffs: Braun in 2026, Porter in 2025, Gordon in both years. The source close to Watson said that Gordon was among the people advising him to be careful with his return.

“I was getting shot up with all types of stuff in my shoulder joint every game to try to hoop. … I didn’t really feel like we were deep enough as a team for me to sit out,” Porter said last month during his podcast conversation with Watson. “If that happened before I had gotten paid, I don’t think I would’ve put myself in that position.”

“When you’re dealing with those (soft tissue) injuries, you have to be very careful in your return,” Paul, Watson’s agent, said on recently. “Guys want to play. You have to protect them from themselves in that moment because you’re up for a contract.”

Claiming that organizational trust in Watson had taken a hit, the Nuggets drew a line in the sand at the beginning of free agency. They offered a four-year contract with an ascending salary in the range of $18 million per year, with a team option, multiple league sources said. Whatever reservations the team had, it still thought highly enough of Watson to pursue an extension with him — for the right price. But dependability and maturity were concerns on Denver’s end, while any such assertion was viewed by Watson’s side as a sign of disrespect, casting a shadow over the negotiation. The initial offer was turned down immediately. The Nuggets kept it on the table but never returned with a new one.

A sparse trade market

Even independent of injury squabbles, it’s fairly common for teams to hold a hard line in restricted free agency. They’re often comfortable letting these negotiations turn into staring contests, especially when no outside suitors extend an offer sheet (as Oklahoma City did for Denver’s Spencer Jones). But by the time this particular staring contest unfolded, the Nuggets had already gauged the trade market on other potential sacrifices they could’ve made to keep Watson.

Rival teams eyed Denver’s cap sheet and tried to take advantage of it. Hoping the Nuggets were desperate to avoid the second apron, those teams asked Denver to give up draft picks along with Johnson, multiple sources said. It wasn’t necessarily because Johnson’s contract genuinely has negative value. He ranked eighth in the NBA with a 43% 3-point clip last season. It was a matter of leverage and opportunism. The Nuggets rebuffed any such efforts.

They also received at least one legitimately good offer for the 30-year-old wing, according to a league source. They still turned it down, viewing Johnson as an impactful starter. He was Denver’s third-leading scorer in the Minnesota series, averaging 14.2 points on 50% shooting to finish strong after a checkered regular season.

Meanwhile, the Nuggets and Watson were nowhere close to a contract agreement. Watson’s side had asked for north of $25 million annually at the outset, believing him to be worth more than Braun, who was coming off his worst season. Both sides began to explore sign-and-trade options. Denver took calls from the Clippers, Bucks, Hawks and Trail Blazers.

Nothing gained much traction. Sixth Man of the Year runner-up Jaime Jaquez was floated in preliminary talks with Milwaukee, but those conversations were entirely conceptual — the Bucks never made an official sign-and-trade offer, league sources said. Denver would’ve been intrigued by the possibility of adding him if an offer had materialized.

Kris Dunn was another potential player brought up in conversations with the Clippers, but Denver wouldn’t have agreed to a deal involving the 32-year-old guard without also getting draft capital back from Los Angeles, a source said. Pulling that off would’ve been difficult because for the Nuggets, taking back any salary in a sign-and-trade would hard-cap them at the second apron by rule, meaning they would need to send out another player in addition to Watson. Zeke Nnaji’s $7.5 million salary would’ve made the most sense within the CBA framework, but he has been viewed as a negative-value contract around the league for years at this point; asking a team to give up draft picks, an attractive player and to take on Nnaji’s contract was always going to be an obstacle.

The conversations with Los Angeles and Milwaukee were also in awkward positions from the beginning because of league investigations into cap circumvention involving both teams. The uncertainty of their situations made it difficult for talks to advance past the conceptual stage.

If Watson were to be traded, it was becoming increasingly clear that an entirely pick-based return was both the most feasible path forward and the Nuggets’ preferred outcome, rather than a player who would likely slot into the back end of their rotation.

A change of scenery

Then along came the Cavs. They were the last team to get involved, a surprise late entry to the Watson sweepstakes. In the end, they were also the only team to offer Denver an unprotected first-round pick — a coveted asset with high-lottery potential, if Cleveland’s championship window is closed five years from now. No teams had offered an unprotected first-rounder for the older Johnson when he was available earlier in the summer, league sources said.

Watson’s camp grew increasingly frustrated by how Denver was navigating the summer, especially the team’s perspective on his injury. By the time Cleveland made the $88 million offer, the sense was that Watson’s side would’ve been unlikely to agree to that same offer if it had hypothetically come from the Nuggets, sources connected to both sides told The Post. A change of scenery was preferred at that point.

There was also a question of on-court role that Denver would’ve needed to address if it had increased its offer, two league sources said. Was Watson going to be a starter next season, or did the Nuggets still see him as a bench player behind the same five as last year?

He’s expected to start in Cleveland, where small forward was the last hole to plug in a lineup that reached the Eastern Conference Finals this year. It’s an impressive outcome for Watson, landing on another championship contender for a salary twice what he was worth last offseason. There were hard feelings on the way out of Denver — “anybody who knows Peyton Watson knows the last thing I am is a quitter,” he told Porter — but he also left town with a public message sending thanks to his teammates, the Kroenkes and other Nuggets brass.

“As a young player who was a bit naive and hadn’t seen much of the real world, you guys took care of me better than I could have ever imagined,” he said in an Instagram post Aug. 25. “Thanks for that. Playing this game every night on the national stage is difficult on both the body and the mind, but the love from the fans always makes it so worthwhile. I will miss seeing you at Ball Arena.”

The Nuggets walked away feeling elated by the draft pick they wrangled out of a tough situation. They know well what they gave up: youth, depth, two-way athleticism, scoring upside. Watson’s electrifying hops and friendly personality made him a fan favorite, and he may have been just scratching the surface in January. But one month was always a small sample size to bet $88 million on. After feeling out the market, the Nuggets decided they preferred Johnson’s expiring salary, Spencer Jones’ cheaper extension, and an unprotected first-rounder rather than what they would have had to sacrifice for a long-term relationship with Watson.

Signing DeMar DeRozan to a veteran minimum contract also helps alleviate the short-term sting of what’s been lost, at least offensively.

Anything can change in the NBA overnight, but as of now, Johnson is fully part of the team’s plan for the 2026-27 season, sources told The Post.

A final assessment of the trade for Denver can’t be completed until the next move. Until the Cavaliers’ pick has a new home, and another player has a new home in Denver.

The Nuggets are still thin on trade-eligible picks. They have only the one first-rounder. If they’re out of the second apron by next summer, they’ll add another to their stash. The next stage of the Jokic era depends on whether they can maximize their draft capital better than in past years.

While they wait for that next move, Watson will try to prove them wrong for this one.

Team Grading The Week raised eyebrows and perked up ears a few days back when former Nuggets forward Michael Porter Jr. lamented the break-up/transition/evolution of Denver’s roster over the last five off-seasons. After the ’23 playoffs, and an NBA title, they lost Bruce Brown, a massive contributor off the bench, to free agency. After ’24, they lost wing guard/defensive specialist Kentavious Caldwell-Pope to another free-agent contract. After ’25, they traded away MPJ to the Nets. After ’26, they traded Peyton Watson to the Cavs.

“I don’t know why they let Pope (go),” “That was the beginning of our downfall.”

