Ben Tenzer and Jon Wallace had taken a measured and conservative approach in the draft. Instead of selecting a player 26th overall, they had traded back nine spots to acquire two future second-round picks, prioritizing asset accumulation over an immediate gamble on late first-round talent. They were walking away with two new rookies, but the real prize was their mini-stash of draft capital. New trade pieces to be used later. Patience for the sake of future aggression.

Meanwhile, it was time to talk about Peyton Watson.

“We feel good about where that’s at,” Tenzer told reporters, reiterating a recent stance. “And we hope Peyton is here a long time.”

As it turned out, Denver’s draft strategy foreshadowed the eventual outcome for Watson, a restricted free agent whose seven-week stalemate with the Nuggets ended in a sign-and-trade to Cleveland on Aug. 19. Denver relinquished the rights to Watson in exchange for a 2031 unprotected first-round pick and a 2032 second-rounder. The Cavaliers signed a four-year, $88 million contract agreement with the 23-year-old wing, who was drafted 30th overall in 2022.

After four years of gradual development and one brilliant month of exploding star potential, Watson’s time in Denver was over. And the Nuggets hadn’t received a player back in the trade, controversially eroding their roster depth ahead of a pivotal 2026-27 season. After feeling out the market, they viewed Cleveland’s first-round pick as a more valuable asset than any player available to them, team sources told The Denver Post. It’s intended as a trade piece to be cashed in well before 2031. Patience for the sake of future aggression.

But what changed between January, when keeping Watson skyrocketed up the Nuggets’ priority list, and August, when their homegrown success story was cut short? Behind the scenes, several factors contributed to the most significant move of Denver’s 2026 offseason — painting a nuanced picture of why the team decided to move on from Watson after a negotiation that was nearly dead on arrival.

“Stan Kroenke is a shark in the water,” as one league source familiar with the sign-and-trade put it. “So is Rich Paul.”

A salary cap crunch

The Nuggets were always prepared for the likelihood that they would lose at least one starter-level player this summer, as The Post previously reported.

The first time they firmly chose a different player over Watson was Oct. 20, 2025. It was the day before a new season tipped off, and the deadline for teams to sign contract extensions with their 2022 draftees. Watson and Christian Braun were entering the final year of their respective rookie-scale contracts. The Nuggets had enough room for only one of them to be added to the 2026-27 payroll. They were anticipating a salary cap crunch, with four starters already under contract and one of them, Aaron Gordon, set for a $9 million raise.

Signing both Braun and Watson would push Denver’s payroll over the projected second apron ($222 million), triggering not only a historic luxury tax bill for owner Stan Kroenke but also a series of roster-building penalties that would render it immensely difficult to negotiate with other teams and make changes. The front office was already concerned by its shortage of trade-eligible draft capital; finishing 2026-27 in the second apron would cause Denver’s 2034 pick to be “frozen” by rule, temporarily forbidden from being traded.

And so it was Braun or Watson. Braun was far more established — a playoff rotation piece on the 2023 championship team, an NBA Most Improved Player candidate in 2025, a durable 15-point-per-game starter. Watson was a work in progress three years into his career, an upside bet whose role on offense remained ambiguous. Was he a secondary ball-handler? A corner spot-up shooter? A dunker spot heir to Gordon? A screener and roller? The Nuggets were hesitant to offer him an average annual value north of $10 million to $12 million at the time.

They focused instead on their negotiations with Braun. With a vote of approval from Nikola Jokic, they signed the guard to a five-year, $125 million deal, planning to take Watson to restricted free agency — a process that traditionally allows teams to squeeze their incumbent young players. The snub left a sour taste for Watson’s camp.

Watson, who had started his career as a client of the same agency as Jokic, geared up for the offseason by hiring new representation: Klutch Sports founder and super-agent Rich Paul, most famous for representing LeBron James. Then came injuries to Jokic, Braun, Gordon and Cam Johnson. Dismal luck for Denver. Opportunity for Watson. He seized it, amassing stats worthy of an All-Star for one tantalizing month: 22 points per game on 49% shooting.

An injury dispute

As Watson erupted, Denver’s offseason outlook shifted. A starter’s salary would need to be sacrificed if the Nuggets were going to re-sign their young wing and stay out of dreaded second-apron territory. Johnson was widely considered most likely to go at first, because of his relatively modest contract commitment: one more year at $23 million.

But the final memory of a crushing playoff defeat in April was that of Johnson amassing 27 points and eight rebounds in a road elimination game, desperate to save Denver’s season. Watson was watching from the bench, ruled out with a lingering right hamstring injury.

Whether he could have played is still disputed.

The injury first emerged in February, during a thriller at Madison Square Garden. Watson limped off the court and underwent an MRI later in the week, revealing a grade 2 strain, according to league sources. Denver announced he would be reevaluated in four weeks. He missed 19 games over a 45-day absence. In a recent appearance on ex-teammate Michael Porter Jr.’s podcast, Watson claimed that he returned too soon. “I feel like we kind of rushed it,” he said, “and didn’t take the right approach.” He reaggravated the hamstring after five games back in the lineup. April 1 in Utah was his last game as a Nugget.

The playoffs arrived, and then they ended, far sooner than Denver had ever expected. A 54-win team crash-landed in the first round against Minnesota. Over the six-game series, Denver never publicly ruled out the possibility that Watson might return.

Privately, Watson’s camp had decided he wouldn’t play. The exact state of his health might forever remain murky, as it depends on who you ask. The Nuggets felt strongly that Watson could’ve suited up by the end of the series but was slow-playing his return to protect his contract value, five league sources told The Denver Post both during the playoffs and afterward.

Another source close to Watson, however, said that he was in no position to return at any point during the series, and that Paul had intervened to tell Watson it would be unsafe to play on a bad hamstring with free agency on the horizon. Injury reports suggesting that he might be available throughout the series, the source contends, were merely an example of gamesmanship by Denver in a tightly contested series against a rival. Watson’s plan was to return during a potential second-round series if Denver had advanced, he said on Porter’s podcast.

“I just knew I hadn’t progressed far enough in my rehab,” he explained. “I knew that this is the most intense level of basketball.”

In either case, the upcoming contract negotiation was very much a consideration, leaving people at every level of the Nuggets organization frustrated with how the situation was handled, sources told The Post. It stood in contrast to other recent examples of Denver’s players attempting to play through injuries in the playoffs: Braun in 2026, Porter in 2025, Gordon in both years. The source close to Watson said that Gordon was among the people advising him to be careful with his return.

“I was getting shot up with all types of stuff in my shoulder joint every game to try to hoop. … I didn’t really feel like we were deep enough as a team for me to sit out,” Porter said last month during his podcast conversation with Watson. “If that happened before I had gotten paid, I don’t think I would’ve put myself in that position.”

“When you’re dealing with those (soft tissue) injuries, you have to be very careful in your return,” Paul, Watson’s agent, said on recently. “Guys want to play. You have to protect them from themselves in that moment because you’re up for a contract.”

Claiming that organizational trust in Watson had taken a hit, the Nuggets drew a line in the sand at the beginning of free agency. They offered a four-year contract with an ascending salary in the range of $18 million per year, with a team option, multiple league sources said. Whatever reservations the team had, it still thought highly enough of Watson to pursue an extension with him — for the right price. But dependability and maturity were concerns on Denver’s end, while any such assertion was viewed by Watson’s side as a sign of disrespect, casting a shadow over the negotiation. The initial offer was turned down immediately. The Nuggets kept it on the table but never returned with a new one.

