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EDITOR’S NOTE: Footnotes have been deleted from these excerpts. They appear in the full report online.

Summary

For more than a decade there has been widespread illegal use of anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing substances by players in Major League Baseball, in violation of federal law and baseball policy. Club officials routinely have discussed the possibility of such substance use when evaluating players. Those who have illegally used these substances range from players whose major-league careers were brief to potential members of the Baseball Hall of Fame. They include both pitchers and position players, and their backgrounds are as diverse as those of all major-league players.

The response by baseball was slow to develop and was initially ineffective, but it gained momentum after the adoption of a mandatory random drug testing program in 2002. That program has been effective in that detectable steroid use appears to have declined. But the use of human growth hormone has risen because, unlike steroids, it is not detectable through urine testing.

This report, the product of an intensive investigation, describes how and why this problem emerged. We identify some of the players who were caught up in the drive to gain a competitive advantage through the illegal use of these substances. Other investigations will no doubt turn up more names and fill in more details, but that is unlikely to significantly alter the description of baseball’s “steroids era,” as set forth in this report.

From hundreds of interviews and thousands of documents we learned enough to accurately describe that era. While this investigation was prompted by revelations about the involvement of players with the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative, the evidence we uncovered indicates that this has not been an isolated problem involving just a few players or a few clubs. It has involved many players on many clubs. In fact, each of the thirty clubs has had players who have been involved with performance-enhancing substances at some time in their careers.

The illegal use of these substances was not limited to the players who are identified in this report. There have been many estimates of use. In 2002, former National League Most Valuable Player Ken Caminiti estimated that “at least half” of major-league players were using anabolic steroids. Dave McKay, a longtime coach for the St. Louis Cardinals and the Oakland Athletics, estimated that at one time 30 percent of players were using them. Within the past week, the former Cincinnati Reds pitcher Jack Armstrong estimated that between 20 percent and 30 percent of players in his era, 1988 to 1994, were using large doses of ster-oids while an even higher percentage of players were using lower, maintenance doses of steroids. There have been other estimates, a few higher, many lower, all impossible to verify.

However, it is a fact that between 5 and 7 percent of the major-league players who participated in anonymous survey testing in 2003 tested positive for performance-enhancing substances. Those figures almost certainly understated the actual level of use since players knew they would be tested at some time during the year, the use of human growth hormone was not detectable in the tests that were conducted, and, as many have observed, a negative test does not necessarily mean that a player has not been using performance-enhancing substances.

Mandatory random testing, formally started in 2004 after the survey testing results, appears to have reduced the use of detectable steroids, but players switched to human growth hormone precisely because it is not detectable. Players who use human growth hormone apparently believe that it assists their ability to recover from injuries and fatigue during the long baseball season; this also is a major reason why players used steroids. Human growth hormone was the substance most frequently sold to players by Kirk Radomski, a former New York Mets clubhouse employee who was a significant source of illegal performance-enhancing substances until late 2005. Separately, a number of players reportedly purchased human growth hormone through “anti-aging” centers using dubious prescriptions written by physicians who never examined, or even met, the customers for whom they were writing prescriptions.

At the beginning of this investigation, I said that I would conduct a “deliberate and unbiased examination of the facts that will comport with basic American values of fairness.” To honor that commitment, I invited each current or former player about whom allegations were received of the illegal possession or use of performance-enhancing substances to meet with me so that I could inform him of the evidence supporting the allegations and give him a chance to respond. The explanations provided by those players who we did interview were taken into account and are reflected in this report.

Among current players I asked to interview were five who have spoken publicly about the issue. When I did so, I made clear that there was no suggestion that any of the five had used performance-enhancing substances, and I repeat here that clarifying statement. Four of the five declined. One of them, Frank Thomas of the Toronto Blue Jays, agreed. His comments were informative and helpful.

Since 1986, drug testing has been subject to collective bargaining in Major League Baseball. For many years, citing concerns for the privacy rights of players, the players association opposed mandatory random drug testing of its members for steroids or other substances. On the other side of the bargaining table, the owners and several Commissioners proposed drug testing programs but gave the issue a much lower priority in bargaining than economic issues. But when the opportunity was presented in 2002 to achieve agreement on a system of mandatory random drug testing, the commissioner pressed hard on the issue and the players association agreed to the basic elements of the program that is in place today.

No drug testing program is perfect. The current drug testing program in Major League Baseball is the product of the give and take inherent in collective bargaining. It appears to have reduced the use of detectable steroids but by itself has not removed the cloud of suspicion over the game. Even as this investigation was underway, developments in several government investigations exposed the depth and breadth of the continuing illegal use of these substances in baseball (and in other sports) and made clear that this problem continues, years after mandatory random testing began and stringent penalties for failing those tests were adopted.

Plainly, baseball needs to do more to effectively address this problem. I have never met or talked with Jeff Kent of the Los Angeles Dodgers, but he appears to have understood this when he said in September, as reported in several newspapers: “Major League Baseball is trying to investigate the past so they can fix the future.”

That is the purpose of the recommendations that are set forth in detail in this report. In summary, they fall into three categories: (1) Major League Baseball must significantly increase its ability to investigate allegations of use outside of the testing program and improve its procedures for keeping performance-enhancing substances out of the clubhouse; (2) there must be a more comprehensive and effective program of education for players and others about the serious health risks incurred by users of performance-enhancing substances; and (3) when the club owners and the players association next engage in collective bargaining on the joint drug program, I urge them to incorporate into the program the principles that characterize a state-of-the-art program, as described in this report.

Although I sought and received a wide range of views, including the opinions of many experts in the field, the conclusions and recommendations in this report are mine alone, following close consultation and extensive discussions with the very talented members of the staff I assembled to assist me in this effort.

A. The investigation and this report

On March 30, 2006, the commissioner of baseball, Allan H. (“Bud”) Selig, asked me to investigate allegations that a number of players in Major League Baseball had illegally used steroids and other performance-enhancing substances. I accepted on the conditions that (1) I have total independence in conducting the investigation and in preparing this report; and (2) I have full freedom and authority to follow the evidence wherever it might lead, so that the investigation would not be limited to any one player or team. The commissioner readily agreed. He pledged that this report, when completed, would be made public, a decision I agreed with. He promised his full support and he kept his promise.

The commissioner retained the authority to determine whether any activities in the conduct of this investigation might violate his obligations under the Basic Agreement, including the joint drug program. I agreed to be bound by his decisions in that regard.

The commissioner also retained the right to prohibit publication in this report of any information that he is under a legal duty to keep confidential. To enable him to make that determination, I agreed to provide his office the opportunity to review this report three business days before it was released publicly. No material changes were made as a result of that review.