Downfall? Strong, but can’t disagree, either.

Were the Nuggets’ postseason fades in ’25 and ’26 due entirely to the loss of KCP?

As usual, MPJ was half right.

As Porter himself pointed out, the Nuggets without KCP pushed the eventual NBA champs, the Oklahoma City Thunder, to seven games in the second round of the ’25 postseason — and that was with MPJ able to use only one working shoulder.

Now, in MPJ’s defense, there’s the defense. In the two seasons since Caldwell-Pope’s been gone, the Nuggets’ numbers on the defensive end of the floor have started to crater. Denver ranked 15th in defensive rating during the ’22-23 regular season and No. 8 in ’23-24. With KCP MIA? No. 21 in ’24-25,

As for perimeter defense, per NBA.com, the Nuggets ranked third in fewest opponent 3-point makes allowed in ’22-23 and finished second in fewest allowed in ’23-24 with KCP leading the charge along the perimeter.

The Nuggets two years ago slid to 20th in opponent 3-pointers made in ’24-25 — and ranked 18th in 3-point makes allowed in ’25-26. Save us, Dave Joerger!

MPJ on Nuggets’ “downfall”  — C

Caldwell-Pope was the perfect, spot-up, fourth or fifth option for the Nuggets of ’22-24. On the other hand, that line of KCP thinking brings us back to some of the same revisionist-history stuff that peppers online conversations about Christian Braun.

GTW’s hoops wonks tend to pinpoint the Nuggets’ “downfall” to Game 7 of that fateful, second-round Timberwolves series in the spring of 2024. Which means KCP was still here for the beginning of any “fade,” to be fair.

Again, per NBA tracking data, the veteran stopper was considered to have been “guarding” Minnesota star Anthony Edwards for 39:29 minutes over that crucial seven-game, second-round series two years ago. If you read those 39-and-a-half minutes as the stat line for a single game,

Now, Edwards was unguardable for most of that series, to be fair. But given an assignment that falls under the definition of “You had ONE job,” KCP didn’t really do it, did he?

“We still went Game 7 with Minnesota after (former Nuggets VP) Tim Connolly kind of built Minnesota to try and beat us with the two bigs. Because then you can put KAT (Karl-Anthony Towns) on Joker and you get Rudy Gobert kind of roam.

“So they kind of built that team to try to beat us, and they got us in Game 7.”

Sure did.

The Nuggets overpaid for MPJ, just as they did for Zeke Nnaji. Braun is a wait-and-see who’s left much of Nuggets Nation with a bitter taste in its mouth. The better front offices managed to get value from contracts for future performance, not just to reward past numbers.

According to Basketball-Reference.com, Caldwell-Pope put up a 112 Defensive Rating per 100 opponent possessions two seasons ago, but that went up to 121 per 100 with Memphis in ’25-26. Braun recorded a 118 Defensive Rating (DR) in ’24-25 and a 120 DR per 100 last year. Not KCP good, but catching up.

Porter at least threw a little compliment to the ’26-27 Nuggets while waxing nostalgic.

“It’s like slowly (breaking it up) … but they still can be called (a contender), as long as you got Joker, Jamal, AG (Aaron Gordon),” the former Nugget reflected. “Deebo’s (DeMar DeRozan)’s over there, Cam (Johnson)’s obviously a good player, CB (Christian Braun) … I mean, they’re still good. But we had some camaraderie (among that championship core).”

“It’s honestly good for you, every once in a while, to get punched in the mouth,” the Nuggets guard told me over the weekend at the , home to his summer 2026 youth camp with Flexwork.

“I’ve said it a couple of times. So it’s good for me to personally get written off. It’s probably good for the team to get written off.

“But like I said, I wouldn’t write a (Nuggets) team off that won that many games and has been there, has won a championship, has done all those things. So we’re excited. And obviously, we don’t really care what other people have to say.”

Good thing. The Nuggets have been taking it in the shorts from pundits far and wide ever since they went over the NBA salary cap’s second apron in order to keep Spencer Jones out of the Thunder’s clutches. Tim Hardaway Jr., Jonas Valanciunas, Jalen Pickett and now Peyton Watson are officially out; Marvin Bagley III, Lonnie Walker IV and now DeMar DeRozan are officially in.

“Really excited to play with another All-Star and learn from him,” Braun said of DeRozan.

“I’m always very confident in what our front office does and the team they’ll put together every single year.”

On paper, the Nuggets will go into preseason camp older than a year ago at this time. Maybe wiser. But maybe not, well, better. And in a Western Conference where Oklahoma City’s roster is still loaded and San Antonio’s Victor Wembanyama is only 22 and just getting started, the smart money says the Mile High title window’s about to snap shut on Nikola Jokic’s Hall-of-Fame fingers. That Denver’s become Milwaukee West. No wonder CB can get a little cheesed off when you bring it up.

“I mean, we’re going to add enough pieces, obviously. As long as we have Jok (Jokic), as long as we have Mal (Jamal Murray) and AG (Aaron Gordon) and that staff, we’re always in a really good spot,” Braun countered.

“I’m very confident in us every single year, no matter who we put on the court.  With those guys, we’ve got a chance to win a championship, and that’s what we’re here for — to win championships. So we’re excited. We’ve got everything we need, as long as we have those guys.”

The Core Four is the Core Three now, mind you, and Father Time isn’t doing Nuggets Nation any favors. Gordon turns 31 in September. He played in only 36 games a season ago, as one of the bounciest players in the NBA battled calf and hamstring issues. Murray had a career year (25.4 points per game) and landed a deserved All-Star berth, but shot 35.7% from the floor during that ill-fated first-round playoff loss to Minnesota. Jokic became just the second player in NBA history to average a triple-double over back-to-back campaigns, but shot 44.6% during the postseason. He’s turning 32 in February.

The Nuggets need to get younger, longer and meaner around that veteran trio, and ASAP. All of which puts a little more hot sauce on Braun, a two-way threat who’s 25, rehabbing an injured ankle, and entering the first season of a five-year, $125-million extension. Especially with Watson, CB’s pal, getting traded to the Cavs as part of a five-team swap that landed the Nuggets draft picks in ’31 and ’32. P-Swat (pick 30) and Braun (pick 21) were both Hoovered up in the ’22 draft, and eventually contributed to the franchise’s first NBA title the following spring.

“Very excited for Peyton and everything he accomplished,” Braun said of his former running mate, who landed a four-year, $88-million deal from Cleveland as part of a sign-and-trade.

“I mean, every single day that I’ve been in the NBA, I’ve been with Peyton. Every single day we’ve competed, we’ve competed together. We’ve done everything together. We’ve practiced every day together. We’ve done all the rookie stuff together. So Peyton’s my guy. Me and his guys, his family, his friends have gotten close (with me) over the last four years, obviously. And he’s a guy that obviously supported me at every step. So I’ll do the same for him, always.”

Yet as the Nuggets chose to pay CB and not P-Swat at the end of their respective rookie deals, the former has become  for Nuggets faithful lately; You sort of see what you want to see inside that inkblot. The hot take is that the former Kansas star cashed in — Braun’s got a $21.55 million cap number for ’26-27 — only to promptly fall off his ’24-25 clip in scoring (12.0 points per game last season, down from 15.4 the year before), shooting (30.1% on treys, down from 39.7% the year prior) and defense (120 points allowed per 100 opponent possessions, up from 118 in ’24-25).