A sparse trade market

Even independent of injury squabbles, it’s fairly common for teams to hold a hard line in restricted free agency. They’re often comfortable letting these negotiations turn into staring contests, especially when no outside suitors extend an offer sheet (as Oklahoma City did for Denver’s Spencer Jones). But by the time this particular staring contest unfolded, the Nuggets had already gauged the trade market on other potential sacrifices they could’ve made to keep Watson.

Rival teams eyed Denver’s cap sheet and tried to take advantage of it. Hoping the Nuggets were desperate to avoid the second apron, those teams asked Denver to give up draft picks along with Johnson, multiple sources said. It wasn’t necessarily because Johnson’s contract genuinely has negative value. He ranked eighth in the NBA with a 43% 3-point clip last season. It was a matter of leverage and opportunism. The Nuggets rebuffed any such efforts.

They also received at least one legitimately good offer for the 30-year-old wing, according to a league source. They still turned it down, viewing Johnson as an impactful starter. He was Denver’s third-leading scorer in the Minnesota series, averaging 14.2 points on 50% shooting to finish strong after a checkered regular season.

Meanwhile, the Nuggets and Watson were nowhere close to a contract agreement. Watson’s side had asked for north of $25 million annually at the outset, believing him to be worth more than Braun, who was coming off his worst season. Both sides began to explore sign-and-trade options. Denver took calls from the Clippers, Bucks, Hawks and Trail Blazers.

Nothing gained much traction. Sixth Man of the Year runner-up Jaime Jaquez was floated in preliminary talks with Milwaukee, but those conversations were entirely conceptual — the Bucks never made an official sign-and-trade offer, league sources said. Denver would’ve been intrigued by the possibility of adding him if an offer had materialized.

Kris Dunn was another potential player brought up in conversations with the Clippers, but Denver wouldn’t have agreed to a deal involving the 32-year-old guard without also getting draft capital back from Los Angeles, a source said. Pulling that off would’ve been difficult because for the Nuggets, taking back any salary in a sign-and-trade would hard-cap them at the second apron by rule, meaning they would need to send out another player in addition to Watson. Zeke Nnaji’s $7.5 million salary would’ve made the most sense within the CBA framework, but he has been viewed as a negative-value contract around the league for years at this point; asking a team to give up draft picks, an attractive player and to take on Nnaji’s contract was always going to be an obstacle.

The conversations with Los Angeles and Milwaukee were also in awkward positions from the beginning because of league investigations into cap circumvention involving both teams. The uncertainty of their situations made it difficult for talks to advance past the conceptual stage.

If Watson were to be traded, it was becoming increasingly clear that an entirely pick-based return was both the most feasible path forward and the Nuggets’ preferred outcome, rather than a player who would likely slot into the back end of their rotation.

A change of scenery

Then along came the Cavs. They were the last team to get involved, a surprise late entry to the Watson sweepstakes. In the end, they were also the only team to offer Denver an unprotected first-round pick — a coveted asset with high-lottery potential, if Cleveland’s championship window is closed five years from now. No teams had offered an unprotected first-rounder for the older Johnson when he was available earlier in the summer, league sources said.

Watson’s camp grew increasingly frustrated by how Denver was navigating the summer, especially the team’s perspective on his injury. By the time Cleveland made the $88 million offer, the sense was that Watson’s side would’ve been unlikely to agree to that same offer if it had hypothetically come from the Nuggets, sources connected to both sides told The Post. A change of scenery was preferred at that point.

There was also a question of on-court role that Denver would’ve needed to address if it had increased its offer, two league sources said. Was Watson going to be a starter next season, or did the Nuggets still see him as a bench player behind the same five as last year?

He’s expected to start in Cleveland, where small forward was the last hole to plug in a lineup that reached the Eastern Conference Finals this year. It’s an impressive outcome for Watson, landing on another championship contender for a salary twice what he was worth last offseason. There were hard feelings on the way out of Denver — “anybody who knows Peyton Watson knows the last thing I am is a quitter,” he told Porter — but he also left town with a public message sending thanks to his teammates, the Kroenkes and other Nuggets brass.

“As a young player who was a bit naive and hadn’t seen much of the real world, you guys took care of me better than I could have ever imagined,” he said in an Instagram post Aug. 25. “Thanks for that. Playing this game every night on the national stage is difficult on both the body and the mind, but the love from the fans always makes it so worthwhile. I will miss seeing you at Ball Arena.”

The Nuggets walked away feeling elated by the draft pick they wrangled out of a tough situation. They know well what they gave up: youth, depth, two-way athleticism, scoring upside. Watson’s electrifying hops and friendly personality made him a fan favorite, and he may have been just scratching the surface in January. But one month was always a small sample size to bet $88 million on. After feeling out the market, the Nuggets decided they preferred Johnson’s expiring salary, Spencer Jones’ cheaper extension, and an unprotected first-rounder rather than what they would have had to sacrifice for a long-term relationship with Watson.

Signing DeMar DeRozan to a veteran minimum contract also helps alleviate the short-term sting of what’s been lost, at least offensively.

Anything can change in the NBA overnight, but as of now, Johnson is fully part of the team’s plan for the 2026-27 season, sources told The Post.

A final assessment of the trade for Denver can’t be completed until the next move. Until the Cavaliers’ pick has a new home, and another player has a new home in Denver.

The Nuggets are still thin on trade-eligible picks. They have only the one first-rounder. If they’re out of the second apron by next summer, they’ll add another to their stash. The next stage of the Jokic era depends on whether they can maximize their draft capital better than in past years.

While they wait for that next move, Watson will try to prove them wrong for this one.

Team Grading The Week raised eyebrows and perked up ears a few days back when former Nuggets forward Michael Porter Jr. lamented the break-up/transition/evolution of Denver’s roster over the last five off-seasons. After the ’23 playoffs, and an NBA title, they lost Bruce Brown, a massive contributor off the bench, to free agency. After ’24, they lost wing guard/defensive specialist Kentavious Caldwell-Pope to another free-agent contract. After ’25, they traded away MPJ to the Nets. After ’26, they traded Peyton Watson to the Cavs.

“I don’t know why they let Pope (go),” “That was the beginning of our downfall.”

Downfall? Strong, but can’t disagree, either.

Were the Nuggets’ postseason fades in ’25 and ’26 due entirely to the loss of KCP?

As usual, MPJ was half right.

As Porter himself pointed out, the Nuggets without KCP pushed the eventual NBA champs, the Oklahoma City Thunder, to seven games in the second round of the ’25 postseason — and that was with MPJ able to use only one working shoulder.

Now, in MPJ’s defense, there’s the defense. In the two seasons since Caldwell-Pope’s been gone, the Nuggets’ numbers on the defensive end of the floor have started to crater. Denver ranked 15th in defensive rating during the ’22-23 regular season and No. 8 in ’23-24. With KCP MIA? No. 21 in ’24-25,

As for perimeter defense, per NBA.com, the Nuggets ranked third in fewest opponent 3-point makes allowed in ’22-23 and finished second in fewest allowed in ’23-24 with KCP leading the charge along the perimeter.

The Nuggets two years ago slid to 20th in opponent 3-pointers made in ’24-25 — and ranked 18th in 3-point makes allowed in ’25-26. Save us, Dave Joerger!

MPJ on Nuggets’ “downfall”  — C

Caldwell-Pope was the perfect, spot-up, fourth or fifth option for the Nuggets of ’22-24. On the other hand, that line of KCP thinking brings us back to some of the same revisionist-history stuff that peppers online conversations about Christian Braun.

GTW’s hoops wonks tend to pinpoint the Nuggets’ “downfall” to Game 7 of that fateful, second-round Timberwolves series in the spring of 2024. Which means KCP was still here for the beginning of any “fade,” to be fair.