I was assisted in this investigation by lawyers from the firm of DLA Piper US LLP and by several experts. They include Richard V. Clark, M.D., Ph.D., a leader in the fields of andrology and endocrinology and Richard H. McLaren, HBA, LL.B., LL.M., C. Arb., a professor of law at the University of Western Ontario and a distinguished arbitrator for the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

I requested the production of relevant documents from the commissioner’s office, each of the thirty major-league clubs, and the players association. We received and reviewed more than 115,000 pages of documents from the commissioner’s office and the thirty clubs and over 20,000 electronic documents that were retrieved from the computer systems of the commissioner’s office and some of the clubs. We also gathered and reviewed many documents from other sources, some of them public.

In the course of the investigation, we interviewed more than 700 witnesses in the United States, Canada, and the Dominican Republic. Over 550 of these witnesses were current or former club officials, managers, coaches, team physicians, athletic trainers, or resident security agents. We also interviewed 16 persons from the commissioner’s office, including Commissioner Selig, president and chief operating officer Robert DuPuy, executive vice president for labor relations Robert D. Manfred, Jr., and former senior vice president for security and facility management Kevin Hallinan.

We sought to interview as many current and former players as possible. We attempted to reach almost 500 former players. Many of them declined to be interviewed, but 68 did agree to interviews. In addition, interviews of 3 former players were arranged through the assistance of federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents.

The Players Association was largely uncooperative. (1) It rejected totally my requests for relevant documents. (2) It permitted one interview with its executive director, Donald Fehr; my request for an interview with its chief operating officer, Gene Orza, was refused. (3) It refused my request to interview the director of the Montreal laboratory that analyzes drug tests under baseball’s drug program but permitted her to provide me with a letter addressing a limited number of issues. (4) I sent a memorandum to every active player in Major League Baseball encouraging each player to contact me or my staff if he had any relevant information. The Players Association sent out a companion memorandum that effectively discouraged players from cooperating. Not one player contacted me in response to my memorandum. (5) I received allegations of the illegal possession or use of performance-enhancing substances by a number of current players. Through their representative, the players association, I asked each of them to meet with me so that I could provide them with information about the allegations and give them a chance to respond. Almost without exception they declined to meet or talk with me.

My goal in preparing this report was to provide a thorough, accurate, and fair accounting of what I learned in this investigation about the illegal use of performance-enhancing substances by players in Major League Baseball. To provide context for my conclusions and recommendations, I also include in the report the medical, legal, and historical issues that are part of this complex problem.

I have not included every allegation that we received or the results of every interview we conducted or every document we reviewed. Inevitably, much of that information was cumulative, not relevant, or of only marginal relevance. None of it would have materially altered the account that is provided.

B. The problem Is serious

The illegal use of performance-enhancing substances poses a serious threat to the integrity of the game. Widespread use by players of such substances unfairly disadvantages the honest athletes who refuse to use them and raises questions about the validity of baseball records. In addition, because they are breaking the law, users of these substances are vulnerable to drug dealers who might seek to exploit their knowledge through threats intended to affect the outcome of baseball games or otherwise.

The illegal use of these substances to improve athletic performance also carries with it potentially serious negative side effects on the human body. Steroid users place themselves at risk for psychiatric problems, cardiovascular and liver damage, drastic changes to their reproductive systems, musculoskeletal injury, and other problems. Users of human growth hormone risk cancer, harm to their reproductive health, cardiac and thyroid problems, and overgrowth of bone and connective tissue.

Apart from the dangers posed to the major-league player himself, however, his use of performance-enhancing substances encourages young athletes to use those substances. Young Americans are placing themselves at risk of serious harm. Because adolescents are already subject to significant hormonal changes, the abuse of steroids and other performance-enhancing substances can have more serious effects on them than they have on adults.

Some estimates appear to show a recent decline in steroid use by high school students; they range from 3 to 6 percent. But even the lower figure means that hundreds of thousands of high school-aged young people are still illegally using steroids. It’s important to devote attention to the Major League Baseball players who illegally used performance-enhancing substances. It’s at least as important, perhaps even more so, to be concerned about the reality that hundreds of thousands of our children are using them. Every American, not just baseball fans, ought to be shocked into action by that disturbing truth. The recent decline is welcome, but we cannot be complacent.

Don Hooton, whose son committed suicide after abusing anabolic steroids, created the Taylor Hooton Foundation for Fighting Steroid Abuse. In 2005 congressional testimony, Mr. Hooton said:

“I believe the poor example being set by professional athletes is a major catalyst fueling the high usage of steroids amongst our kids. Our kids look up to these guys. They want to do the things the pros do to be successful. …

“Our youngsters hear the message loud and clear, and it’s wrong. If you would want to achieve your goal, it’s OK to use steroids to get you there, because the pros are doing it. It’s a real challenge for parents to overpower the strong message that’s being sent to our children by your behavior.”

Finally, the illegal use in baseball of steroids and other performance-enhancing substances victimizes the majority of players who do not use those substances. A September 2000 study by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse observed that:

” ‘Clean’ athletes face three choices: (1) compete without performance-enhancing substances, knowing that they may lose to competitors with fewer scruples; (2) abandon their quest because they are unwilling to use performance-enhancing substances to achieve a decisive competitive advantage; or (3) use performance-enhancing substances to level the playing field.”

We heard from many former players who believed it was grossly unfair that some players were using performance-enhancing substances to gain an advantage. One former player told us that one of the “biggest complaints” among players was that a “guy is using steroids and he is taking my spot.”

C. Governing laws and Major League Baseball policies

Anabolic steroids are listed as controlled substances under the federal Controlled Substances Act. Since 2004, the dietary supplement androstenedione and other steroid precursors have been as well. That means that it is illegal to use or possess steroids or steroid precursors without a valid physician’s prescription. Violations of this law carry penalties similar to those applicable to the illegal use or possession of narcotics. Human growth hormone is a prescription medication. It is illegal to issue a prescription for human growth hormone except for very limited purposes. Human growth hormone never has been approved for cosmetic or anti-aging uses, or to improve athletic performance. Issuing a prescription for human growth hormone for any of these unauthorized purposes is a violation of federal law.

Many have asserted that steroids and other performance-enhancing substances were not banned in Major League Baseball before the 2002 Basic Agreement. This is not accurate. Beginning in 1971 and continuing today, Major League Baseball’s drug policy has prohibited the use of any prescription medication without a valid prescription. By implication, this prohibition applied to steroids even before 1991, when Commissioner Fay Vincent first expressly included steroids in baseball’s drug policy. Steroids have been listed as a prohibited substance under the Major League Baseball drug policy since then, although no player was disciplined for steroid use before the prohibition was added to the collective bargaining agreement in 2002. …

For many years before 2002, the players association opposed any drug program that included mandatory random testing, despite several proposals for such a program from different Commissioners. The early disagreements on this issue centered around testing for cocaine and other “recreational” drugs, not steroids, but the effect of the players association’s opposition was to delay the adoption of mandatory random drug testing in Major League Baseball for nearly 20 years.