But there were caveats, too. For one, CB played hurt last season, and everybody knew it. One of Braun’s strengths is an almost sneaky explosiveness combined with reckless abandon — whether sprinting on run-outs, squirting free on back-door cuts, throwing his body into the paint, or rising high to finish open looks from beyond the arc. Braun tore ligaments in his left ankle last November and wasn’t quite the same after that. He missed 38 games. He spent three weeks wearing a boot. Then he dinged his calf in Game 1 of the Minnesota series. He managed three points in Game 6, as one of the most anticipated seasons in recent Nuggets memory ended with a stunning thud in Minneapolis.

From a 2026 lens, extending Braun while kicking Watson’s can down the road looks like an epic blunder that could cost the Nuggets another title in the Joker’s prime.

But hindsight makes Jerry Wests of us all. If someone told you a year ago that you’d only be able to pay either Watson or Braun the $20-ish million it would take to keep them, eight out of 10 Nuggets fans — probably more — would’ve given the money to the latter. Without hesitation.

Basketball-Reference.com tracks a stat called “Box score Plus/Minus,” or BPM — which, in simplest terms, measures points per 100 possessions a player accounts for in a game above that of an average player. Braun put up a +0.1 BPM score or better in 41 of 78 appearances (53%) during the ’24-25 season, and posted a BPM net-positive score in 19 of 51 (37%) career postseason appearances. Watson, by contrast, registered an +0.1 BPM in 23 of 68 appearances (33.8%) in ’24-25 and posted nine net-positive BPM games out of 29 playoff tilts (31%).

It’s fine to fault the Nuggets front office for not seeing 2026 Watson coming. But while it’s OK to talk about ancient history, it’s a weak look to keep revising that history to fit the narratives of the present.

Your buddy with the season tickets might not have given Braun $20 million a year ago, but he would’ve laughed you out of the bar if you’d suggested doing the same for P-Swat last August. And if he says otherwise, he’s lying.

That said, it also behooves Braun to get back on track, fair or not. If Watson becomes an All-Star in the East, Nuggets Nation won’t let No. 0 in blue hear the end of it.

And they need him. Now more than ever. Since the spring of ’24, the Nuggets are 10-4 in the postseason when Braun scores in double digits and 6-12 when he doesn’t. That’s an awful lot of pressure on one left ankle.

“Yeah, I think we’re going to put it in the past, and it’s not something I want to talk about anymore,” Braun said of last year’s injuries. “I’ve worked extremely hard to get past it and will continue to work on it, and (it’s) something that will continue to develop, continue to get better. So I’m not too worried about what other people have to say about it.

“I know who I am and the player I am. I know I’ll bounce back and be right where I need to be next year.”

From a financial standpoint, it made sense to let Peyton Watson move on, convinced he is not worth the four-year, $88-million contract Cleveland gave him. The Nuggets remain the only team in the second apron. So they were not going to pay Watson.

The problem is that the entire offseason has been lost in translation. The Nuggets appear detached from reality, lacking a clear direction.

One day, they are going for it, matching Oklahoma City’s $11.75 million offer sheet for Spencer Jones, a move that spiked their luxury tax bill by $32 million. The next, they are driving Watson to the airport in exchange for Julian Reese, who will be waived, and a 2031 first-round draft pick and a second-rounder in 2032. 

The first person who can articulate the Nuggets’ plan this summer gets free tickets to Elitch’s and a game-used ice pack and Ace bandage signed by Aaron Gordon.

Unless the Nuggets believed Watson quit in the playoffs — he was officially out with a hamstring injury — then they should have kept him. A disgruntled Watson playing on the qualifying offer is better than what this multi-team, money-laundering deal delivered.

The Nuggets needed Watson’s athleticism, his two-way skillset, his ability to create off the dribble. They provided runway to prove himself when Jokic missed 16 games, and their reward is a cheesy Hotels.com commercial and the bile taste in their mouth every time they realize Zeke Nnaji remains on the roster. 

I would have loved to see Nikola Jokic’s reaction to this move. “So let me get this straight. We got no players. And the draft picks are available when I am 36 and 37 years old?” 

It is a failure.

There is no argument to construct otherwise, save for intel that Watson, 23, could have played in the postseason and staged Operation Shutdown. Eyebrows were raised in April when Gordon was dragging himself up and down the court on one leg, and Watson was watching from the bench.

He played on April 1. And that was it. There was talk that he was working his way back. That he was practicing. Then he wasn’t.

I don’t know what happened. I know the Nuggets’ chances of beating the Timberwolves nose-dived without him.

So after a game of chicken, of the market not responding to Watson, the Nuggets chose the easy way out. Fine. Then, why not demand that Cleveland include Jaylon Tyson in the deal?

For those saying the Nuggets had no other choice because the luxury tax bill would have exceeded $200 million. That is not the case. They could have shipped out Cam Johnson early in the offseason, leaving room to absorb Watson’s new contract.

As depressing as it sounds, it would have been easier to stomach a bad deal for Johnson than Watson. Watson was their guy. They drafted him. They developed him. They deserved to benefit from a few prime years.

Instead, they get to flash fake smiles that they love Christian Braun — hopefully he bounces back from his ankle injury — Julian Strawther and DaRon Holmes II.

Is it possible for the Nuggets to rehire Calvin Booth so they can fire him again?

In an offseason that demanded improvement given the upper crust in the Western Conference — San Antonio, Oklahoma City, Minnesota — the Nuggets lacked creativity and imagination.

They brought the band back. This was admirable a year ago. Not this summer.

Jamal Murray, Jokic, Gordon and Johnson are terrific — when healthy.  Murray, Jokic, Gordon and Johnson are dynamic — when available.

Sequels rarely live up to expectations. And as Hollywood themes go, the Nuggets are giving off tiki idol Brady Bunch vibes. 

Sure, they could use the first-rounder to acquire a better player than Watson. But the way this offseason has transpired, it is more likely they attach the pick to move Nnaji.

According to reports, the Nuggets have turned their attention to signing free agent DeMar DeRozan. He is 37.

When Josh Kroenke said everything was on the table at the end of the season presser, did he mean Bengay, heating pads, insoles and arch supports?

DeRozan can still score. But not sure if you are aware, putting the ball in the basket is not the Nuggets’ problem. Preventing it from going in is the issue.

I am not going to bore you with the apron problems the Nuggets are facing. The NBA demands that fans be CPAs to understand the salary cap.

However, one thing is easy to see. By not going for it — and keeping Spencer Jones and signing DeRozan does not qualify — they are wasting another year of Jokic’s prime.

What makes this different is that he could leave this time.

When Jokic did not agree to a contract extension, kicking the can down the road again, it means he can sign a $359.5 million contract extension next summer. That would be the largest in league history and bring his career earnings within squinting distance of one billion.

Jokic clearly likes money. Not as much as horses. But his affection for the dollar is real. Good for him. And no one can pay him more than Denver.

But his future is now a story as the Nuggets more closely resemble the unraveling of the Bucks in the last years of Giannis Antetokounmpo than the championship team of 2023.

In some ways, the bloated contracts made this a likely conclusion.

But barring Watson bailing on his teammates, the Nuggets are not better without him.