Again, per NBA tracking data, the veteran stopper was considered to have been “guarding” Minnesota star Anthony Edwards for 39:29 minutes over that crucial seven-game, second-round series two years ago. If you read those 39-and-a-half minutes as the stat line for a single game,

Now, Edwards was unguardable for most of that series, to be fair. But given an assignment that falls under the definition of “You had ONE job,” KCP didn’t really do it, did he?

“We still went Game 7 with Minnesota after (former Nuggets VP) Tim Connolly kind of built Minnesota to try and beat us with the two bigs. Because then you can put KAT (Karl-Anthony Towns) on Joker and you get Rudy Gobert kind of roam.

“So they kind of built that team to try to beat us, and they got us in Game 7.”

Sure did.

The Nuggets overpaid for MPJ, just as they did for Zeke Nnaji. Braun is a wait-and-see who’s left much of Nuggets Nation with a bitter taste in its mouth. The better front offices managed to get value from contracts for future performance, not just to reward past numbers.

According to Basketball-Reference.com, Caldwell-Pope put up a 112 Defensive Rating per 100 opponent possessions two seasons ago, but that went up to 121 per 100 with Memphis in ’25-26. Braun recorded a 118 Defensive Rating (DR) in ’24-25 and a 120 DR per 100 last year. Not KCP good, but catching up.

Porter at least threw a little compliment to the ’26-27 Nuggets while waxing nostalgic.

“It’s like slowly (breaking it up) … but they still can be called (a contender), as long as you got Joker, Jamal, AG (Aaron Gordon),” the former Nugget reflected. “Deebo’s (DeMar DeRozan)’s over there, Cam (Johnson)’s obviously a good player, CB (Christian Braun) … I mean, they’re still good. But we had some camaraderie (among that championship core).”

“It’s honestly good for you, every once in a while, to get punched in the mouth,” the Nuggets guard told me over the weekend at the , home to his summer 2026 youth camp with Flexwork.

“I’ve said it a couple of times. So it’s good for me to personally get written off. It’s probably good for the team to get written off.

“But like I said, I wouldn’t write a (Nuggets) team off that won that many games and has been there, has won a championship, has done all those things. So we’re excited. And obviously, we don’t really care what other people have to say.”

Good thing. The Nuggets have been taking it in the shorts from pundits far and wide ever since they went over the NBA salary cap’s second apron in order to keep Spencer Jones out of the Thunder’s clutches. Tim Hardaway Jr., Jonas Valanciunas, Jalen Pickett and now Peyton Watson are officially out; Marvin Bagley III, Lonnie Walker IV and now DeMar DeRozan are officially in.

“Really excited to play with another All-Star and learn from him,” Braun said of DeRozan.

“I’m always very confident in what our front office does and the team they’ll put together every single year.”

On paper, the Nuggets will go into preseason camp older than a year ago at this time. Maybe wiser. But maybe not, well, better. And in a Western Conference where Oklahoma City’s roster is still loaded and San Antonio’s Victor Wembanyama is only 22 and just getting started, the smart money says the Mile High title window’s about to snap shut on Nikola Jokic’s Hall-of-Fame fingers. That Denver’s become Milwaukee West. No wonder CB can get a little cheesed off when you bring it up.

“I mean, we’re going to add enough pieces, obviously. As long as we have Jok (Jokic), as long as we have Mal (Jamal Murray) and AG (Aaron Gordon) and that staff, we’re always in a really good spot,” Braun countered.

“I’m very confident in us every single year, no matter who we put on the court.  With those guys, we’ve got a chance to win a championship, and that’s what we’re here for — to win championships. So we’re excited. We’ve got everything we need, as long as we have those guys.”

The Core Four is the Core Three now, mind you, and Father Time isn’t doing Nuggets Nation any favors. Gordon turns 31 in September. He played in only 36 games a season ago, as one of the bounciest players in the NBA battled calf and hamstring issues. Murray had a career year (25.4 points per game) and landed a deserved All-Star berth, but shot 35.7% from the floor during that ill-fated first-round playoff loss to Minnesota. Jokic became just the second player in NBA history to average a triple-double over back-to-back campaigns, but shot 44.6% during the postseason. He’s turning 32 in February.

The Nuggets need to get younger, longer and meaner around that veteran trio, and ASAP. All of which puts a little more hot sauce on Braun, a two-way threat who’s 25, rehabbing an injured ankle, and entering the first season of a five-year, $125-million extension. Especially with Watson, CB’s pal, getting traded to the Cavs as part of a five-team swap that landed the Nuggets draft picks in ’31 and ’32. P-Swat (pick 30) and Braun (pick 21) were both Hoovered up in the ’22 draft, and eventually contributed to the franchise’s first NBA title the following spring.

“Very excited for Peyton and everything he accomplished,” Braun said of his former running mate, who landed a four-year, $88-million deal from Cleveland as part of a sign-and-trade.

“I mean, every single day that I’ve been in the NBA, I’ve been with Peyton. Every single day we’ve competed, we’ve competed together. We’ve done everything together. We’ve practiced every day together. We’ve done all the rookie stuff together. So Peyton’s my guy. Me and his guys, his family, his friends have gotten close (with me) over the last four years, obviously. And he’s a guy that obviously supported me at every step. So I’ll do the same for him, always.”

Yet as the Nuggets chose to pay CB and not P-Swat at the end of their respective rookie deals, the former has become  for Nuggets faithful lately; You sort of see what you want to see inside that inkblot. The hot take is that the former Kansas star cashed in — Braun’s got a $21.55 million cap number for ’26-27 — only to promptly fall off his ’24-25 clip in scoring (12.0 points per game last season, down from 15.4 the year before), shooting (30.1% on treys, down from 39.7% the year prior) and defense (120 points allowed per 100 opponent possessions, up from 118 in ’24-25).

But there were caveats, too. For one, CB played hurt last season, and everybody knew it. One of Braun’s strengths is an almost sneaky explosiveness combined with reckless abandon — whether sprinting on run-outs, squirting free on back-door cuts, throwing his body into the paint, or rising high to finish open looks from beyond the arc. Braun tore ligaments in his left ankle last November and wasn’t quite the same after that. He missed 38 games. He spent three weeks wearing a boot. Then he dinged his calf in Game 1 of the Minnesota series. He managed three points in Game 6, as one of the most anticipated seasons in recent Nuggets memory ended with a stunning thud in Minneapolis.

From a 2026 lens, extending Braun while kicking Watson’s can down the road looks like an epic blunder that could cost the Nuggets another title in the Joker’s prime.

But hindsight makes Jerry Wests of us all. If someone told you a year ago that you’d only be able to pay either Watson or Braun the $20-ish million it would take to keep them, eight out of 10 Nuggets fans — probably more — would’ve given the money to the latter. Without hesitation.

Basketball-Reference.com tracks a stat called “Box score Plus/Minus,” or BPM — which, in simplest terms, measures points per 100 possessions a player accounts for in a game above that of an average player. Braun put up a +0.1 BPM score or better in 41 of 78 appearances (53%) during the ’24-25 season, and posted a BPM net-positive score in 19 of 51 (37%) career postseason appearances. Watson, by contrast, registered an +0.1 BPM in 23 of 68 appearances (33.8%) in ’24-25 and posted nine net-positive BPM games out of 29 playoff tilts (31%).

It’s fine to fault the Nuggets front office for not seeing 2026 Watson coming. But while it’s OK to talk about ancient history, it’s a weak look to keep revising that history to fit the narratives of the present.

Your buddy with the season tickets might not have given Braun $20 million a year ago, but he would’ve laughed you out of the bar if you’d suggested doing the same for P-Swat last August. And if he says otherwise, he’s lying.