However, opposition by the players association was not the only reason that mandatory random drug testing was not adopted. In 1994, Commissioner Selig and the club owners proposed a drug program that would have included some forms of testing and would have listed steroids among baseball’s prohibited substances. Robert D. Manfred, Jr., who is now executive vice president for labor relations in the commissioner’s office, recalled that anabolic steroids were included in the 1994 proposal to be proactive, and the decision to include steroids in the proposal was not based on any particular concern about the use of those substances in baseball at that time. He acknowledged that at the time the drug program was not as high a priority as economic issues.

The Players Association did not agree to the proposal. Officials of the players association said that the clubs did not appear to regard the 1994 proposal as a high priority and did not pursue its adoption vigorously. Indeed, Players Association executive director Donald M. Fehr recalled that the proposal never even reached the main bargaining table during negotiations.

Later that year, a work stoppage ended the season and resulted in the cancellation of the World Series. Play resumed in 1995 without a collective bargaining agreement, and the owners made no attempt to renew the drug program proposal when collective bargaining resumed. That bargaining resulted in an agreement that remained in effect until 2002, so the next proposal for a mandatory random drug testing program was made in those negotiations with the players association in early 2002.

In 2001, the commissioner had unilaterally implemented drug testing throughout baseball’s affiliated minor leagues. He used that program as the basis for his 2002 proposal to the players association for a major-league program. The proposal included many of the elements of the current Major League Baseball joint program. Building from that proposal, the players association and the clubs negotiated the terms of a joint drug program as part of the 2002 Basic Agreement. For the first time, there was a program; it provided for the possibility of mandatory random drug testing of all major-league players if more than 5 percent of players tested positive for steroids during anonymous survey testing in 2003. After that did in fact occur, mandatory random drug testing began in Major League Baseball in 2004. That year, there were 12 undisputed positive tests for steroids. No player was suspended because the program did not provide for suspensions of first-time offenders at that time.

The Major League Baseball Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program has been modified twice since it originally was agreed to in 2002. In January 2005, human growth hormone (along with seventeen other compounds) was added to the list of prohibited substances. In addition, the players association agreed to more stringent penalties for a positive test for steroids (or similar substances) including, for the first time, a suspension of 10 days for a player’s first positive test. In 2005, 12 players tested positive for steroids and were suspended for 10 days.

Later that year, further revisions were agreed to, including significant increases in penalties: a 50-game suspension for a first positive test; a 100-game suspension for a second positive test; and a permanent suspension for a third positive test. The penalties are unchanged since those revisions. The penalties for positive drug tests under the major-league program are the strongest in major U.S. professional sports leagues. In 2006, two players tested positive for steroids and were suspended for 50 games. In 2007, three players were suspended for 50 games each for positive steroids tests.

In addition, in June 2006 Arizona Diamondbacks pitcher Jason Grimsley was suspended for 50 games based on “non-analytic” evidence that he had violated the policy, specifically, his reported admissions to federal agents that he had used steroids and human growth hormone. In September 2007, Cincinnati Reds catcher Ryan Jorgenson also was suspended for 50 games based on non-analytic evidence that he had violated the joint program. In December 2007, two players, Jay Gibbons and Jose Guillen, were each suspended for 15 days based on non-analytic evidence of past violations of the joint program.

D. The rise of the “steroids era”

Reports of steroid use in Major League Baseball began soon after the widely publicized discipline of Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson at the Summer Olympic Games in September 1988. Jose Canseco of the Oakland Athletics was the subject of the first media speculation about his use of steroids, and Boston Red Sox fans taunted him for his alleged steroids use during the 1988 American League Championship Series.

News reports about alleged steroid use in baseball grew more frequent throughout the 1990s. In 1996, after a dramatic increase in offense throughout Major League Baseball, Ken Caminiti of the San Diego Padres was voted the National League’s Most Valuable Player. In a 2002 Sports Illustrated article, he admitted that he had been using ster-oids that season and credited them for his increased power. In August 1998, coverage of the issue reached what seemed at the time to be a peak, when an article reported that Mark McGwire was using the then legal steroid precursor androstenedione while chasing the single-season home run record.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that baseball missed the early warning signs of a growing crisis. Then, beginning in the summer of 2000, a number of incidents involving steroids or drug paraphernalia came to the attention of club and commissioner’s office officials, and the players association. They included:

In June 2000, state police in Boston discovered steroids and hypodermic needles in the glove compartment of a vehicle belonging to a Boston Red Sox infielder;

Also in June 2000, a clubhouse attendant found a paper bag containing six vials of steroids and over two dozen syringes in the locker of a pitcher with the Florida Marlins;

In mid-September 2000, a clubhouse employee discovered a bottle of steroids and several hundred diet pills in a package that had been mailed to the ballpark for an Arizona Diamondbacks infielder;

In October 2001, officers with the Canadian Border Service discovered steroids, syringes, and other drugs in an unmarked bag that came from the entourage of a Cleveland Indians outfielder;

In September 2002, a bullpen catcher with the Montreal Expos was arrested for trying to send marijuana back to Florida with the Florida Marlins’ luggage. He later told Major League Baseball security officials that he had supplied drugs to nearly two dozen major-league players, including eight players for whom he said he had procured steroids.

Further inquiries were made in the Arizona and Montreal incidents, but in some of these cases, little investigation was conducted. Almost without exception, before this investigation began active major-league players were not interviewed in investigations into their alleged use of performance-enhancing substances.

Instead, players under suspicion frequently were subjected to “reasonable cause” testing for steroid use. Prior to the 2002 Basic Agreement those tests were the subject of an informal arrangement between the commissioner’s office and the players association that involved negotiations in each case as to whether testing of a player would be conducted and, if so, when. As a result, when they did occur, the tests were administered long after the allegations were received, and no suspected player ever tested positive for steroids in these tests.

Commissioner Selig and Rob Manfred both recognized the flaws in “reasonable cause” testing as it was conducted during those years. In 2002, Manfred told a Senate subcommittee that the process was “ad hoc at best, and dysfunctional at worst.” To remedy the problems, they focused their efforts on negotiating a comprehensive drug program with the players association which, when it was agreed to, included both mandatory random drug testing and its own formal procedure for reasonable cause testing.

More recently, the commissioner’s office has been more aggressive in responding to allegations of the use of steroids or other performance-enhancing substances.

Examples include:

In June 2004, a minor-league athletic trainer discovered a vial of ster-oids in a package that had been mailed by a player on a major-league 40-man roster. Manfred and his deputy investigated the incident and negotiated a resolution with the players association under which the player was immediately separated from his team and was required to submit to a drug test if he ever attempted to return to Major League Baseball;

In June 2006, the commissioner suspended Arizona Diamondbacks pitcher Jason Grimsley for 50 games based on admissions he reportedly made to federal law enforcement officers about his illegal use of performance-enhancing substances.

The joint drug program did not expressly provide for a suspension under those circumstances, but as part of a later settlement the players association agreed that the suspension was appropriate and could be a precedent in the future;

During 2007, the commissioner’s office interviewed several players, and to date has suspended two of them, after news articles appeared alleging their past illegal use of performance-enhancing substances.

