Under increasing Western pressure, Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, announced Sunday that he will hold parliamentary elections in early January and will step down as army chief. But he refused to say when he will restore the constitution and lift the emergency that he imposed on Nov. 3.
Since then, Musharraf has dismissed the chief justice, Iftakar Tikhar Chaudhry, and 65 of about 100 judges of Pakistan’s supreme court and its high courts, replacing them with others who have taken an oath of allegiance under his provisional constitutional order. He has also imprisoned or placed under house arrest thousands of lawyers, judges, students, politicians, and human rights activists, and has muzzled the news media. How can the planned elections be considered free and fair under these conditions?
Musharraf justified his actions as necessary to fight Islamist extremism. He blames the judiciary for freeing terrorists and creating uncertainty. But the popular perception is that he took this pre-emptive action because of an impending ruling of the Supreme Court that could have invalidated his October election victory.
It speaks volumes that lawyers, who are normally restrained, have taken to the streets, demonstrating in many cities and clashing with the police. A classmate of mine from Yale Law School, Parvez Hassan, wrote from Lahore last week, “I was released early this morning from my detention with 35 other lawyers in one small room with an open toilet and the filthy floor for a bed.” The president of the American Bar Association has announced a lawyers’ march in Washington, D.C., tomorrow “to support the rule of law and lawyers in Pakistan.”
Although the U.S. has provided nearly $10 billion in aid to Pakistan since Sept. 11, 2001, its options are rather limited. The administration keeps reiterating that Musharraf remains an “indispensable ally” in the war on terror. Notwithstanding the criticism that the U.S. must shift its policy from “a Musharraf policy to a Pakistan policy,” this is not likely to happen.
The current crisis in Pakistan has challenged the main assumption the U.S. had made while seeking close collaboration with Musharraf: that he would be a strong force against Islamic extremism and an ally in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. However, the emergency rule is likely to further embolden terrorists instead of weaken them.
Musharraf surely did not anticipate the kind of opposition, both internal and external, that he is now facing. The longer the situation remains uncertain, the greater the fear that the crisis will deepen and there will be instability. And the winners, no doubt, will be the extremists.
The critical question is whether the military will continue to support Musharraf, or if another general will topple him. Instability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan has to be a matter of grave concern to the U.S.
There may still be a deal between Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who has returned after several years in exile, even though publicly they seem to be clashing. The U.S. and Britain have encouraged such a coalition, under which Musharraf could take off his military uniform and remain as president while she becomes prime minister.
When the dust settles, I hope we will not have to answer the disturbing question, “Who lost Pakistan?”
Professor Ved P. Nanda(vnanda@law.du.edu) is Evans University Professor and director of International Legal Studies, University of Denver. He is a regular contributor to the op-ed pages.
