The Iraqi people go to the polls next Saturday in a referendum to ratify or reject the constitution drafted by their transitional government.
This would be a good time for the Bush administration to be careful what it wishes for. Approval of the charter could well mark the beginning of a hyperviolent end to America’s tragic encounter with Iraq. It would be an ugly end to witness – let alone to have 160,000 American troops stuck in the middle of.
Like most aspects of the war in Iraq, it didn’t have to turn out this way.
The White House had two principal objectives for the draft constitution. The first was that it incorporate the interests of Iraq’s 60 percent Shiite, 20 percent Kurdish and 20 percent Sunni population. By so doing, it would lay the foundation for a democratic government in the heart of the Arab world and set an example for other Arab countries. True enough, this war rationale was proffered by the White House only after the original justification – Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction – turned out to be somewhat less than a “slam dunk.” Still, in the long run, a democratic Arab world is in America’s national interest.
Of more immediate importance to the White House was having a constitution in which the Sunni minority’s interests were protected, hopefully creating an incentive for the several million moderate Sunnis to participate peacefully in Iraq’s political process, thereby eliminating the tacit Sunni support that allows the insurgents to survive.
This “drain the Sunni swamp” theory was sound enough. But thanks to the administration’s bungling and hubris, approval of the constitution will probably only deepen the Iraqi tarpit into which President Bush charged in 2003.
The main Sunni concern with the draft constitution is the issue of federalism, which the Sunnis feel will deprive them of resources and ultimately lead to the breakup of Iraq. Of Iraq’s 18 provinces, the Kurds have had autonomy in the three northern provinces, accounting for 20 percent of Iraq’s oil production, since 1991. The pragmatists among the Sunnis knew this “Kurdish exception” was a fait accompli and not up for discussion in the constitutional negotiations.
But late in the talks, the Shiite contingent unexpectedly insisted on having their own right to autonomy. They inserted a clause that would allow any number of like-minded provinces to form new autonomous regions. Their goal was clear: creation of a southern Shiite super-region comprised of nine provinces. This mini-state, essentially free from central government control, would comprise fully one-half of Iraq’s provinces – and control 80 percent of the country’s oil.
Between the existing Kurdish autonomous region in the north, and the prospective Shiite region in the south, the Sunnis would be left with a handful of landlocked and resource poor provinces in west-central Iraq. It was immediately clear the autonomy clause demanded by the Shiite leadership would lead Sunni negotiators to reject the draft constitution. As indeed they did.
In a measure of the Bush administration’s desperation, the president was convinced to lay down his chain saw long enough during his Crawford vacation to call the lead Shiite negotiator, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, and ask him to drop the autonomy demand.
And, in a measure of the Shiites’ sense of their own emerging power, al-Hakim stiffed the president of the United States and stated the clause would remain in the document.
Bush should have used his respite from brush clearing to derail the Shiites’ pending power and oil grab across southern Iraq. He should have put it to al-Hakim bluntly, “I didn’t sacrifice American blood and treasure so you can create an oil-fueled, theocratic mini- state under Iranian influence and break Iraq apart. As 60 percent of the population in a democratic system, you’ll control the central government in Baghdad anyway. What do you need autonomy from? Given America’s sacrifice – without which you wouldn’t be on the verge of controlling Iraq – we have the right to lay down some redlines. The most essential is that Iraq stays united.”
And the Kurds? While an estimated quarter million Shiites were being slaughtered by Hussein in southern Iraq after Desert Storm, American airpower protected the Kurds in their northern sanctuary. They were and remain America’s most reliable allies in Iraq. In light of that, Bush could have told Kurdish leaders, “We shielded you from Saddam for 12 years while you grew prosperous off Iraq’s northern oil fields. You owe us. Tell the Shiites you won’t support their demand for autonomy.”
But no. Bush let the Shiites, with Kurdish backing, roll the Sunnis. In doing so, they also rolled Bush – and any remaining chance to extricate American forces from a pacified Iraq.
Where does this leave American policy in Iraq? Many analysts – including within our own intelligence community – fear the outbreak of full-scale civil war within three to six months after the constitutional draft passes. They pin their dwindling hopes for a peaceful outcome in Iraq on the Sunnis’ ability to muster a two-thirds “no” vote in at least three provinces, the benchmark required to defeat the draft constitution. Were that to happen, the December vote would elect another interim parliament to draft a new constitution. With full Sunni representation in the new parliament (they have none in the current body), a revised charter would presumably better protect the Sunni minority’s interests. Sunni support for the insurgency would diminish. And we’d be back in the swamp draining business.
But it’s highly unlikely the constitution will be defeated. To begin with, the Sunnis are divided. Do they boycott the referendum entirely, to lessen the credibility passage? Or do they turn out to vote against it? In addition, Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s foreign jihadists will do all they can to keep Sunnis away from the polls. Zarqawi wants the charter to succeed, precisely because, unlike Bush, he recognizes it will lead to increased Sunni radicalization.
The constitution will likely pass. For a look at what may happen afterwards, it’s instructive to note the comments by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal during a late September visit to Washington. The Saudi said he was meeting with “with everyone who will listen” in the Bush administration. Given this administration’s penchant for pronouncing much and listening little, the prince’s appointment calendar was pretty wide open.
Al-Faisal’s message was that Iraq is spinning toward disintegration, that “all the dynamics are pulling the country apart,” a process likely to accelerate if the new constitution is ratified. What happens if Iraq splinters into separate Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni states? According to the Saudi foreign minister, such a development would “draw neighboring countries into the conflict.”
Turkey has consistently said it would cross into northern Iraq rather than tolerate an independent Kurdish state on its border. And Shiite Iran has injected significant amounts of arms, money and agents into southern Iraq to support the Shiite militias that already exercise de facto control there. For its part, Syria is unlikely to stand by while its Sunni coreligionists and fellow Baathists are defeated by the Shiites. As for Saudi Arabia, keeper of Sunni Islam’s most holy sites, it borders Sunni as well as Shiite provinces in Iraq and is unlikely to stay on the sidelines.
An Iraq engulfed in all-out civil war, convulsed by widespread ethnic cleansing, with foreign jihadist terrorists and neighboring countries’ troops involved in the fighting – and our soldiers caught in the middle – would be America’s nightmare scenario for 2006. Is it inevitable? Let’s hope not. But it’s increasingly possible – thanks to the administration’s handling of the constitutional drafting process.