E. The BALCO investigation

Commissioner Selig asked me to conduct this investigation after the publication of “Game of Shadows,” a book that contained allegations about the illegal use of performance-enhancing substances by major-league players that were supplied by BALCO and the personal trainer Greg Anderson.

Throughout this investigation, a federal criminal investigation related to BALCO was ongoing. On November 15, 2007, former San Francisco Giants outfielder Barry Bonds was indicted for perjury and obstruction of justice based on his grand jury testimony in that investigation. The ongoing criminal investigation, and the resulting unwillingness of many participants to cooperate with me, limited my ability to gather information that was not already in the public record about the involvement of major-league players with BALCO. The information that we did obtain is set forth in Chapter VII.

F. Evidence obtained of other players’ possession or use

Through the efforts of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California and federal law enforcement agencies, we obtained the cooperation of former New York Mets clubhouse employee Kirk Radomski. Radomski was interviewed by me and members of my investigative staff on four occasions, with federal law enforcement representatives participating in all interviews and his lawyer participating in three of them. Radom-ski identified a large number of current or former major-league players to whom he said he illegally sold steroids, human growth hormone, or other substances.

Radomski also provided me with a number of documents relating to his transactions with players in Major League Baseball, including copies of deposited checks that he retrieved from his banks, copies of some shipping labels or receipts, his telephone records for two years, and a copy of his address book in the form in which it was seized by federal agents when they executed a search warrant at his home.

We also obtained information from sources other than Radomski about players’ possession or use of performance-enhancing substances. These included several former major-league players and two former strength and conditioning coaches, some of whom met with us voluntarily; others did so at the request of federal law enforcement officials.

As a result, we gathered sufficient evidence about their alleged illegal possession or use of performance-enhancing substances to identify in this report dozens of current or former players in Major League Baseball. Each of the players was invited to meet with me to provide him with information about the allegations against him and give him an opportunity to respond.

Both pitchers and position players are named in this report. Some of those named are prominent, including winners of significant post-season awards. Many played in the World Series or in All-Star Games. Others are less well known, and some had only brief careers at the major-league level. The players were with clubs spread throughout Major League Baseball, as Radomski’s customers referred their friends and teammates to him as they moved from club to club.

I carefully reviewed and considered all of the information we received about the purchase, possession, or use of performance-enhancing substances by Major League Baseball players.

(1) Kirk Radomski provided substantial information about the distribution of performance-enhancing substances, and in many cases his statements were corroborated by other evidence. He did not, however, observe or participate in the use of performance-enhancing substances by any player named in this report, with one exception that is described below.

The corroboration took many forms, including: (a) the admission by 11 players that Radomski had supplied them with performance-enhancing substances, as he had said in our interviews of him; (b) 10 checks or money orders written to Radom-ski by some players in appropriate amounts; (c) mailing receipts for shipments of performance-enhancing substances by Radomski to some players; (d) statements by other witnesses supporting the allegations of use by some players; (e) the names, addresses, and/or telephone numbers of many players were found in Radomski’s seized address book; (f) telephone records showing calls between Radomski and some players; and (g) a positive drug test.

I did not include in this report the names of three players to whom Radomski said he sold performance-enhancing substances: two of them because the players had retired from Major League Baseball by the time of the alleged sales; and one of them because the player admitted that he had purchased and possessed the substances but denied that he had used them and his version of events was corroborated by other credible evidence.

I interviewed Radomski four times (in June, July, October, and November 2007), three times in person, once by telephone. His personal lawyer participated in three of the interviews. Federal law enforcement officials and members of my staff participated with me in all of the interviews. No one from the commissioner’s office, any club, or the players association participated in these interviews.

During each of the interviews, the law enforcement officials warned Radomski that if he made any false statements he would forfeit their commitment to recommend a more lenient sentence and he would face further criminal jeopardy. Before the interviews, Radomski had been debriefed extensively by federal prosecutors and agents. They subsequently confirmed that the information he provided to us in his interviews was consistent with the information he had previously provided to them.

(2) Six players are named based on information obtained from persons other than Radomski or former major-league strength and conditioning coach Brian McNamee. In each case, these allegations are supported by one or more of the following: (a) checks; (b) prior consistent statements; (c) a statement made about a player’s use where the witness was a friend of the player identified and under circumstances in which the witness faced criminal exposure for making a false statement; (d) statements reporting a witness’s direct observation of the player using a performance-enhancing substance; (e) the player’s own admission of his use.

(3) Brian McNamee said that he was a direct eyewitness and participant in alleged illegal use by three players who he served as a personal trainer. I interviewed him three times (in July, October, and December 2007), once in person and twice by telephone. His personal lawyer participated in each interview. Federal law enforcement officials and members of my staff participated with me in all of the interviews. No one from the commissioner’s office, any club, or the players association participated in these interviews.

During each of the interviews, the law enforcement officials warned him that he faced criminal jeopardy if he made any false statements. With respect to two of the players, McNamee was acting against his financial interest in disclosing this information. Before the interviews, McNamee had been debriefed extensively by federal prosecutors and agents. They subsequently confirmed that the information he provided to us in his interviews was consistent with the information he had previously provided to them.

In some cases, I include statements by club personnel in e-mails or other documents commenting on a player’s alleged drug use. Those statements are cited as corroboration of other evidence that a player possessed or used performance-enhancing substances; they did not serve as the primary basis for any of the decisions I made. No player is identified in this report on the basis of mere suspicion or speculation. …

G. Players’ use of substances purchased from anti-aging centers

In February 2007, a government task force executed search warrants on Signature Compounding Pharmacy in Orlando, Fla., and other businesses, including several so-called “rejuvenation centers,” exposing another source of illegal performance-enhancing substances. Some businesses that describe themselves as anti-aging or rejuvenation centers sell steroids or human growth hormone and arrange for buyers to obtain prescriptions for those substances from corrupt or suspended physicians or even, in some cases, a dentist. The prescriptions are then filled by a compounding pharmacy affiliated with the center and delivered to the buyer either through the mail or at the “clinic.”

In a series of news reports during 2007, eight active major-league players and eight former players were identified as appearing in the customer records of either anti-aging clinics or compounding pharmacies that are involved in this illegal trade. Those players reportedly purchased steroids, human growth hormone, and other drugs used to counteract the effects of steroid use.

Several players mentioned in these news reports admitted that they purchased human growth hormone from an anti-aging clinic or rejuvenation center and claimed that the purchases were to treat an injury or other medical condition. The Food and Drug Administration has never approved the use of human growth hormone to treat an athletic injury, to become more lean, or to improve athletic performance. The use of human growth hormone is a violation of federal law if not for an authorized purpose, even if with a prescription. In any event, based on the news reports it is doubtful that the prescriptions were valid.

In the section of this report entitled “Alleged Internet Purchases of Performance-enhancing Substances By Players in Major League Baseball,” I briefly describe alleged purchases by sixteen players. The information in that section was obtained from public sources, primarily news articles. All of these disclosures arose out of investigations by federal and state law enforcement agencies.