That said, it also behooves Braun to get back on track, fair or not. If Watson becomes an All-Star in the East, Nuggets Nation won’t let No. 0 in blue hear the end of it.

And they need him. Now more than ever. Since the spring of ’24, the Nuggets are 10-4 in the postseason when Braun scores in double digits and 6-12 when he doesn’t. That’s an awful lot of pressure on one left ankle.

“Yeah, I think we’re going to put it in the past, and it’s not something I want to talk about anymore,” Braun said of last year’s injuries. “I’ve worked extremely hard to get past it and will continue to work on it, and (it’s) something that will continue to develop, continue to get better. So I’m not too worried about what other people have to say about it.

“I know who I am and the player I am. I know I’ll bounce back and be right where I need to be next year.”

From a financial standpoint, it made sense to let Peyton Watson move on, convinced he is not worth the four-year, $88-million contract Cleveland gave him. The Nuggets remain the only team in the second apron. So they were not going to pay Watson.

The problem is that the entire offseason has been lost in translation. The Nuggets appear detached from reality, lacking a clear direction.

One day, they are going for it, matching Oklahoma City’s $11.75 million offer sheet for Spencer Jones, a move that spiked their luxury tax bill by $32 million. The next, they are driving Watson to the airport in exchange for Julian Reese, who will be waived, and a 2031 first-round draft pick and a second-rounder in 2032. 

The first person who can articulate the Nuggets’ plan this summer gets free tickets to Elitch’s and a game-used ice pack and Ace bandage signed by Aaron Gordon.

Unless the Nuggets believed Watson quit in the playoffs — he was officially out with a hamstring injury — then they should have kept him. A disgruntled Watson playing on the qualifying offer is better than what this multi-team, money-laundering deal delivered.

The Nuggets needed Watson’s athleticism, his two-way skillset, his ability to create off the dribble. They provided runway to prove himself when Jokic missed 16 games, and their reward is a cheesy Hotels.com commercial and the bile taste in their mouth every time they realize Zeke Nnaji remains on the roster. 

I would have loved to see Nikola Jokic’s reaction to this move. “So let me get this straight. We got no players. And the draft picks are available when I am 36 and 37 years old?” 

It is a failure.

There is no argument to construct otherwise, save for intel that Watson, 23, could have played in the postseason and staged Operation Shutdown. Eyebrows were raised in April when Gordon was dragging himself up and down the court on one leg, and Watson was watching from the bench.

He played on April 1. And that was it. There was talk that he was working his way back. That he was practicing. Then he wasn’t.

I don’t know what happened. I know the Nuggets’ chances of beating the Timberwolves nose-dived without him.

So after a game of chicken, of the market not responding to Watson, the Nuggets chose the easy way out. Fine. Then, why not demand that Cleveland include Jaylon Tyson in the deal?

For those saying the Nuggets had no other choice because the luxury tax bill would have exceeded $200 million. That is not the case. They could have shipped out Cam Johnson early in the offseason, leaving room to absorb Watson’s new contract.

As depressing as it sounds, it would have been easier to stomach a bad deal for Johnson than Watson. Watson was their guy. They drafted him. They developed him. They deserved to benefit from a few prime years.

Instead, they get to flash fake smiles that they love Christian Braun — hopefully he bounces back from his ankle injury — Julian Strawther and DaRon Holmes II.

Is it possible for the Nuggets to rehire Calvin Booth so they can fire him again?

In an offseason that demanded improvement given the upper crust in the Western Conference — San Antonio, Oklahoma City, Minnesota — the Nuggets lacked creativity and imagination.

They brought the band back. This was admirable a year ago. Not this summer.

Jamal Murray, Jokic, Gordon and Johnson are terrific — when healthy.  Murray, Jokic, Gordon and Johnson are dynamic — when available.

Sequels rarely live up to expectations. And as Hollywood themes go, the Nuggets are giving off tiki idol Brady Bunch vibes. 

Sure, they could use the first-rounder to acquire a better player than Watson. But the way this offseason has transpired, it is more likely they attach the pick to move Nnaji.

According to reports, the Nuggets have turned their attention to signing free agent DeMar DeRozan. He is 37.

When Josh Kroenke said everything was on the table at the end of the season presser, did he mean Bengay, heating pads, insoles and arch supports?

DeRozan can still score. But not sure if you are aware, putting the ball in the basket is not the Nuggets’ problem. Preventing it from going in is the issue.

I am not going to bore you with the apron problems the Nuggets are facing. The NBA demands that fans be CPAs to understand the salary cap.

However, one thing is easy to see. By not going for it — and keeping Spencer Jones and signing DeRozan does not qualify — they are wasting another year of Jokic’s prime.

What makes this different is that he could leave this time.

When Jokic did not agree to a contract extension, kicking the can down the road again, it means he can sign a $359.5 million contract extension next summer. That would be the largest in league history and bring his career earnings within squinting distance of one billion.

Jokic clearly likes money. Not as much as horses. But his affection for the dollar is real. Good for him. And no one can pay him more than Denver.

But his future is now a story as the Nuggets more closely resemble the unraveling of the Bucks in the last years of Giannis Antetokounmpo than the championship team of 2023.

In some ways, the bloated contracts made this a likely conclusion.

But barring Watson bailing on his teammates, the Nuggets are not better without him.

At the very least, they needed to make sure they didn’t lose their top priority of the offseason for nothing in return.

The Nuggets are sending Watson to Cleveland for a 2031 first-round pick and a 2032 second-rounder, two league sources told The Denver Post on Wednesday, confirming . Watson has agreed to a four-year, $88 million contract with the Cavaliers as part of a multi-team sign-and-trade that won’t be officially completed Wednesday night, as it grows to include other transactions around the league, according to a Nuggets team source.

Cleveland is sending Max Strus to the Clippers and Tre Mann to the Wizards, while Washington sends Cam Whitmore to Cleveland and Julian Reese to Denver, according to Charania. Reese, who was on a two-way contract, will be waived.

Essentially, the Nuggets aren’t getting any players back, leaving them with two open roster spots and a payroll about $2 million over the second apron. The crux of the deal for Denver is the draft compensation, picking up one trade-eligible first-round pick. The 2032 second-round pick acquired in the trade is Sacramento’s.

By not taking any salary back in the trade despite their urgent championship window with Nikola Jokic entering a potential contract year, the Nuggets have signaled their intent is to avoid an astronomical luxury tax bill next season — and possibly to shed even more salary and evade the second apron. Retaining Watson without a subsequent cost-cutting trade would’ve resulted in a record tax bill.

Watson became a restricted free agent on June 30 with the expiration of his four-year, rookie-scale contract, meaning the Nuggets had the ability to retain him by matching any offer sheet he might’ve received from an outside suitor.

That gave them negotiating leverage when no such offer arrived at Watson’s doorstep during the busiest weeks of free agency. It’s rare for lucrative offer sheets to be extended in the NBA, and even rarer for them to go unmatched. When Warriors center Quentin Post joined Memphis last month for three years and $30 million, he became the first restricted free agent to depart his team for an offer sheet since Bogdan Bogdanovic in 2020.

More commonly, sign-and-trades function as a release valve for teams that can’t agree on a salary range with their restricted free agents. Watson’s camp, according to a league source, was seeking well north of $20 million per year, an average annual value that Denver didn’t feel comfortable meeting despite Watson’s breakout fourth season. The 6-foot-8 wing averaged 14.6 points, 4.9 rebounds and 2.1 assists on 49.1% shooting and 41.1% from 3-point range.

Most of his production occurred in a key four-week stretch when the Nuggets were missing Jokic, the central hub of their offense. They were in dire need of shot creation off the dribble, and Watson stepped up, averaging an efficient 22.5 points over 17 games. But shortly after Jokic returned, Watson suffered a hamstring strain on Feb. 4 in New York.

