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The fiery debate over the possibility that Dubai Ports World would operate container terminals at six U.S. ports has been characterized by misinformation and a lack of knowledge about the nature of international trade today.

It has, however, also raised some legitimate concerns, particularly about the degree to which the changes over the past five years have created a system that can prevent or at least mitigate the impacts of a terrorist attack, especially one using a nuclear device in a container.

The tremendous increase in global trade has been facilitated by the container revolution. Almost 50 million containers travel between the world’s major ports each year; 6 million of these (50 percent of the value of U.S. imports) arrive at our ports. Altogether, about 7,500 foreign ships load and unload cargo at 350 U.S. ports each year. Protecting such a huge system, which is increasingly linked to the systems of other countries and in which a host of private and public organizations interact, is a daunting challenge that has not yet been met adequately.

Many programs have been put in place since Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Act in 2002. Of particular significance is the Container Security Initiative, under which U.S. Customs agents are stationed at about 40 foreign ports, including Dubai, to prescreen high-risk containers.

The information they gather is sent to what’s called the National Targeting Center, where it’s analyzed along with other intelligence to identify containers that should be examined before loading.

Other programs include one to develop new cargo management systems and another that allows shippers that adopt certain security standards to get faster clearance of their cargo.

Although each of these initiatives has yielded some positive results, much remains to be done. Serious problems of coordination and cooperation among agencies and with the private sector, along with lack of clear guidance and vague roles for port owners and operators, have limited progress.

Customs has so far checked a relatively small percentage of all importers and others who participate in the fast-clearance program to ensure that the rules are being applied.

Inspection at foreign ports is particularly problematic – the Government Accountability Office recently estimated that, due to lack of staffing and diplomatic problems, about 30 percent of “potentially dangerous” containers were not screened. The information available to the targeting center is often inadequate to assign accurate risk ratings, and the available radiation and other technologies are not yet sophisticated enough to do fully reliable scans. Overall, an estimated 6 percent of all containers that enter the U.S. are inspected.

The Coast Guard is responsible for regulating and inspecting the ports’ security assessments and ensuring that appropriate measures are implemented, but it is not clear that it possesses the necessary manpower and other resources to carry out these new functions effectively. The GAO found a lack of defined goals, inadequate planning, coordination problems and difficulties in financing implementation of security programs.

Since 2002, Congress has allocated about $500 million, but the Coast Guard estimates that in order to safeguard the ports by 2012, $7.3 billion will be needed. The Bush administration argues that the private sector should bear most of the expense, even though billions of federal dollars are spent annually to safeguard air travel.

In short, port security remains an elusive goal. Various proposals have been made for mandatory screening of every container that reaches the U.S., and new legislation in the Senate seeks to remedy deficiencies in current programs.

Such initiatives deserve urgent attention. If the furor over the Dubai Ports deal, now apparently resolved, leads to the adoption and effective implementation of measures that can minimize the real dangers that haunt our ports, a great service will have been performed in the struggle against terrorism.

Joseph S. Szyliowicz is a professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver.

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