H. Major League Baseball’s joint drug prevention and treatment program

The joint drug prevention and treatment program was added to the Basic Agreement in 2002. Under that program, testing has been conducted of players in Major League Baseball since 2003, first in the form of anonymous survey testing in 2003, and thereafter in mandatory random testing that now carries with it severe penalties for violations. The program has been amended formally twice since 2002 as the result of negotiations between the commissioner and the players association, and other minor modifications also have been made. As a result, penalties have been increased, the list of prohibited substances has been lengthened, and some improvements in procedures have been made.

Adoption of the current program was a positive first step. The information obtained in this investigation suggests that the use of detectable steroids by players in Major League Baseball has declined but the use of human growth hormone has increased. In some respects, however, the program still falls short of current best practices in drug testing for the use of performance-enhancing substances.

The drug testing programs in all sports, including the Olympics, have evolved over time through a process of trial and error, as the programs were modified to address problems and concerns. In that respect, baseball’s program has been like all the others. The challenge now is to take the program to a new and higher level and to then continue the process of improvement to deal with the problems and concerns which cannot be foreseen but which inevitably will arise. Certain characteristics are now widely recognized as essential to an effective testing program. These are: independence of the program administrator; transparency and accountability; effective, year-round, unannounced testing; adherence to best practices as they develop; due process for athletes; adequate funding; and a robust education program. …

Concerns have been raised about the collection procedures used, including allegations that some players received advance notice of testing. In Game of Shadows, and in an earlier San Francisco Chronicle article, the authors described a surreptitious recording of a conversation that reportedly occurred in spring 2003 between Greg Anderson and an unidentified person. In that conversation, Anderson reportedly claimed that he would receive notice of upcoming tests between one and two weeks in advance. He also reportedly claimed that testing was “going to be either at the end of May or beginning of June . . .”

I could not obtain a copy of the recording or otherwise confirm that Anderson made these statements, or that he made them before late May 2003 as reported by the authors. However, records that we obtained from the contractor who administered his tests show that Bonds was tested on May 28 and June 4, 2003. Therefore, if the report of this conversation is accurate Anderson correctly predicted the dates of testing, at least for his client Barry Bonds.

We interviewed the relevant personnel from Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., the company responsible for sample collection under the Major League Baseball joint drug program. Those witnesses denied that they provided advance notice of test dates to Bonds or anyone else. CDT witnesses also told us that advance notice of testing dates was never provided to Quest Diagnostics, Inc., the laboratory that processed test samples, so Quest personnel could not have been the source of advance notice to anyone else. A Quest spokesman was reported to have said the same thing in the original news article about the recording.

I also investigated other allegations that some players received advance notice of tests in 2004. In April 2004 federal agents executed search warrants on the two private firms involved in the 2003 survey testing, Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. and Quest Diagnostics, Inc.; the warrants sought drug testing records and samples for 10 major-league players connected with the BALCO investigation. In the course of those searches, the agents seized data from which they believed they could determine the identities of the major-league players who had tested positive during the anonymous survey testing.

Shortly after these events, the players association initiated discussions with the commissioner’s office regarding a possible suspension of drug testing while the federal investigation proceeded. Manfred said the parties were concerned at the time that test results that they believed until then raised only employment issues had now become an issue in a pending criminal investigation. Ultimately, the commissioner’s office and the players association agreed to a moratorium on 2004 drug testing. While the exact date and length of this moratorium is uncertain, and the relevant 2004 testing records have been destroyed, Manfred stated that the moratorium commenced very early in the season, prior to the testing of any significant number of players. Manfred stated that the players association was not authorized to advise its members of the existence of the moratorium.

According to Manfred, the moratorium lasted for a short period. For most players, drug tests then resumed. With respect to the players who the federal agents believed had tested positive during 2003 survey testing, however, the commissioner’s office and the players association agreed that: (1) the players association would be permitted to advise those players of this fact, since that information was now in the hands of the government; (2) the testing moratorium would continue with respect to those players until the players association had an opportunity to notify them; and (3) the players association would not advise any of the players of the limited moratorium.

Sometime between mid-August and early September 2004, Manfred contacted Orza because the players association had not yet notified the players involved. The 2004 season was drawing to a close without those players having been tested because they remained under the moratorium. Manfred said that he pressed Orza to notify the players as soon as possible so that they could be tested. All of the players were notified by early September 2004.

A former major-league player stated that in 2003 he was tested as part of the survey testing program. He said that in September 2004, Gene Orza of the players association told him that he had tested positive in 2003 and that he would be tested in the next two weeks.

Independently, Kirk Radomski told us that this former player had earlier told him the same thing about Orza’s statements shortly after the conversation between Orza and the former player occurred. In addition, the former player Larry Bigbie told us that the same former player had told him the same thing about his conversation with Orza.

Furthermore, according to Bigbie, in 2004 a current player admitted to Bigbie that he also had been told by a representative of the players association that he had tested positive for steroids in 2003.

I am not permitted to identify either the former player with whom we spoke or the current player who made the admission to Bigbie because the commissioner’s office and the players association have concluded that for me to do so would violate the confidentiality provisions of the joint program.

According to the redacted affidavit filed in support of a search warrant sought for Jason Grimsley’s residence, Grimsley told federal agents that he, too, was informed that he had tested positive for anabolic steroids in 2003. The identity of the person who so advised Grimsley is redacted in the public version of the affidavit, and I did not have access to the unredacted version.

Other players may have received similar notice, since (1) the program required that each player be tested once during the 2004 season, (2) the commissioner’s office and the players association agreed that, since the government had the names of the players who they believed had tested positive in 2003, those players should be notified and should not be tested in 2004 until that notification had taken place, and (3) that notification did not take place until late August or early September 2004, just weeks before the season ended.

Orza declined my request for an interview.

Officials of the commissioner’s office emphasized that the circumstances described above represented an emergency response to an unforeseen event: a government investigation that obtained the names of players who had tested positive in the 2003 survey testing, information that the parties had agreed in advance would be anonymous. Consequently, they assert that it does not describe the normal operation of the program.

The players association objected to my making any reference to this matter. I offered to include a statement by the association and they provided me with the following:

“Because of certain actions by the Government in 2004 (which led to litigation, much of which has been under seal), the parties were forced to confront a serious threat to the confidentiality and integrity of our program. To combat that threat, and indeed to save the credibility of our program, the parties undertook certain measures in that year only. These were not unilateral actions undertaken by the MLBPA, but actions discussed and agreed upon between the MLBPA and the commissioner’s office. Each party was fully aware and in agreement with the steps the other was taking.

“The MLBPA believes that, by publishing in this Report anything related to these subjects, Senator Mitchell and the commissioner’s office are breaching promises of confidentiality made to the MLBPA and to its members.”