How did they get into this payroll dilemma, and which decision over the last few years is most responsible for it? Which contract or trade has limited their roster-building flexibility most in hindsight?

There was the Michael Porter Jr. extension inked by former general manager Tim Connelly, which will end up paying Porter $179.3 million over five seasons. Two front office regimes later, it cost the Nuggets an unprotected first-round pick to free themselves from the last two years of that contract.

Then there was the Zeke Nnaji extension in 2023, a four-year, $32 million deal that proved to be one of the defining transactions of Calvin Booth’s tenure. Halfway through the term of that contract now and six years into his career, Nnaji still hasn’t solidified himself as a reliable rotation player, rendering him almost impossible to trade. The roster’s sixth-highest salary was seated on the bench for almost the entirety of Denver’s first-round playoff defeat in April.

There was the two-year Reggie Jackson contract that used up Denver’s taxpayer mid-level exception, curiously included a player option and eventually forced Booth to cough up three future second-round picks to salary-dump the veteran point guard. And there was the decision to trade away another three second-round picks to move up six spots in the 2024 draft for a non-lottery prospect who hasn’t panned out yet. And the long-term commitments made to Aaron Gordon and Jamal Murray, who will make a combined 50% of the salary cap next season.

Now it’s Christian Braun’s five-year, $125 million deal — the first extension handed out by lead executives Jon Wallace and Ben Tenzer — that has emerged as the latest lightning rod among Nuggets fans, mostly because of who didn’t get extended as a result. Peyton Watson and Denver are stuck in a negotiating stalemate this summer, while the trade value of Braun’s new contract has been heavily scrutinized following a down year for the shooting guard.

Keeping the band together

The truth, of course, is that Denver’s sticky second-apron situation is the sum of all those moves, not a direct consequence of one of them. It’s also the price that every championship team seems to pay for success under the rule of the 2023 collective bargaining agreement. Just this summer, Knicks owner James Dolan declared “you’d have to be suicidal” to spend over the second apron as his team was trying to bask in the afterglow of a dominant title run. Sure enough, New York let Mitchell Robinson walk in free agency — then watched as the 2025 champions (OKC) salary-dumped three players for the same reason Dolan outlined.

“This was a financial decision,” Thunder general manager Sam Presti told the Oklahoman in a surprisingly blunt on-the-record confession after trading Lu Dort, Isaiah Joe and Aaron Wiggins.

As soon as confetti rained on the Nuggets in 2023, every key player who had contributed to the historic scene at Ball Arena suddenly became more expensive. For those who were part of the front office’s long-term vision, their importance to the franchise would show on their next contract. Denver’s margin for error in roster construction shrank to near-zero in that moment.

The Nuggets have been reckoning with that margin for error for three years now, a period in which their contract extensions have also revealed a stubborn (perhaps even admirable) determination to win again with as many of those key players as possible — the sentimentality of a seemingly bygone era.

It’s getting increasingly difficult to keep those players. If Denver eventually manages to re-sign Watson, the 23-year-old wing might prove to be more expensive than just the dollar amount of his extension.

As all of this apron tension bubbles closer to the surface, so does the question of how Denver plans to get out of this before it gets worse. If Nikola Jokic stays true to his word, he’ll sign the most lucrative contract in NBA history next summer to remain a Nugget. Building around that contract and remaining a serious championship contender into Jokic’s late 30s will the long-term challenge for Wallace and Tenzer. If they’re also building around several other expensive salaries, their flexibility will continue to be hindered.

Is a more dramatic roster overhaul looming in the near future?

Pricey pairs

One transaction earlier this offseason was particularly illuminating as a possible precedent-setter. At the very least, it’s a relevant, if controversial, move for teams like Denver to study.

The Jaylen Brown trade.

Before the Celtics shockingly shipped him off to Philadelphia for Paul George and picks, The Denver Post outlined the uncanny similarities between Brown’s status in Boston and Jamal Murray’s in Denver.

Both were drafted in 2016, four picks apart; they’ve enjoyed arguably the two best pro careers in their draft class. Both were instrumental in their teams’ slow and steady ascents from the basement of the league to its pinnacle. Both demonstrated the qualities of a playoff riser as the No. 2 option on a championship squad nearly a decade into their careers. Both turn 30 next season. Both have three years remaining on their current max contracts (Brown’s is a supermax), with no player or team options.

All the discourse this summer surrounding Brown’s impact on winning, or lack thereof, has existed within the unspoken context of the CBA. The argument against him isn’t that analytics view him as a bad player. It����ap that analytics suggest he’s not worth an average annual value of $61.7 million for the next three seasons. It’s a good old-fashioned “Moneyball” case study. Especially with Celtics co-star Jayson Tatum already taking up 35% of the salary cap on his own supermax contract.

“The path looked a little bit more challenging with 70% of our cap and such a high percent of our usage tied into two players,” Boston executive Brad Stevens said in July.

And that’s before considering the contract extension dynamics with an entrenched star like Brown, who might’ve believed he was owed another max offer by Boston as a gesture of respect. Trading him wasn’t only about his salary for the next three years; it was also a clear admission by Stevens that he didn’t want Brown occupying 35% of the cap at 35 years old. Hence Boston’s willingness to take back Paul George in the deal — another bloated salary ($55 million on average for two more years), but one that doesn’t carry the baggage of a 10-year relationship, of expectations for more long-term commitment.

George will be 38 next time he’s a free agent, assuming he picks up his player option next summer. It’s widely understood that if he signs another NBA contract, it will be for much less money.

Two months ago, Murray became eligible for a 35% supermax extension for the first time in his career by making an All-NBA team. (His current max contract is worth 30% of the cap.) Will he expect Denver to offer him that when the time comes, and will the Nuggets want to pay that much for a secondary star in his mid-30s? Will they even want to commit 30% of the cap to him for another chunk of years, with Jokic already on a supermax? The Celtics didn’t.

And the Celtics chose to get out in front of it, knowing the optics and knowing the risk. Stevens candidly acknowledged to reporters that his decision could age poorly.

Even through a short-term lens, the widely respected GM did make a salient point about trying to win with two max players in a restrictive system.

These are the two most expensive salaries on every NBA team entering the 2026-27 season:

The last eight teams to reach the NBA Finals did so with their two most expensive players occupying 60% or less of the cap.

2026: Knicks (59.9%) vs. Spurs (41.8%)

2025: Thunder (46.9%) vs. Pacers (60%)

2024: Celtics (54.1%) vs. Mavericks (57.4%)

2023: Nuggets (52.8%) vs. Heat (55%)

Can the Nuggets be an outlier?

The defining transaction behind New York’s championship was Jalen Brunson’s decision to sacrifice millions of dollars on his most recent contract; the Knicks were able to build a more complete starting lineup and a deeper bench with their best player earning the third-most in salary

It’s notable that their highest-paid player, Karl-Anthony Towns, is currently extension-eligible but hasn’t signed. Brunson probably isn’t going to give Dolan another bargain on his next extension. The Knicks must now operate under the assumption that Brunson will be playing on a supermax in the next couple of years. Planning accordingly means playing hardball with KAT — or trading him.

The Spurs have similarly capitalized on a mini-window with Victor Wembanyama on his rookie-scale contract. It gets trickier in 2027-28, but even then, Wembanyama gave them a minor discount. He and De’Aaron Fox will make a combined 55.7% that season.