He missed the remainder of the season except for a five-game stint in which he tried to return but was physically limited. He didn’t play in Denver’s playoff series against Minnesota, a six-game defeat.

The Nuggets drafted Watson with the 30th overall pick out of UCLA in 2022. He was a member of their 2023 championship team, though he spent most of that season developing in the G League. Denver chose to prioritize his fellow 2022 draftee, Christian Braun, when both players were eligible for a contract extension last preseason. Braun signed a five-year, $125 million deal. Watson went into a contract year staring down an uncertain future.

“From what I understand, it was just a financial business decision (for the Nuggets). Obviously, with the new CBA and the second apron, things of that nature, they wanted to stay out of that,” Watson told The Denver Post at the time. “As a business, you’ve gotta operate (based on) what����ap best for your business. And when it comes time for me to make my decision next summer, I’ve gotta operate as a business myself. That����ap no diss to the Nuggets. That����ap no diss to the Kroenkes.”

“If he has a great year, he can put himself where he wants to,” Nuggets coach David Adelman said before opening day last October. “That����ap what our league is about. You prove it every day. You prove it every year. … He can set his market, and I think he will.”

Watson’s best pro season coincided with Braun’s worst. As the 23-year-old gradually assumed a larger role, he hired Klutch Sports and superagent Rich Paul to represent him in restricted free agency. The Nuggets signaled to other teams that they were prepared to match any offer sheet for Watson, hoping to scare away a market that was already thin. The Nets, Bulls, Lakers and eventually the Clippers were the only teams with the available cap space to seriously threaten Denver.

None of them came forward in recent weeks. As contract negotiations between Watson and Denver stalled, the Nuggets began to explore the sign-and-trade market, a league source told The Post. They felt comfortable with the possibility of an extended negotiation if no suitable trades materialized. The team already has heavy financial investments in Jokic, Jamal Murray and Aaron Gordon. Signing Watson for the contract he received from Cleveland would’ve caused Denver’s 2026-27 roster payroll to spike more than $20 million into second apron territory, where the Kroenkes have never ventured before this offseason.

Watson ends his tenure with the franchise that drafted him having played 225 games. He started 64 of those games and also appeared in 29 playoff contests.

After developing from a late first-round pick into a viable rotation player, the Nuggets have transformed him back into a future first-rounder, plus a second-round footnote — trade assets that could be used much sooner than the 2030s.

How did they get into this payroll dilemma, and which decision over the last few years is most responsible for it? Which contract or trade has limited their roster-building flexibility most in hindsight?

There was the Michael Porter Jr. extension inked by former general manager Tim Connelly, which will end up paying Porter $179.3 million over five seasons. Two front office regimes later, it cost the Nuggets an unprotected first-round pick to free themselves from the last two years of that contract.

Then there was the Zeke Nnaji extension in 2023, a four-year, $32 million deal that proved to be one of the defining transactions of Calvin Booth’s tenure. Halfway through the term of that contract now and six years into his career, Nnaji still hasn’t solidified himself as a reliable rotation player, rendering him almost impossible to trade. The roster’s sixth-highest salary was seated on the bench for almost the entirety of Denver’s first-round playoff defeat in April.

There was the two-year Reggie Jackson contract that used up Denver’s taxpayer mid-level exception, curiously included a player option and eventually forced Booth to cough up three future second-round picks to salary-dump the veteran point guard. And there was the decision to trade away another three second-round picks to move up six spots in the 2024 draft for a non-lottery prospect who hasn’t panned out yet. And the long-term commitments made to Aaron Gordon and Jamal Murray, who will make a combined 50% of the salary cap next season.

Now it’s Christian Braun’s five-year, $125 million deal — the first extension handed out by lead executives Jon Wallace and Ben Tenzer — that has emerged as the latest lightning rod among Nuggets fans, mostly because of who didn’t get extended as a result. Peyton Watson and Denver are stuck in a negotiating stalemate this summer, while the trade value of Braun’s new contract has been heavily scrutinized following a down year for the shooting guard.

Keeping the band together

The truth, of course, is that Denver’s sticky second-apron situation is the sum of all those moves, not a direct consequence of one of them. It’s also the price that every championship team seems to pay for success under the rule of the 2023 collective bargaining agreement. Just this summer, Knicks owner James Dolan declared “you’d have to be suicidal” to spend over the second apron as his team was trying to bask in the afterglow of a dominant title run. Sure enough, New York let Mitchell Robinson walk in free agency — then watched as the 2025 champions (OKC) salary-dumped three players for the same reason Dolan outlined.

“This was a financial decision,” Thunder general manager Sam Presti told the Oklahoman in a surprisingly blunt on-the-record confession after trading Lu Dort, Isaiah Joe and Aaron Wiggins.

As soon as confetti rained on the Nuggets in 2023, every key player who had contributed to the historic scene at Ball Arena suddenly became more expensive. For those who were part of the front office’s long-term vision, their importance to the franchise would show on their next contract. Denver’s margin for error in roster construction shrank to near-zero in that moment.

The Nuggets have been reckoning with that margin for error for three years now, a period in which their contract extensions have also revealed a stubborn (perhaps even admirable) determination to win again with as many of those key players as possible — the sentimentality of a seemingly bygone era.

It’s getting increasingly difficult to keep those players. If Denver eventually manages to re-sign Watson, the 23-year-old wing might prove to be more expensive than just the dollar amount of his extension.

As all of this apron tension bubbles closer to the surface, so does the question of how Denver plans to get out of this before it gets worse. If Nikola Jokic stays true to his word, he’ll sign the most lucrative contract in NBA history next summer to remain a Nugget. Building around that contract and remaining a serious championship contender into Jokic’s late 30s will the long-term challenge for Wallace and Tenzer. If they’re also building around several other expensive salaries, their flexibility will continue to be hindered.

Is a more dramatic roster overhaul looming in the near future?

Pricey pairs

One transaction earlier this offseason was particularly illuminating as a possible precedent-setter. At the very least, it’s a relevant, if controversial, move for teams like Denver to study.

The Jaylen Brown trade.

Before the Celtics shockingly shipped him off to Philadelphia for Paul George and picks, The Denver Post outlined the uncanny similarities between Brown’s status in Boston and Jamal Murray’s in Denver.

Both were drafted in 2016, four picks apart; they’ve enjoyed arguably the two best pro careers in their draft class. Both were instrumental in their teams’ slow and steady ascents from the basement of the league to its pinnacle. Both demonstrated the qualities of a playoff riser as the No. 2 option on a championship squad nearly a decade into their careers. Both turn 30 next season. Both have three years remaining on their current max contracts (Brown’s is a supermax), with no player or team options.

All the discourse this summer surrounding Brown’s impact on winning, or lack thereof, has existed within the unspoken context of the CBA. The argument against him isn’t that analytics view him as a bad player. It����ap that analytics suggest he’s not worth an average annual value of $61.7 million for the next three seasons. It’s a good old-fashioned “Moneyball” case study. Especially with Celtics co-star Jayson Tatum already taking up 35% of the salary cap on his own supermax contract.

“The path looked a little bit more challenging with 70% of our cap and such a high percent of our usage tied into two players,” Boston executive Brad Stevens said in July.

And that’s before considering the contract extension dynamics with an entrenched star like Brown, who might’ve believed he was owed another max offer by Boston as a gesture of respect. Trading him wasn’t only about his salary for the next three years; it was also a clear admission by Stevens that he didn’t want Brown occupying 35% of the cap at 35 years old. Hence Boston’s willingness to take back Paul George in the deal — another bloated salary ($55 million on average for two more years), but one that doesn’t carry the baggage of a 10-year relationship, of expectations for more long-term commitment.

