As are many Coloradans, I am delighted that the Colorado General Assembly has opposed the notion that Fort Carson be allowed to forcefully take land in southeastern Colorado to expand its Piñon Canyon training area. The legislature did the just thing, despite the opposition of members of the Colorado Springs delegation who primarily regard the Army post and its soldiers as a local cash cow.
When I recently wrote about why the U.S. Army shouldn’t need more land for Fort Carson to train for future battles, many military officer retirees blindly defended the additional land grabs beyond the current Piñon Canyon training area. Behind the veil of patriotism and “grand strategy,” the majority of the retirees protected one key objective: to make money by keeping Fort Carson on the growth track. Surely, if you’re profiting from military contracting and associated real estate deals, it’s tough to understand the concerns of Colorado ranchers.
So, in all fairness, let’s look one more time at Fort Carson’s size and utility in the context of America’s posture for winning rapidly in modern war.
History teaches that whenever a powerful military fights enemies it vastly outclasses in numerous categories, the inferior enemy must exploit known and perceived weaknesses. Ideally, the weaker foe traps the superior force in a scenario where it cannot use its greater numbers, artillery, air power, heavy armor and other so-called combat multipliers.
Today, Iraq and Afghanistan are no different. Cities with dense housing developments and sewer systems are very much three-dimensional battlefields – just like the jungles of Vietnam. Supported by many strategic studies, the prospect for future conflicts clearly points at urban areas. They will pit U.S. forces against loosely organized insurgent forces, and random terrorist gangs. Not surprisingly, only Marine Corps leaders had identified these scenarios prior to Sept. 11, while the U.S. Army rested comfortably on its Cold War laurels.
Given today’s realities, military and political leaders must not only address a leaner and meaner force structure but also strategic positioning for brush fire-type war scenarios. The real issue for Fort Carson is that the Fort Hood/Fort Carson-based 4th Infantry Division can only reach the enemy by sending vehicles and heavy gear by rail to seaports in Texas or California. From the ports, fast sealift ships take the units’ equipment to the Middle East, a journey of 10 to 21 days. The rail loading and transport from Fort Carson to the embarkation ports add another three to seven days.
That’s why America’s heavier combat units should actually be located as close as possible to sea ports – and not in the middle of the country.
To prepare for urban warfare of the 21st century, battalions, squadrons, companies and platoons remain the key combat elements that decide the fight. In Iraq, clearly the small units rule the mean streets. For platoon through battalion, Fort Carson has enough training areas and firing ranges in its immediate surroundings. The current maneuver area at Piñon Canyon suffices for all such combat training.
Live-fire training for larger and heavy tank and mechanized units in preparation for large maneuver operations, such as Operation Desert Storm, should logically occur at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California and Fort Bliss, Texas.
Ultimately, if our military and political leaders cared less about economics and more about winning in future wars through proper positioning for global rapid-strike warfare, the Piñon Canyon expansion wouldn’t be an issue at all. With some “deployment logic,” Fort Carson would be home to a light and rapidly deployable division plus combat aviation units – for which the currently available training lands are totally sufficient.
Ralf W. Zimmermann is a former tank battalion commander and Desert Storm veteran. He writes and speaks on military and international affairs topics.