The Thunder won with Chet Holmgren and Jalen Williams both on rookie deals. Now, those two have 25% max extensions taking effect this season, which should suffice as a viable payroll structure for at least one more year. Then in 2027, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander’s supermax kicks in, and the top-heavy cap sheet gets dicey.

Boston won the year before Brown’s supermax took effect (and two years before Tatum’s). Denver won the year before Jokic’s took effect (and three before Murray’s 30% max). The similarities hardly feel coincidental.

By all of this logic, the top eight teams listed above are automatically disqualified from contention for the 2027 championship (including Boston, ironically). That would explain why Stevens was willing to trade a franchise cornerstone to a rival of all teams. Philadelphia already had a supermax player on the books, plus Tyrese Maxey making $40 million. Now the 76ers have the exact payroll structure that Boston seemingly wanted to avoid. The problem is that they also have VJ Edgecombe on a rookie deal and LeBron James for $3.9 million.

The real overarching lesson could be this: If a team is going to pay two players an exorbitant amount of finite money, it had better be supremely confident that those two players are a perfect fit together.

Of all the duos near the top of that 2026-27 chart, Jokic and Murray have proven themselves more worthy of a combined 66% cap hit than anyone else. They’re the only tandem in the top six with more than 60 games played together. Embiid and Brown; Tatum and George; Antetokounmpo and Adebayo; and Davis and Young are all brand-new pairings.

As long as Denver’s front office remains confident that Jokic and Murray’s offensive chemistry transcends their defensive shortcomings, maybe that’ll be enough to buoy their partnership. Maybe the belief will persist in Denver that Murray and Jokic can be an outlier.

Or maybe Stevens’ words will ring true with the Nuggets, and they’ll eventually feel forced to press the red button on their loyal payroll structure.

The Nuggets will play only 14 back-to-backs in the 2026-27 regular season — three fewer than last season. Their longest road trips will span four games — three fewer than last season, when Nikola Jokic hyperextended his knee and injuries piled up during a two-week marathon out east.

They will return to Denver for a one-game homestand only four times, and they will leave town for an awkward one-game excursion only six times — seven fewer than last season in both cases, enabling them to enjoy the comforts of home more.

The full NBA schedule was unveiled Thursday afternoon, minus two to-be-determined games for each team that will have to wait for the results of the NBA Cup group stage. Here are 10 key games for Nuggets fans to circle on the calendar — excluding the season opener at Oklahoma City and Christmas nightcap at Golden State, which were already announced Tuesday. It goes without saying that those are interesting, premier games.

Tip times are listed in MT. Nationally broadcasted games are denoted by the TV network or streaming service on which they’ll appear.

Nov. 2 vs. Portland Trail Blazers, 7 p.m.

Denver’s home opener on Oct. 24 against the Pelicans will certainly be intriguing, as fans will greet the team in a competitive environment for the first time since last season ended on the road in an abrupt and embarrassing fashion. But the third home game of the year is even more worth watching. Jokic’s pal Micah Nori has taken over as Portland’s head coach, and he’s tasked with finding a synergy between wild card newcomer Ja Morant and franchise icon Damian Lillard, who’s coming off a torn Achilles tendon and should return to the court as a Blazer for the first time since 2023, a week before this matchup.

Nov. 7 at Indiana Pacers (Mexico City), 3 p.m.

Speaking of Achilles injuries, this game is fascinating for a couple of reasons, primarily because it’s scheduled early in the NBA’s reintroduction of Tyrese Haliburton. He and Jokic might be the two greatest passers in the sport today, point gods of the highest order, following in the footsteps of Chris Paul and Russell Westbrook. They combined for 34 assists when they faced off two years ago in Indiana. Also, Mexico City is cool.

Nov. 27 at Utah Jazz, 7:30 p.m.

Denver will face the Suns (Oct. 30 in Phoenix), Rockets (Nov. 20 at home), Mavericks (Nov. 24 at home) and Jazz in the NBA Cup group stage. It’s the first time the Nuggets haven’t found themselves in a “group of death” since 2023. And this will be the grand finale, potentially with a trip to the knockout stage on the line, if you care about those things. If you don’t? Utah is still a more interesting opponent than it has been in recent years, with No. 2 overall draft pick Darryn Peterson arriving and Jaren Jackson Jr. joining the frontcourt.

Dec. 19 vs. Los Angeles Lakers, 7 p.m.

Jokic vs. Doncic is always appointment viewing, and the Lakers have reassembled their roster to better suit Luka’s needs this offseason. JJ Redick will naturally be eager to put Jokic in as many actions as possible. This will be the three-time MVP’s first time trying to defend the Doncic-Walker Kessler pick-and-roll, which Los Angeles clearly expects to be a dominant bread-and-butter play for years to come. These teams meet again in Hollywood four days later.

Dec. 28 vs. Minnesota Timberwolves, 8:30 p.m. (NBC)

And then on the other side of Christmas, on the second night of a back-to-back, the Nuggets face their first encounter with the LaMelo Ball-Anthony Edwards tandem. Bitter playoff memories could bubble to the surface in this two-game series, which begins in Denver and switches to Minnesota on New Year’s Eve. The Wolves made a big offseason change to their lineup, but Jaden McDaniels and his trash-talking ways haven’t gone anywhere.

Jan. 11 at New York Knicks, 5:30 p.m. (Peacock)

The annual trip to Madison Square Garden, which is not only the world’s most famous arena but also the home of the champions now. Jalen Brunson scored 42 points when the Nuggets visited last season, lifting the Knicks to a double-overtime win. Playing in that game was so fun, Jamal Murray said afterward, that he didn’t even notice when Peyton Watson left the floor with a hamstring injury that altered the course of Denver’s season.

Jan. 21 vs. Washington Wizards, 7 p.m.

Nobody knows what to make of the Wizards. They’re a remarkably strange team, blessed with the No. 1 overall pick in this year’s draft lottery (AJ Dybantsa), yet also suddenly headlined by Anthony Davis and Trae Young. Their mix of compelling young talent and overpriced star power has resulted in a wide range of predictions for their season. In any case, they should be an interesting opponent for Denver to host a couple of weeks before the trade deadline.

Feb. 28 at San Antonio Spurs, 11 a.m. (ABC)

For the second consecutive year, you’re gonna have to wait to watch Jokic and Victor Wembanyama go head-to-head in the post. They didn’t share the court until April 6 last season, due to a combination of scheduling and injury misfortune. But when they finally did match up, it was everything a hoops fan dreamt it would be. The power structure has shifted since then. Wembanyama has led San Antonio to the NBA Finals. It’s his league, not Jokic’s. Until further notice.

March 14 vs. Miami Heat, 5:30 p.m. (NBC)

Denver’s two meetings with the new-look Heat are both in March; the game in Miami is scheduled for a week after this. Will the physicality and rim protection of Giannis Antetokounmpo, Bam Adebayo and Andrew Wiggins make the Nuggets’ mighty offense look bad? Or will Miami’s utter lack of spacing do the improbable and make their defense look good? A fun subplot here: Tim Hardaway Jr. returns to Ball Arena, likely to the tune of a standing ovation.