George will be 38 next time he’s a free agent, assuming he picks up his player option next summer. It’s widely understood that if he signs another NBA contract, it will be for much less money.

Two months ago, Murray became eligible for a 35% supermax extension for the first time in his career by making an All-NBA team. (His current max contract is worth 30% of the cap.) Will he expect Denver to offer him that when the time comes, and will the Nuggets want to pay that much for a secondary star in his mid-30s? Will they even want to commit 30% of the cap to him for another chunk of years, with Jokic already on a supermax? The Celtics didn’t.

And the Celtics chose to get out in front of it, knowing the optics and knowing the risk. Stevens candidly acknowledged to reporters that his decision could age poorly.

Even through a short-term lens, the widely respected GM did make a salient point about trying to win with two max players in a restrictive system.

These are the two most expensive salaries on every NBA team entering the 2026-27 season:

The last eight teams to reach the NBA Finals did so with their two most expensive players occupying 60% or less of the cap.

2026: Knicks (59.9%) vs. Spurs (41.8%)

2025: Thunder (46.9%) vs. Pacers (60%)

2024: Celtics (54.1%) vs. Mavericks (57.4%)

2023: Nuggets (52.8%) vs. Heat (55%)

Can the Nuggets be an outlier?

The defining transaction behind New York’s championship was Jalen Brunson’s decision to sacrifice millions of dollars on his most recent contract; the Knicks were able to build a more complete starting lineup and a deeper bench with their best player earning the third-most in salary

It’s notable that their highest-paid player, Karl-Anthony Towns, is currently extension-eligible but hasn’t signed. Brunson probably isn’t going to give Dolan another bargain on his next extension. The Knicks must now operate under the assumption that Brunson will be playing on a supermax in the next couple of years. Planning accordingly means playing hardball with KAT — or trading him.

The Spurs have similarly capitalized on a mini-window with Victor Wembanyama on his rookie-scale contract. It gets trickier in 2027-28, but even then, Wembanyama gave them a minor discount. He and De’Aaron Fox will make a combined 55.7% that season.

The Thunder won with Chet Holmgren and Jalen Williams both on rookie deals. Now, those two have 25% max extensions taking effect this season, which should suffice as a viable payroll structure for at least one more year. Then in 2027, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander’s supermax kicks in, and the top-heavy cap sheet gets dicey.

Boston won the year before Brown’s supermax took effect (and two years before Tatum’s). Denver won the year before Jokic’s took effect (and three before Murray’s 30% max). The similarities hardly feel coincidental.

By all of this logic, the top eight teams listed above are automatically disqualified from contention for the 2027 championship (including Boston, ironically). That would explain why Stevens was willing to trade a franchise cornerstone to a rival of all teams. Philadelphia already had a supermax player on the books, plus Tyrese Maxey making $40 million. Now the 76ers have the exact payroll structure that Boston seemingly wanted to avoid. The problem is that they also have VJ Edgecombe on a rookie deal and LeBron James for $3.9 million.

The real overarching lesson could be this: If a team is going to pay two players an exorbitant amount of finite money, it had better be supremely confident that those two players are a perfect fit together.

Of all the duos near the top of that 2026-27 chart, Jokic and Murray have proven themselves more worthy of a combined 66% cap hit than anyone else. They’re the only tandem in the top six with more than 60 games played together. Embiid and Brown; Tatum and George; Antetokounmpo and Adebayo; and Davis and Young are all brand-new pairings.

As long as Denver’s front office remains confident that Jokic and Murray’s offensive chemistry transcends their defensive shortcomings, maybe that’ll be enough to buoy their partnership. Maybe the belief will persist in Denver that Murray and Jokic can be an outlier.

Or maybe Stevens’ words will ring true with the Nuggets, and they’ll eventually feel forced to press the red button on their loyal payroll structure.

Sean Keeler: If Klutch wanted to play the “long” game, mission accomplished. But the money game? Brick city, baby. The Nuggets have almost all the cards now. The Bulls passed. The Lakers passed. The Hawks passed. If hoops insiders told us on June 30 that a reported $70 million offer over five years was the best money Watson would have on the table all summer, we’d have laughed them out of the room. And yet — here we are, almost six weeks later, and it’s still topping the leaderboard. Who’s laughing now? It ain’t Klutch, I promise you that.

Renck: Agents get paid to get clients paid. Klutch Sports made Watson feel important this summer. His show pony events included attending the ESPYs and enjoying the suite life at a World Cup game. But the money never matched his growing profile, and that stings. Teams that made sense, like the Lakers and Bulls, spent their money elsewhere. The Bucks and Clippers are confirmed suitors, but neither appears willing to provide a lucrative offer sheet. That falls back on the agent. The Nuggets are winning this game of chicken. There has been speculation that Watson could return to Denver on the $6.5 million qualifying offer, making an enormous bet on himself to cash in as a true free agent after the season. It demonstrates how little leverage Watson has left. Without an offer sheet for Watson, the Nuggets can exercise patience. But there are no winners if the Nuggets’ purpose is not to keep Watson long-term.

Keeler: No, and you do wonder what effect that has on the locker room, even on a short-term basis. There’s no “i” in “Nuggets,” but there are multiple “g”s — and feelings can be hurt when money’s involved. Both sides have to make cold, impersonal business decisions. It’s a tricky balance. The Nuggets have spent liberally on the parts of their core they really, really like, and being the one piece they’re not spending liberally on does send a message. But I understand management’s play here. According to Basketball-Reference.com, the NBA player whose most recent four-year career run most closely matches P-Swat’s is Guess what Green makes? Roughly $14.6 million — which is about what the Nuggets have offered Watson.

Renck: Klutch Sports has real gravitas. The agency, however, is not clairvoyant. They have missed on a few restricted clients, leading to standoffs. And this is not what they expected for Watson. If Watson shows a willingness to play on the qualifying offer, he can pressure the Nuggets to avoid this embarrassment. Is it enough to make them blink? Not likely. With the offer sheets not budging for now, the easy solution is for the Nuggets to avoid a sign-and-trade for picks or a player they don’t really want and offer Watson $20 million per season. The problem? If Klutch Sports promised Watson $25-million plus — more than Christian Braun, of course — then they would have to admit they misread the market. Don’t count on it.

Keeler: “Cede” is a four-letter word in agent circles. So is “quit,” and “cave.” But Klutch is going to have to come up with something insanely clutch to pull a win out of this one. Watson is a fun, rangy, athletic talent, the kind you wish the Nuggets could find more of — a true development success story. But he’s not a proven $30-million player (yet), and the rest of the league knows it. How much did not playing in the postseason, when the Nuggets could’ve really used him, hurt his stock? That’s the question on the mind of more than a few Nuggets fans right now. Based on the last two months, it’s clearly been on the mind of more than a few front offices, too.

Crazy eyes. Brows in attack mode. Nostrils burning like sparklers at an Independence Day picnic. A grown man who’s not gonna take this bleep anymore.

You think the Nuggets would ever sit on their hands over the summer — any summer — if the Joker went at ownership the way a black bear goes at an Arby’s dumpster?

Pay for Peyton Watson, or I walk.

Find us a backup ball-handler besides Tyus Jones, or I’m going house-hunting in Brentwood with Luka Doncic.

“My idea and desire is to stay in Denver. I’ll probably sign (an extension) next year,” Jokic told reporters in Serbian last month after a FIBA World Cup qualifier. “My desire is to play the rest of my life in Denver.”

No, no, no, dude! Angrier! Pretend Lu Dort just stole Delicious Gar! Hulk smash!