VIII. Information Obtained Regarding Other Players’ Possession or Use of Steroids and Human Growth Hormone

A. Background

On Dec. 14, 2005, federal law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at the home of Kirk Radom-ski, a personal trainer and former employee of the New York Mets who was suspected of selling anabolic steroids and human growth hormone to professional baseball players. During the search, agents seized documents relating to Radomski’s distribution of performance-enhancing substances, primarily to Major League Baseball players, including Radomski’s address book and receipts documenting the shipment of packages to players. Radomski then began cooperating with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California, and that cooperation continues to this day. After he began cooperating, Radomski obtained and produced many other documents, among them copies of cancelled checks, money orders, other bank records and telephone records.

On April 26, 2007, Radomski signed a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of distribution of anabolic steroids and one count of money laundering. In that agreement, Radomski admitted that from 1995 until December 2005 he distributed anabolic steroids, human growth hormone, and clenbuterol, as well as amphetamines, to “dozens of current and former Major League Baseball players and associates,” and that his network of clients ultimately could be traced to contacts he made during his “past employment in Major League Baseball.” Radomski’s guilty plea was entered the next day.

The plea agreement required Radomski to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which directed Radomski to provide complete and truthful information to me and to my investigative staff as part of his cooperation. I agreed that I would not make any public statements about the information provided by Radomski, including the statements in this report, without the approval of that Office.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office has agreed to recommend that Radom- ski receive a more lenient sentence if it concludes that he cooperated completely and truthfully, including with regard to the information he provided to me.

In addition to his statements, Radomski provided us with copies of bank, telephone, and other records that corroborated his statements.

Where checks or money orders were not available, other documents often corroborated Radomski’s testimony.

Radomski developed many friendships with players while he was working with the Mets, especially after he began attending spring training in 1988. Around that time, he became interested in weight training and began exercising regularly at a gym in the Bronx. In the early 1990s, Radomski decided he wanted to become a competitive bodybuilder. He knew the use of anabolic steroids was prevalent in that sport, and he did a great deal of research about various types of steroids and their effects. He began using Winstrol and Deca-Durabolin in six-to-eight- week cycles.

In 1993, when Radomski arrived at spring training significantly bigger, many players noticed and asked him about his size and training program. He told them he was using steroids as part of his training regimen.

Radomski said that his dealing in performance-enhancing substances began in response to inquiries from players.

A number of players to whom Radomski supplied performance-enhancing substances confirmed that he never solicited them to purchase these substances. The former players we spoke with confirmed that Radomski’s distribution network grew through word-of-mouth referrals among major league players.

B. Information Regarding Purchases or Use of Performance Enhancing Substances by Players in Major League Baseball

This section summarizes the information provided by Radomski and other individuals concerning the illegal purchase or use of performance- enhancing substances by current and former players in Major League Baseball. Since this was not a judicial proceeding, none of the persons who provided information testified under oath. However, Radomski, former New York Yankees and Toronto Blue Jays strength coach Brian McNamee, and former major league players Chad Allen and Larry Bigbie all provided information during interviews attended by federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents during which each was advised that he faced potential criminal exposure if he made false statements. Radom- ski and McNamee were also advised by their own personal lawyers before providing their cooperation and during the interviews.

In addition, former Albuquerque Dukes strength coach Todd Seyler and former major league player Adam Piatt both provided information to our investigation.

I carefully reviewed and considered all of the information we received about the purchase, possession, or use of performance-enhancing substances by Major League Baseball players.

1. Kirk Radomski provided substantial information about the distribution of performance-enhancing substances, and in many cases his statements were corroborated by other evidence. He did not, however, observe or participate in the use of performance-enhancing substances by any player named in this report, with one exception that is described below.

Brian McNamee said that he was a direct eyewitness and participant in alleged illegal use by three players who he served as a trainer.

During each of the interviews, the law enforcement officials warned him that he faced criminal jeopardy if he made any false statements.

Each player mentioned in this report, and others not mentioned, was provided that fair opportunity; each was invited to meet with me, with his personal lawyer and a lawyer from the Players Association if he so chose, so that I could provide him with information about the allegations against him and give him the opportunity to respond. Most players declined to meet with me.

The following discussion is organized in roughly chronological order. Records do not exist to document every transaction described by witnesses. Radomski stated that, with one exception noted below, the payments he received from professional baseball players were for performance-enhancing substances, as opposed to personal training or other services, and this assertion was confirmed by those players who agreed to speak with us about their dealings with him.

Roger Clemens

Roger Clemens is a pitcher who, from 1984 to 2007, played for four teams in Major League Baseball: the Boston Red Sox (13 seasons), Toronto Blue Jays (two seasons), New York Yankees (six seasons), and Houston Astros (three seasons). He has won more than 350 games, seven Cy Young Awards, and was the American League most valuable player in 1986. He was named to all-star teams 11 times.

During the Radomski investigation, federal law enforcement officials identified Brian McNamee as one of Radomski’s customers and a possible sub-distributor. McNamee, through his attorney, entered into a written agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California. The agreement provides that McNamee will cooperate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

In 1995, (Tim) McCleary was hired as the assistant general manager for the Toronto Blue Jays. In 1998, that club hired McNamee as its strength and conditioning coach

Roger Clemens signed with Toronto in 1997, after spending the first 13 years of his career with the Red Sox. After McNamee began working for the Blue Jays in 1998, he and Clemens both lived at the Toronto SkyDome (there is a hotel attached to the stadium).

McNamee and Clemens became close professionally while in Toronto, but they were not close socially or personally.

Jose Canseco was playing for the Blue Jays in 1998. On or about June 8-10, 1998, the Toronto Blue Jays played an away series with the Florida Marlins. McNamee attended a lunch party that Canseco hosted at his home in Miami. McNamee stated that, during this luncheon, he observed Clemens, Canseco and another person he did not know meeting inside Canseco’s house, although McNamee did not personally attend that meeting. Canseco told members of my investigative staff that he had numerous conversations with Clemens about the benefits of Deca-Durabolin and Winstrol and how to “cycle” and “stack” steroids. Canseco has made similar statements publicly.

Toward the end of the road trip which included the Marlins series, or shortly after the Blue Jays returned home to Toronto, Clemens approached McNamee and, for the first time, brought up the subject of using steroids. Clemens said that he was not able to inject himself, and he asked for McNamee’s help.

Later that summer, Clemens asked McNamee to inject him with Winstrol, which Clemens supplied.

According to McNamee, from the time that McNamee injected Clemens with Winstrol through the end of the 1998 season, Clemens’ performance showed remarkable improvement. During this period of improved performance, Clemens told McNamee that the steroids “had a pretty good effect” on him. McNamee said that Clemens also was training harder and dieting better during this time.

In 1999, Clemens was traded to the New York Yankees. McNamee remained under contract with the Blue Jays for the 1999 season. In 2000, the Yankees hired McNamee as the assistant strength and conditioning coach under Jeff Mangold. According to McNamee, the Yankees hired him because Clemens persuaded them to do so. In this capacity, McNamee worked with all of the Yankees players. McNamee was paid both by the Yankees and by Clemens personally.