March 28 vs. Philadelphia 76ers, 8 p.m. (NBC)

If these 10 games were ranked on a scale of anticipation, rather than listed chronologically, Philly’s visit to Ball Arena would be a pretty obvious No. 1. Where to start? It might be LeBron James’ last game in Denver. It might be Joel Embiid’s first game in Denver in seven and a half years (or it might not be — great theater either way). And it’s an up-close look at the NBA’s newest superteam, featuring Jaylen Brown vs. Aaron Gordon and Tyrese Maxey vs. Jamal Murray and even a cameo from old friend Kentavious Caldwell-Pope. When the Sixers come to town, it’ll be the hottest ticket of the season.

Fourth round? For the guy who’s been arguably the Broncos’ best runnner in camp since they put pads on?

Bargain of the draft.

With soft-tissue injuries mounting, it’s not a stretch to call Coleman ����apountry’s most important rookie.

Especially with J.K. Dobbins, Payton’s RB1, limping off the field during Monday’s drills.

When the Broncos visit Atlanta on Friday night in their preseason opener, it’s not all about the scoreboard. It’s about narratives. Bo Nix’s ankle. Davis Webb, Payton and the play-calling operation. Sam Ehlinger’s ascent. The rise of Pat Bryant III. Somebody, anybody, flashing from the tight end room.

But I want to see if Coleman can do to the Dirty Birds, or least Atlanta’s first or second team stoppers,

I want to see if Coleman is the J.K. comp this team missed last December and January. The bruiser. The grinder. The workhorse.

The eye test says Dobbins’ strengths are Coleman’s. So do the numbers.

First downs? Last fall, when everybody who lined up against the Washington Huskies knew what was coming, Coleman averaged 5 yards per carry with 11 of 83 carries piling up at least 10 yards. The season before that, he rattled off 5.8 yards per tote on first down, with 19 of 110 attempts going for at least 10 yards a pop.

Short-yardage? On third-down-and-3-yards-or-less last fall, Coleman notched a first down on 11 of 15 attempts. The year prior, he was 7-for-11.

Among running backs drafted in 2026, Coleman ranked second in broken tackles forced by the wonks at Pro Football Focus. No. 1 in his class? The only cat ahead of him? Jeremiyah Love, the No. 3 overall pick by Arizona, whom the Cardinals just gave $53 million guaranteed on his rookie deal — the most for a tailback in NFL history.

Since 2014, only two FBS backs with at least 500 collegiate carries have averaged more opponent missed tackles per rush than Coleman: Bijan Robinson, Ashton Jeanty and David Montgomery. Let’s see. That’s the best runner in the NFL now; a former No. 6 pick who piled up 975 yards on the ground for a laughable Raiders offense last fall; and a veteran who’s currently on a streak of seven straight seasons of at least 700 rushing yards.

Darn good company, I’d say.

There’s more. Blocking? What Coleman lacks in size (5-foot-8, 220 pounds), he makes up in sheer rage. PFF graded him out with a 70-plus (out of a 100) or better in pass-blocking with Washington each of the last two seasons. Also per PFF: three sacks allowed in four seasons as a collegiate blocker.

The book says Coleman committed just one fumble in 639 collegiate touches as a runner or receiver with Washington and Arizona. And only one drop over more than 120 targets as a receiver.

In other words, safer than a steel deadbolt. Trustworthy. The kind of guy Payton craves, and will inevitably need, given that Dobbins joined the soft-tissue injury club Monday — a table that’s already got Jaylen Waddle and Marvin Mims Jr.

“I think he’s going to be fine,” Payton said of Dobbins. “We’re just being smart with it.”

It wasn’t just smart to draft Coleman out of the University of Washington. It was borderline genius. Dobbins is 27. He’s coming off the best two back-to-back seasons of his NFL career, a high-stepping, high-volume hammer who’s averaging 4.8 yards per touch since 2024. You need a tone-setting run on first down, he’s your man. You need a tough couple yards on third-and-short, No. 27 knows how to move those chains north.

It’s just that, over these last two seasons, he’s also averaged only 12 appearances and 10 starts. At his peak.

Dobbins has become the Broncos’ version of Aaron Gordon: Physical, essential, a good teammate and a fan favorite … whose body also has a habit of repeatedly failing on him.

The Broncos were 8-2 (.800) last fall when Dobbins started and 6-0 when he touched the rock 16 times or more. The Nuggets went 27-9 (.750) during the ’25-26 regular season when AG played and 26-7 (.788) when he started.

The parallels are more than a little uncanny, aren’t they? When both are healthy, their teams feel whole, their systems make sense. And if they weren’t there, neither franchise had truly found a comparable replacement in case of an injury.

Until now.

Coleman has spent the last 11 days or so looking like the Broncos’ most complete runner after Dobbins himself. Willing blocker? Yep. Weapon out of the backfield? That, too. Angry runner inside? Check. Secure with the football? Absolutely. Home-run speed? Sure, although maybe not to the degree of an RJ Harvey, Tyler Badie or Jaleel McLaughlin.

Harvey’s strengths are his second and third gears. You just rarely saw them between the tackles. And that’s fine. If Harvey becomes the Broncos’ version of James White, it’s not necessarily a wasted draft pick. As a speedster who’s better in space, beating defenders around the perimeter, Harvey’s more of a compliment/caddy to Dobbins, more lightning to his thunder, than a like-for-like substitute.

“I think (as a) young runner,” Payton noted last week, “you don’t feel like a rookie with Jonah.”

Thank goodness for that. You’ll say it this weekend. You’ll say it Week 5. And Week 10. And in the AFC Championship game, if the fates are kind.

One of those transactions is more important than the others. Denver’s 48-hour dance with Oklahoma City over the rights to Spencer Jones was one of the most intriguing under-the-radar dramas to play out all summer in the NBA. After the Thunder extended an aggressive two-year, $12 million offer sheet, people around Jones didn’t expect the Nuggets to match due to their uncomfortable salary cap crunch. Doing so would mean entering the fearsome second apron with Peyton Watson’s situation still unresolved. Jones even shared to his followers a social media post by his agency depicting him in a Photoshopped Thunder jersey.

But the Nuggets stood firm. As the clock dwindled and speculation swirled, they matched Oklahoma City’s offer, automatically retaining the 25-year-old restricted free agent. It’s the only contract they’ve signed for more than a minimum salary this offseason (so far), and it made them the only team in the NBA with a payroll exceeding the $221.7 million second apron.

Here are three takeaways from the transaction, which leaves other questions unanswered more than a month after the start of free agency.

1. Denver’s skewed roster

Keeping Jones revealed a willingness to at least temporarily exacerbate the roster imbalance that already existed between Denver’s frontcourt and backcourt. With 13 roster spots filled, the Nuggets have barely addressed ball-handling, which they publicly claimed was one of their most glaring needs at the beginning of the offseason.

�ҳܲ������:��Jamal Murray, Christian Braun, Julian Strawther, Tyus Jones.

Forwards: Cam Johnson, Aaron Gordon, Spencer Jones, Alpha Diallo, Zeke Nnaji, Trevon Brazile, DaRon Holmes II.

Consider also that Denver’s other draft pick, Bryce Hopkins, is another wing. His contract status hasn’t been determined yet, with the Nuggets seemingly trying to keep their options open. For example, they don’t want to give him a standard deal now only to find themselves regretting it a few weeks later if they’re out of roster spots while trying to complete a trade. But if they end up in a position where they’re narrowly under the apron and needing to fill one more roster spot to meet league requirements, perhaps the low salary of a second-round pick would make sense.