The Kroenkes got lucky about 17 different ways with Jokic, didn’t they?  Especially the part about how the best-passing center in the history of the NBA also happens to be a very nice guy. Unless, of course, you stick your leg out to try and trip him.

The basketball gods will never shine on Nuggets owner Stan Kroenke and team president Josh Kroenke again the way they did with the Joker. Ever. And they know it.

You sometimes wonder if they take advantage of it, too.

The way the Nuggets botched their roster-building — the Zeke Nnaji contract and Reggie Jackson-to-Charlotte trade providing the nadir — around Jokic, most NBA icons, by now, would’ve fled our fair landlocked shores. Or kicked up enough red rocks that management started to get the hint.

But that’s not Nikola. An NBA flyover franchise in a proud, provincial, hard-working, no-frills, blue-collar town bags a proud, provincial, hard-working, no-frills, blue-collar gem in the second round of the 2014 draft. A star falls from the sky and lands in your lap while ESPN’s busy cutting away to a Taco Bell commercial. The greatest player in Nuggets history, more often than not, still acts as if he’s just happy to be rolling with the fellas. From his origin story onward, the Joker has become the super-hero movie long-suffering Front Range fans deserved.

, brother, sequels are awfully hard to pull off. We’ve entered the “Nobody Repeats!” phase of 21st-century NBA history, with eight different franchises — including Denver in 2023 — winning league titles over the last eight seasons.

It’s as if the Nuggets, like Icarus, flew too close to the sun, and the league’s Collective Bargaining Agreement has spent the last two years melting the wax on their wings.

They’re the only franchise over They’re in a staring contest with Watson, a restricted free agent, that could last until September. Three-point specialist Tim Hardaway Jr. bolted for Miami and backup center Jonas Valanciunas went back to Europe.

Unless the Kroenkes are willing to eat some serious tax money, the franchise is probably going to have to try to trade — and without much leverage — one of wing guards Watson, Cameron Johnson ($23.1 million cap number for 2026-27) or Christian Braun ($21.5 million) to balance the books. Bruce Brown looks like a long shot to return.

If you’re the Joker, is this how you envision spending the winter of a Hall-of-Fame career? Hey, I want Jokic, 31, to retire a Nugget as much as the next fella. Given that he’s still, at heart, a small-town guy with a small-town franchise, the smart money still says he’s not going anywhere.

But we’re talking serious money, too. Jokic could’ve signed a four-year, $278-million supermax contract extension this summer. Instead, he says he’d prefer to kick that gold-plated can to next summer, when he’s eligible for a whopping $359.5 million over five seasons — the largest in NBA history.

What did he say in that second sentence, though? Probably.

Which means between now and next June, the Nuggets have to show him something. Something besides Stan’s checkbook, at any rate.

“I think this team is stacked, still,” NBC/Peacock insider Grant Liffmann, who spent three seasons in the Atlanta Hawks’ front office, told me recently. “He’s a top-5 player in the league. Any team that has a top-5 player in the league has a chance to win a championship every single year, right? And he was the top player in the world pretty much the last five years.”

He was, which is why it feels as if the Nuggets’ title window was 2019-2024. That the S.S. Larry O’Brien just sailed. We just don’t know it yet. Or don’t want to admit it.

Half-full view: They snatched one ring. And it was glorious. A hazy fever dream of confetti and cigar smoke, the time of our lives. The ’23 Finals were over in five games. The Heat rolled over so quickly, we barely had time to savor the moment.

Half-empty: They should’ve won at least two. And we’re one day all going to look back at the fall of 2023 through the spring of 2025 and grimace.

Game 7 against the Timberwolves in 2024 is going to loom larger and larger in Nuggets nightmares. If you don’t blow a 20-point second-half lead to a hated rival, at home, you take care of Dallas in the next round. Then you take out Boston, which didn’t want to play you, in the NBA Finals. Jokic is a back-to-back champ, and even Kendrick Perkins bows down.

Didn’t happen. And now you wonder where No. 2 is going to come from. And when.

Meanwhile, on paper, Denver’s depth is down a peg — maybe several — off the roster it built last summer. Lonnie Walker IV is here, though. So’s Marvin Bagley III. Even if the Nuggets don’t win a division, at least they’ll lead the Northwest in Roman numerals. Is that enough to convince Joker to stay put?

“It’s a great question,” Pete Babcock, the Nuggets’ GM from 1985-90, told me over the phone. “I think when you’re building a team, or you’re trying to maintain a team at a certain level, if you have a key player that you’re building around, to keep that player, you’ve got to really demonstrate that you are building around them, so that they feel like there’s a chance to win another championship.

“I mean, as an outsider looking in, if you got a player like Jokic, I would assume his decision is going to be based on what he sees around him. And if it feels like there’s a supporting cast of teammates that complement him, and help him be successful, then I think he probably stays put.”

Probably. In the meantime, though, you might want to mute anyone you follow on Xwitter that has Lakers ties for the next 10 months or so. Or friends with Lakers ties.

The NBA’s got more leakers than the Pentagon, and the whispers are already circulating that teams are working to clear cap room for next June so they can make a serious play for the best player on the planet. Including one franchise whose home is just a few steps from the

“I cannot stress enough how much the title window is absolutely open for this (Nuggets) team,” Liffmann said. “I would consider them a top-5 title contender next year.”

Unfortunately, the West’s top two contenders, the Thunder and Spurs, keep stealing everybody else’s lunch. This isn’t an Arby’s, sir. If Jokic wants to pop champagne again on this side of the pond, he needs to have a word with the manager. And no time like the present.

Nonetheless, it is one of the noisiest lingering NBA storylines of the summer — mostly because Watson is in a tight spot. After attempting to set his average annual value north of $25 million, the 23-year-old wing was unable to obtain an offer sheet from any of the three teams with salary cap space at the beginning of the offseason. The Lakers, Nets and Bulls went about their business without throwing their hat into the ring for Watson. Los Angeles even chose to aggressively pursue a different restricted free agent instead. Basically, Watson’s representation tested the market, and the market didn’t respond.

That doesn’t mean he’s not viewed as a valuable player. It just means he had limited pathways to a lucrative offer given the league’s financial landscape, and the few teams with the resources to extend one decided against it because of other roster priorities or the risk of it being a waste of time. The Nuggets would’ve had up to 48 hours to match any offer sheet, as they eventually did to keep fellow restricted free agent Spencer Jones.

An offer sheet is highly unlikely at this point because most of the money has dried up around the NBA. That’s good news for Denver; not so much for Watson. Now for him to get paid, his camp must either come to the negotiating table — there’s no indication that Denver’s offers to this point have exceeded $20 million annually — or convince another team that Watson is worth not only what he desires financially but also a trade package that will satisfy Denver.

This is the cruel reality of restricted free agency. It’s designed to favor the incumbent team. The Nuggets effectively have the rights to Watson, their 2022 late first-round draft pick who revealed glimpses of star potential in his fourth season. Playing the long game has positioned them to benefit from this process in some form, regardless of the outcome.

But what are the remaining outcomes, and what do they mean? As the awkward situation drags out and Watson’s side is left feeling increasingly disrespected, here’s a breakdown of the three main possibilities.

Sign-and-trade

Let’s start with the complicated stuff. Most of the recent national speculation about Watson has been focused on the possibility of a sign-and-trade. This is probably the preferred outcome for his camp at this point, because it’s the clearest path to a higher salary.

For the Nuggets, it functions as a solid contingency plan if they decide the negotiation is a lost cause. While they’re certainly in a position to squeeze Watson down to a more team-friendly contract extension, they’re in a position to flip him for other assets by the same token; they can make another suitor pay them for the right to sign Watson. He’s a young two-way wing who seems to be on an upward trajectory as a shot creator. Every team wants that, for the right price.