According to McNamee, during the middle of the 2000 season Clemens made it clear that he was ready to use steroids again. During the latter part of the regular season, McNamee injected Clemens in the buttocks four to six times with testosterone from a bottle labeled either Sustanon 250 or Deca-Durabolin that McNamee had obtained from Radomski.

McNamee stated that during this same time period he also injected Clemens four to six times with human growth hormone he received from Radomski, after explaining to Clemens the potential benefits and risks of use.

McNamee said that he and Clemens did not have any conversations regarding performance-enhancing substances from late 2000 until August 2001. McNamee did, however, train Clemens and Andy Pettitte during the offseason at their homes in Houston. Clemens often invited other major league players who lived in the Houston area to train with him. …

According to McNamee, Clemens advised him in August 2001 that he was again ready to use steroids. Shortly thereafter, McNamee injected Clemens with Sustanon or Deca- Durabolin on four to five occasions at Clemens’ apartment. According to McNamee, he again obtained these drugs from Kirk Radomski. McNamee concluded from Clemens’s statements and conduct that Clemens did not like using human growth hormone (Clemens told him that he did not like the “bellybutton shot”). To McNamee’s knowledge, Clemens did not use human growth hormone in 2001 …

In order to provide Clemens with information about these allegations and to give him an opportunity to respond, I asked him to meet with me; he declined.

Andy Pettitte

Andy Pettitte is a pitcher who since 1995 has played with two teams in Major League Baseball: the New York Yankees (10 seasons) and the Houston Astros (three seasons). He has been named to the all-star team twice and was most valuable player in the 2001 American League Championship Series.

McNamee began serving as Pettitte’s personal trainer and started assisting Pettitte in off-season workouts after the 1999 season. According to McNamee, during the 2001-02 offseason, Pettitte asked him about human growth hormone. McNamee said that he discouraged Pettitte from using human growth hormone at that time.

From April 21 to June 14, 2002, Pettitte was on the disabled list with elbow tendonitis. McNamee said that Pettitte called him while Pettitte was rehabilitating his elbow in Tampa, where the Yankees have a facility, and asked again about human growth hormone.

Pettitte stated that he wanted to speed his recovery and help his team. McNamee traveled to Tampa at Pettitte’s request and spent about ten days assisting Pettitte with his rehabilitation. McNamee recalled that he injected Pettitte with human growth hormone that McNamee obtained from Radomski on two to four occasions. Pettitte paid McNamee for the trip and his expenses; there was no separate payment for the human growth hormone …

In order to provide Pettitte with information about these allegations and to give him an opportunity to respond, I asked him to meet with me; he declined.

Chuck Knoblauch

Chuck Knoblauch played as an infielder for three teams in Major League Baseball from 1991 to 2002: the Minnesota Twins (seven seasons), New York Yankees (four seasons), and Kansas City Royals (one season). He was the 1991 American League rookie of the year and played on four all-star teams.

Knoblauch played for the Yankees during 2000 and 2001, the two years when McNamee served as the Yankees’ assistant strength coach. McNamee provided personal training services to Knoblauch.

McNamee said that he acquired human growth hormone from Radomski for Knoblauch in 2001. Beginning during spring training and continuing through the early portion of the season, McNamee injected Knoblauch at least seven to nine times with human growth hormone.

Knoblauch paid Radomski through Jason Grimsley and, once or twice, through McNamee. (Radomski produced two checks from Grimsley in 2001 that totaled $5,550.) …

In order to provide Knoblauch with information about these allegations and to give him an opportunity to respond, I asked him to meet with me; he did not respond to my request.

Eric Gagne

Eric Gagne is a relief pitcher who began his career in Major League Baseball with the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1999 and played with the Dodgers through 2006. In 2007, he played for the Texas Rangers and the Boston Red Sox, and in December he signed with the Milwaukee Brewers. In 2002 and 2003, Gagne was the Los Angeles Dodgers player of the year. In 2003, he saved 55 games and won the Cy Young Award and the National League Rolaids relief pitcher of the year. In 2004, he saved 45 games and again won the National League Rolaids relief pitcher of the year. He has played in three All-Star Games.

Paul Lo Duca and Gagne were teammates with the Dodgers from 1999 to 2004.

Although he is not sure when, Radomski recalled that Lo Duca called Radomski and told Radomski that Gagne was with him and wanted to buy human growth hormone. Gagne then came onto the phone and asked Radomski a question about how to get air out of a syringe. This is the only time Radomski spoke to Gagne. Radomski said that Lo Duca thereafter placed orders on Gagne’s behalf.

Radomski said that he mailed two shipments to Gagne, each consisting of two kits of human growth hormone. …

According to notes of the October 2003 meetings of Dodgers officials, it was reportedly said of Gagne that: “he probably takes medication and tendons and ligaments don’t build up just the muscle.” …

In order to provide Gagne with information about these allegations and to give him an opportunity to respond, I asked him to meet with me; he declined.

XI. Recommendations

To prevent the illegal use of performance-enhancing substances in Major League Baseball, I make a series of recommendations. Some can be implemented by the commissioner unilaterally; some are subject to collective bargaining and therefore will require the agreement of the Players Association.

First, the commissioner’s office should place a higher priority on the aggressive investigation of non-testing (so-called “non-analytic”) evidence of possession or use, enhance its cooperation with law enforcement authorities, and make other improvements designed to keep performance-enhancing substances out of major-league clubhouses.

Second, Major League Baseball needs a compelling and greatly enhanced educational program that focuses on real-life stories as well as on all the risks involved in the use of performance-enhancing substances. …

I have been warned by a number of former players that some players will use performance-enhancing substances no matter what they are told. They may be right. But I also heard from other former players who wrestled long and hard with the decision to use performance-enhancing substances. An education program that effectively communicates the messages described above might not deter all players from use, but it surely will deter some.

Third, although it is clear that even the best drug testing program is, by itself, not sufficient, drug testing remains an important part of a comprehensive approach to combatting the illegal use of performance-enhancing substances. The commissioner does not have the authority to act unilaterally on drug testing, however; the agreement of the Players Association is required. …

A. Recommendations for Investigation of Non-Testing Based Allegations of Performance-enhancing Substance Possession or Use

… It is imperative that the commissioner’s office have a more robust investigative ability to respond promptly and effectively to allegations of the illegal use or possession of performance-enhancing substances. This report and recent law enforcement efforts show that non-analytic evidence of use can be obtained. The commissioner’s office must vigorously respond when such allegations are made, particularly as violators continue to shift their use to substances such as human growth hormone that are difficult or impossible to detect through currently available testing procedures. …

1. The commissioner should establish a department of investigations.

The commissioner should create a Department of Investigations, led by a senior executive who reports directly to the president of Major League Baseball. Ideally, this senior executive should have experience as a senior leader in law enforcement, with the highest credibility among state and federal law enforcement officials; the success of this department will depend in part upon how well it interacts with law enforcement authorities. The senior executive should have sole authority over all investigations of alleged performance-enhancing substance violations and other threats to the integrity of the game, and should receive the resources and other support needed to make the office effective.