The over-index on forwards doesn’t even account for Watson, who still could end up back in Denver next season. That would add another wing. The Nuggets’ pursuit of shot creation depth has also steered them to target veteran small forward DeMar DeRozan in free agency, according to a league source.

At least five of the seven forwards already under contract (including Jones) are players who likely won’t be expected to operate the ball much, if at all.

What does it all indicate? One, that Jones clearly was highly valued by the Nuggets for them to willingly wade deeper into their state of positional lopsidedness. Two, that the roster’s other, more expensive forwards (Gordon, Johnson, Nnaji) aren’t entirely safe in Denver yet. Something eventually needs to be done to address the lack of guard depth behind Murray.

2. Death, taxes and frozen picks

Another reason that re-signing Jones might foreshadow an eventual trade or two? Finances, of course.

Because they’re a repeater tax team for the 2026-27 league year, every dollar the Nuggets add to their payroll above the luxury tax line ($200.4 million) results in an exponential increase to their tax bill. In addition to those heightened penalties, the Nuggets will also have to pay harsher luxury tax fees if they finish the season above the second apron. They’re checking both boxes after matching the offer sheet for Jones.

That means an astronomical $68 million tax bill as the roster currently stands, according to ESPN front office expert Bobby Marks. Denver must add at least one more player to have a legal roster. In the unlikely scenario that Watson plays next season on his $6.5 million qualifying offer to become an unrestricted free agent in 2027, Denver’s tax bill would blimp to a record-shattering $112 million — even with such a team-friendly salary. It’s also possible that Watson could sign an extension with the Nuggets at an average annual value three-times more lucrative than the qualifying offer.

The second apron also imposes roster-building penalties. Perhaps most consequential in this case would be the maneuverability of Denver’s 2034 first-round pick. Teams are allowed to trade first-rounders up to seven years in advance, meaning 2034 firsts will generally become trade-eligible next July, when the 2027-28 league year begins. But if the Nuggets finish 2026-27 in the second apron, their 2034 pick would be “frozen” by rule — temporarily forbidden from being traded.

That might not seem important, but for a team in their specific position, it is. The Nuggets are clinging desperately to a win-now timeline with limited resources to meaningfully improve their roster — they’ve burned through all of their trade-eligible future first-round picks already. The 2034 pick could be a vital asset for them at a high-stakes moment; the 2027 offseason is when Nikola Jokic ���������he will sign a long-term extension in Denver. What if they need to make a significant move to show him a 2027-28 roster worthy of contending for the championship before he’s willing to follow through on his word?

Since the 2023 CBA took effect, the second apron has been unpopular with league observers because the roster-building restrictions provide team owners with a convenient non-financial excuse to spend less. It’s not just the Kroenkes. Last season, only the Cleveland Cavaliers finished the season in the second apron. The other 29 teams avoided it.

As things stand, the Nuggets have both financial and basketball reasons to want to avoid this threshold. The only way to do that is via trade, whether this offseason or at the trade deadline next February. They’re $2.03 million over the second apron now.

If they indeed want out, salary-dumping Nnaji looks like the easiest way on paper, but that would require the sacrifice of even more precious draft capital to convince a team to take his poorly perceived contract. And even then, the Nuggets wouldn’t have any room under the apron for a Watson extension, so they would still need to either lose him (via sign-and-trade) or another chunk of salary to make room for him.

That was always the uncomfortable reality, regardless of what happened with Jones. The decision to re-sign him doesn’t change that. But it does indicate that Jones at $6 million per year might be considered more cost-effective by the Nuggets than whatever contract they (hypothetically) choose to shed down the road.

In any case, Denver is directly confronted by the consequences of second apron life now more than ever. The purported lack of a spending mandate is about to be tested.

3. Precedent setter?

Whether or not Jones is worth every bit of that $6 million per year, losing him to Oklahoma City of all teams for nothing in return would’ve been a bad look for Denver.

Burning limited draft assets to get off of Nnaji’s contract to make room for him would be a bad look. Eventually sacrificing a starter-level player to avoid the second apron would be a bad look.

Yet paying the aforementioned tax bill associated with keeping Jones and nearly everyone else from a team that lost in the first round of the playoffs would also be a head-scratcher, if admirable.

All of the outcomes were unsavory as soon as the Thunder laid down that offer sheet. This was and still is a major quagmire for Denver’s front office and ownership group.

Which is why this might become a more common strategy in future offseasons.

Under the rule of this CBA, so many contending teams have been bogged down by the consequences of their contracts that they’re often more vulnerable to offer sheets than ever before. Restricted free agency could be an increasingly viable way for certain teams to take advantage of others. All you need to do is identify another team’s salary cap crunch and make an offer just high enough to make that team squirm a bit.

At the bare minimum in this case, OKC general manager Sam Presti was able to force a rival into an uncomfortable decision after he had dealt with weeks of shedding salary at the behest of his team’s owner. Keeping Jones was a significant triumph for the Nuggets, but offer-sheeting him was at least a minor win for the Thunder as well.

Their championship window has closed. Slammed shut by too many generous contracts.

Dynasties — or even multiple championships — are sabotaged by loyalty.

The Nuggets have become an iceberg in a sea of glaciers. Locked. Wedged. Jammed into a tight spot.

Now the rest of the league is dunking on them.

As it stands, the Nuggets are the only team in the second apron, adding $32 million to their luxury tax bill by matching Oklahoma City’s offer sheet for Spencer Jones.

The Nuggets celebrated the move on social media. Hopefully the party music was so loud they could not hear Thunder GM Sam Presti laughing.

He was playing chess. And the Nuggets were playing battleship.

It fits perfectly in an offseason where every move seems painful and reactionary.

Now, it is fair to wonder if Jokic can trust the organization’s vision going forward.

Lost in Jokic’s charm because of his sense of humor and loose grasp of the English language is his brain.

If you think the player with the highest basketball IQ was not sending a message by not signing a contract extension this summer, it’s time to have your head examined.

We all know Jokic says he wants to finish his career in Denver. That he loves it here. And delaying his next deal will bring him additional money, which clearly matters more to him than most believe.

But is this about his salary when he is in his mid-30s? Or his way of floating a text bubble into the offices of president Josh Kroenke and co-GMs Jon Wallace and Ben Tenzer?

Remove emotion and look at the situation. It is unnerving at best, and nightmarish at worst.

Which brings us back to the Bucks, and the uncomfortable comparisons to the Nuggets.

Milwaukee was a contender from 2018-2024. They won the NBA championship in the 2020-21 season. They have not advanced past the semifinals since, including three straight first-round knockouts before missing the playoffs entirely last season.

The Nuggets claimed their only NBA title in the 2022-23 season. They have since won two postseason series and were pantsed in the opening round by the Timberwolves in May.

The Bucks were positioned to make a pair of strong runs, but injuries to Khris Middleton undermined them.

Sound familiar? The Nuggets thought they had parades in their sights until Aaron Gordon got hurt. When his hamstring and calf issues sprouted, the Nuggets were eliminated by the Thunder and Timberwolves.

As the Bucks failed to reach their past glory, their seasons became a meal of frustration with a side of drama. Giannis Antetokounmpo’s future became a topic. Trade rumors swirled, forever leading to nothing until this offseason, when they became something.