The dilemma with this option is purely logistical. Denver’s payroll — already the most expensive in the league without Watson on the books — is $2 million over the second apron. That presents more than just a financial obstacle. Among the many convoluted rules of the NBA apron system is this: If a team takes back any salary in a sign-and-trade, that team becomes hard-capped at the second apron for the remainder of the league year. You can be over the second apron before executing the sign-and-trade, but you must be under the apron when the transaction is completed. Otherwise, it is not legal under the collective bargaining agreement.

In the Nuggets’ case, that means if they want to receive a player in return for Watson, they have to send a second player out in the sign-and-trade, and the incoming player must have a 2026-27 cap hit $2 million less than the second outgoing player. (Keep in mind that Watson’s outgoing salary for trade purposes would be $0, given that trading him would not be getting rid of any money that already exists on Denver’s payroll; it would merely be getting rid of the rights to a free agent.)

Still following? This introduces all kinds of problems. Who’s the second player? If it’s a bigger contract like Cam Johnson or Christian Braun to create more wiggle room on the incoming salary, you’re suddenly giving up two starter-level players, not just one. If it’s Zeke Nnaji’s $7.5 million cap hit, which is considered a negative-value contract around the league, then you’re willingly diluting the quality of your return. And if the Nuggets find themselves deciding to trade Watson, they must net a substantial return.

The easier sign-and-trade concept to grasp is an entirely picks-based package — Denver could simply try to obtain as much draft capital as possible for Watson, without taking back a player. As counterproductive as that sounds for a win-now team, it would have its merits. Since the draft in June, the Nuggets have been trying to replenish their war chest of future picks so they can eventually flip those picks back into win-now players at the right time. They’re currently operating without a single trade-eligible first-round pick, preventing them from pursuing prominent players on the trade market. They have very little maneuverability, unlike other Western Conference contenders (OKC, San Antonio).

A picks-based package has its own difficulties, of course. One of the teams actively showing interest in Watson, a league source confirmed to The Post, is Milwaukee. The Bucks officially embraced a rebuild six weeks ago when they traded Giannis Antetokounmpo. Even if Watson makes sense for them as a long-term building block, teams in their position don’t traditionally cough up first-round picks to acquire a player. Denver’s best hope of completing a solid deal with Milwaukee would more likely need to involve one of the Bucks’ young players, such as Ryan Rollins, Jaime Jaquez Jr. or Kasparas Jakucionas.

The Clippers, Cavaliers and Hawks have been the other teams to reportedly engage the Nuggets in sign-and-trade talks. The Clippers, whose interest The Post can also confirm, would make sense as a desirable destination for Watson; they play in his hometown. Derrick Jones Jr. has been floated as a return candidate for Denver, but his $10.5 million salary complicates matters, as it’s more than Nnaji’s cap figure. Kris Dunn’s $5.7 million is closer to the potential sweet spot.

Denver could technically avoid a second apron hard cap by splitting a sign-and-trade into multiple transactions — Watson for picks, then a separate player-for-player deal. But even in that scenario, the apron rules dictate that Denver’s incoming salary would need to be less than the outgoing money in the player-for-player portion.

It might be a moot point, because if the Nuggets are willing to be a second-apron team, they might as well use their Bird rights to pay Watson instead of jumping through hoops to flip him for a different player.

Qualifying offer

The other two outcomes are much simpler. At the end of June, the Nuggets tendered Watson a predetermined qualifying offer of $6.5 million — “a standing offer for a one-year guaranteed deal.” Teams are required to submit a qualifying offer to trigger their restricted free agency rights. It basically gives the player a thin layer of protection in an otherwise unfair situation. If negotiations go poorly, they can take the cheap one-year contract and become an unrestricted free agent next summer.

Watson is reportedly considering the possibility of playing next season on the qualifying offer if the Nuggets don’t pay up or find a sign-and-trade soon. That could be the truth, or it could be a bluff. The qualifying offer route would be an extremely risky vote of self-confidence by Watson. He would be passing up millions of dollars to enter another contract year and to bet on himself. He would be motivated to play well, but he would also be one injury away from costing himself a life-changing amount of money.

Whether or not he’s actually considering the QO, it doesn’t hurt to insist that he is. Applying public pressure on the Nuggets is one of the only ways his camp can squirm for leverage here. And this is the one outcome the Nuggets might feel most pressured to avoid.

Why? It’s not like it would be an abject disaster. Even amid their efforts to low-ball Watson and utilize their leverage in the RFA process, the Nuggets clearly value him at a way higher number than $6.5 million. They would be getting him at an obvious discount for the 2026-27 season.

Then, in all likelihood, they would lose him in free agency next summer for nothing in return. Maybe if the Nuggets are bullish that they can win the 2027 championship, that’s worth the risk. But Denver is widely viewed now as a second-tier contender after losing in the first round of last season’s playoffs. The most tantalizing short-term option for the Nuggets is also the least favorable long-term outcome.

Contract extension

And so we finish here, with the most self-explanatory of these three outcomes, the one that has been Denver’s goal all along — signing a young homegrown talent to a long-term extension that would make him part of the core alongside Nikola Jokic.

As of now, the Nuggets and Watson seem worlds apart on deciding a fair salary. The Nuggets have taken a patient approach, as is the blueprint for front offices in this situation. Their determination to land a team-friendly deal stems from the possibility that other key players might be sacrificed for cap relief if Watson stays.

But Denver might need to budge at least a little to convince Watson’s camp to compromise. If this eventually ends in an extension, there’s a decent chance it’s for an average annual value that neither side is thrilled about. Could $20 million per year be suitable for everyone under the circumstances? Would it have to be more for Watson not to take the qualifying offer? Would he really pass up that much money?

The answers aren’t clear yet, as everyone is looking for an upper hand in the negotiation. One month in, it’s a stalemate.

In their latest attempt to identify talent outside the box, they’re plucking Lonnie Walker IV from the EuroLeague team Maccabi Tel Aviv on an Exhibit 9 contract, two sources told The Denver Post.

Walker, 27, will report to Denver on a training camp invite as he attempts to return to the NBA after spending parts of the last two years overseas. He’ll compete for a Nuggets roster spot at camp this fall. If he makes the team, he’ll be on a one-year veteran minimum contract.

The 6-foot-4 guard has averaged 14.6 points, 2.8 rebounds and 2.1 assists . He joins Alpha Diallo as the second free agent to sign a contract with Denver out of the EuroLeague this offseason.

Before venturing east — he also played a stint with the Lithuanian club Zalgiris Kaunas — Walker was settling into a career as an NBA journeyman. He’s played 342 games and started 95 across seven NBA seasons, primarily for the Spurs. San Antonio drafted him with the 18th overall pick in the 2018 draft out of Miami. He went four spots after Denver selected Michael Porter Jr.

Walker has also played for the Brooklyn Nets, Los Angeles Lakers and Philadelphia 76ers. If and when he takes the court for Denver, he’ll be playing his first NBA minutes since April 13, 2025. He’s averaging 10 points per game in his NBA career on 42.2% shooting from the field and a 35.6% mark from 3-point range.

In Denver, Walker has a chance join a thin backcourt depth chart that currently features Jamal Murray, Christian Braun, Julian Strawther and Tyus Jones. Denver still has two open roster spots, as contract negotiations with restricted free agent Peyton Watson remain at an impasse.

If a veteran minimum cap hit is added to the roster as it currently stands, Denver’s payroll would increase to $4.5 million over the second apron, bringing the luxury tax bill up to more than $80 million.