Giannis was agreeable to exiting, steering his way to the Miami Heat. After 13 years in Wisconsin, the Greek Freak was gone to South Beach.

Jokic is entering his 12th season in Denver, and squinting is not required to see the storm clouds hovering. Maybe it is no big deal. But if Denver wins 42 games this season and trades Gordon in February, are we sure Jokic will remain a Nugget for life?

Especially as teams begin making moves to free up salary cap space to trade for him.

This season sets up as a test of health, patience and purpose. The Nuggets need a plan. Leave the loyalty programs to Starbucks and Amazon Prime.

If the Nuggets avoid injuries, as unlikely as that is with aging players, they could contend. But nobody without a KSE email believes they are dethroning the Spurs or the former champion Thunder in the rugged Western Conference.

Their over-under is 49.5 wins, four fewer than last season. They are going the wrong direction. Over the last three seasons, the Bucks posted 49, 48 and 32 victories, bottoming out a year ago.

The Nuggets look like they are on the same track, if only a season behind.

While the salary cap broke the Bucks, it has the Nuggets stuck.

They can’t do anything other than hope a tepid market brings back Peyton Watson on a qualifying offer or modest extension. Unless the Nuggets make a trade to get out of the apron, any sign-and-trade of Watson can only involve picks.

Remember that when dreaming of them getting Ryan Rollins or A.J. Green and a first-rounder from Milwaukee.

Losing Watson, even for value, would be a disaster. They need to bring him back even if they have to execute a salary dump with Cam Johnson or Gordon. They have to get younger.

Watson is exactly the type of player the Nuggets require in a league where the regular season and playoffs feature two different styles of basketball.

He can create his own shot, drain 3s and play with defensive intensity to change momentum, something that was desperately needed when Denver got punked in the Minnesota series.

The Nuggets find themselves in this mess because of the CBA and their own mistakes. In a vacuum, the contract for Gordon (three years, $103.6 million) made sense. However, once Denver decided to reward Mr. Nugget, they needed to become prudent.

They never considered not paying Jamal Murray. But even with his All-Star berth last season, he is not a super max player. And having two on the same team — along with Jokic– is a problem. They doubled down on the mistake by paying Christian Braun with a five-year, $125 million extension.

I liked the deal in a silo. But I thought it meant the Nuggets would ship out Gordon, Murray or Johnson — or two of them — this summer. Instead, they confronted a sobering truth. Gordon has a limited market because he has been hurt too often. And Murray, like Jaylen Brown, is not viewed as valuable to other teams as he is to Denver.

It does not help that Gordon turns 31 in September with bouncy legs that are starting to age like Blake Griffin’s. And that Murray is 29.

The Nuggets did things that are not as easy to criticize. They were not cheap. They rewarded their own. But they did so without a vision for how the puzzle pieces would fit in two years, three years, or longer.

It was like they never considered what would happen if impact players started getting injured.

So this summer, when everything was on the table, has served as a big nothing burger.

The Nuggets have their hands tied because of immovable contracts. And the one they wanted a signature on was kicked down the road until next offseason.

It used to be that Jokic and Giannis were tied together as former MVPs.

Now, it runs deeper, and this offseason is creating uncomfortable thoughts that Jokic might be traded or leave someday.

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Because if this was David Adelman’s idea, the man’s got some serious crown jewels. Nikola Jokic’s coaching staff got a little bit better this week. Although it’s not hrd to imagine that David Adelman’s job security as head coach just got a little bit worse.

, the Nuggets have landed Dave Joerger to be David Adelman’s “coach-in-waiting.” Sorry. To be Adelman’s “co-coach.” Dang it! I meant “lead assistant coach.”

Whatever. If you’ve been pining for a veteran NBA voice with playoff experience to start whispering in Adelman’s ear, Joerger’s your man.

New Dave has served as a head coach or assistant with five NBA franchises since 2007. The 52-year-old Joerger had a fairly successful run as the head man in Memphis from 2013-16 (147-99, three playoff berths) followed by a less successful run right after that in Sacramento (99-148, no playoff appearances), before he hooked onto Doc Rivers’ staffs in Philly and Milwaukee.

Josh Kroenke gave Adelman the dreaded public vote of confidence a few months back after a team built to win it all couldn’t win four games out of seven against a Minnesota roster that was missing Anthony Edwards.

At first blush, hiring Joerger now feels an awful lot like hedging bets with your head coach — and right after a massively disappointing playoff series during which said coach got schooled on about eight different levels by Chris Finch.

The Nuggets will put on their for David and Dave, of course, the same one they wore for years in front of the cameras while Michael Malone and Calvin Booth were snarling at one another behind the scenes.

All is not well when you’re the only NBA franchise swimming in the second apron of the salary cap. Although, on paper, this is the type of tweak that could actually work.

The presumption is that Joerger is boarding the S.S. Kroenke to serve as Adelman’s Vic Fangio, his Vance Joseph. New Dave is regarded as something of a defensive mastermind in hoops circles, although his units’ statistical results over the last decade have been, shall we say, more inconclusive on that assumption.

Joerger’s Grizzlies ranked among the NBA’s top 10 in defensive rating in 2013-14 (103.8 points given up per 100 possessions) and 2014-15 (101.2), only to slip to 20th (107.1) in Year 3, his last in Bluff City. His defenses over three seasons as the head coach in Sacramento checked in at 26th, 27th and 21st, giving up between 110-111 points per 100 possessions.

As an NBA assistant the last three seasons, the defensive variance has largely continued. While working with Rivers, the Bucks ranked No. 12 in defensive rating (112.7) in ’24-25 but dipped to 26th (118.3) this past season.

a fresh set of eyeballs certainly couldn’t hurt. Especially after Minnesota forward Jaden McDaniels so gleefully stuck his fingers in them this past April.

“Go after Jokic, Jamal (Murray), all the bad defenders,” McDaniels infamously offered after his Timberwolves snatched a soul-crushing 119-111 victory at Ball Arena in Game 2 of Denver’s first-round capitulation. “Tim Hardaway (Jr.), Cam Johnson, Aaron Gordon, the whole team. Just go at them. Yeah, they’re all bad defenders.

“They don’t (have) people that can defend the rim. And if (Jokic) is there, we’re still more athletic than them. And (we’ve) just got to be able to finish when we do (get to the rim).”

Did they ever. During a first-round series loss that rattled the Rockies, the Nuggets allowed 29.8 shot attempts in the restricted area — the most of any Western Conference postseason participant, according to NBA.com tracking data. Their 20.5 field goals given up in the restricted area against the Wolves were also rock-bottom in the West bracket.

History says Joerger should help on that front. And help Jokic, Lord willing.

Fun fact: The new Nuggets assistant’s Memphis teams allowed the fewest field-goal tries in the restricted area of any NBA defense (24.9) during the regular season in ’15-16, and ranked second in fewest allowed in ’14-15 (24.4) and ’13-14 (23.9). Joerger’s first two Kings squads as a head coach allowed the fourth-fewest attempts among NBA defenses in the restricted area in ’16-17 (23.9) and the fifth-fewest in ’17-18 (25.1).

Marc Gasol and Zach Randolph then, Jokic and Aaron Gordon now. Hopefully. If New Dave can somehow get Jamal Murray on board with the whole “grit and grind” part of the equation, don’t just give that man an extension. Hand him a Nobel Prize.

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