The commissioner’s office should establish policies to ensure the integrity and independence of the department’s investigations, including the adoption of procedures analogous to those employed by internal affairs departments of law enforcement agencies. The adoption of and adherence to these policies can serve to ensure public confidence that the commissioner’s office is responding vigorously to all serious allegations of performance-enhancing substance violations. …

In turn, that senior executive should be required to report immediately all significant allegations of player substance use directly to both the Commissioner and the president of Major League Baseball; this has not always happened in the past. Additionally, the Department of Investigations should make quarterly reports to the Commissioner and president describing the Department’s investigatory efforts. …

2. The commissioner’s office Should More Effectively Cooperate with Law Enforcement Agencies

No matter how skilled, the commissioner’s office’s investigators face significant disadvantages in investigating illegal performance-enhancing substance use compared to law enforcement officials. Law enforcement officials, of course, have a broad array of investigatory powers, including search warrants and subpoena power. …

Improved relations with law enforcement agencies and customs officials may also serve as a deterrent to substance use by players. The Radomski case, the Signature Pharmacy investigation, and other performance-enhancing substance investigations, for example, may have implications beyond the individual players identified in those cases. If nothing else, they serve as a warning to all players that no one is protected from being identified by his supplier. …

3. The commissioner’s office Should Actively Use the Clubs’ Powers, as Employer, to Investigate Violations of the Joint Program

One of the critical tools available to all employers is the investigatory interview.

Generally, an employer may compel union-represented employees to attend and truthfully respond during any interview conducted by or on behalf of the employer. …

4. All Clubs Should Have Clear, Written, and Well-Publicized Policies for Reporting Information Relating to Possible Performance-enhancing Substance Violations

Since 1991, Major League Baseball’s Drug Policy has covered performance-enhancing substances expressly. That policy states in part:

If any club covers up or fails to disclose to (the Commissioner’s) office any information concerning drug use by a player, the Club will be fined in an amount up to $2 million, the highest allowable amount under the Major League Constitution.

Many club personnel told us that they were not aware of the policy. …

5. Logging Packages Sent to Players at Major League Ballparks

In a number of incidents of players’ possession or use that have been described in this report, a major-league player reportedly received deliveries of performance-enhancing substances through clubhouse attendants at Major League Baseball facilities. Kirk Radomski shipped illegal substances to some of his customers at major-league clubhouses. …

We interviewed clubhouse personnel throughout Major League Baseball. It is apparent from those interviews that players receive a significant volume of mail, most of it entirely legitimate, in care of their clubhouse managers. In response to recent news reports that players have received shipments of human growth hormone and other substances from compounding pharmacies at major-league ballparks, George Hanna, who is the current director of investigations for the security department in the commissioner’s office, has suggested that all packages received for players at major-league clubhouses be logged.

The Commissioner’s Office should require each major and minor league club to establish a system to log every package received for a player at its facilities. …

B. Additional Actions to Address Performance-enhancing Substance Violations There are several other actions that the Commissioner can take to address the issue that do not require collective bargaining.

1. Background Investigations of Prospective Clubhouse Personnel

3. Hot Line for Reporting Anonymous Tips

4. The Top Draft Prospects Should Be Tested Prior to the Major League Draft

C. Educational and Related Recommendations to Decrease Use of Performance-enhancing Substances

Critical to any effort to deter performance-enhancing substance use in Major League Baseball is an effective program designed to inform players about the dangers of substance use in a way that will resonate with them. Over the last several years, the commissioner’s office and the Players Association have made an increased effort to provide players and some club personnel with educational materials on performance-enhancing substances. …

Nevertheless, we heard criticism from both former players and club personnel about the current anti-steroids education programs. Some criticized the perceived shallowness of the efforts, while others could not remember the programs at all, even though they were with clubs when the programs were supposed to have been presented. Plainly, there is much room for improvement. …

The Taylor Hooton Foundation was founded in memory of Taylor Hooton, a high school baseball player who committed suicide after taking anabolic steroids. Taylor’s father, Don Hooton, created the Foundation and has educated high school and world class athletes around the country about the dangers of performance-enhancing substances. Mr. Hooton’s message painfully demonstrates that, when major-league players use performance-enhancing substances, the ramifications go far beyond the players themselves. Whether they like it or not, Major League Baseball players are role models for young athletes, and what they do – right or wrong – affects those young people. Telling the story of Taylor Hooton, and those like him, to players – many of whom are fathers or are considering becoming fathers – will serve to underscore the profound social dangers associated with performance-enhancing substance use by high profile athletes.

D. Recommendations for Further Improvement of the Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program

There have been a number of improvements in Major League Baseball’s drug testing program since the Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program became effective in 2003. Because of the constantly evolving nature of this problem, however, further improvements are necessary. …

1. The Program Should Be Independent

Independence is the most important principle of an effective drug testing program.

The parties previously have recognized the importance of this principle by delegating some of the administrative authority for the program to an independent program administrator. However, under the current program, both the independence of the program administrator and the level of authority that has been delegated to him are limited.

2. The Program Should Be Transparent

Drug testing programs must respect the privacy rights of the athletes who are tested. Yet to instill public trust and ensure accountability, they must be as transparent as possible consistent with protecting those rights. Transparency can be achieved by such actions as submitting to outside audits, and publishing periodic reports of de-identified aggregate testing results, retaining records of negative test results so that confirmation is available to correctly interpret subsequent tests, which may inure to the benefit of a player charged with a positive result in a later test. …

3. There Should Be Adequate Year-Round, Unannounced Drug Testing

Adequate year-round, unannounced testing is essential to any effective drug testing program. While strong sanctions for violators are necessary, those sanctions are meaningless unless testing maximizes the chance that violators will be detected. If tests are limited, predictable, or announced in advance, players can avoid detection …

4. The Program Should Be Flexible Enough to Employ Best Practices as They Develop

A state of the art drug testing program must employ best practices as they develop. Just as the methods that violators employ to avoid detection are not static, neither are these best practices. This may involve modification of the program as enhanced techniques, new tests, and best practices evolve.

5. The Program Should Continue to Respect the Legitimate Rights of Players

While I believe that changes are necessary to make the drug testing program more effective, there is nothing inconsistent between my recommendations and continued respect for the legitimate privacy and due process rights of players. …

6. The Program Should Have Adequate Funding

It would be contrary to Major League Baseball’s and the Players Association’s self-interests to deny needed resources to a truly independent program.

These recommendations are designed to work in combination with one another to create a new environment, one that is more aggressive in deterring the use of performance-enhancing substances, while still protecting the rights of the players. I believe that the principal beneficiaries of these reforms will be the majority of major-league players who play clean and follow the rules. These players have been harmed by having to play against violators who gained an unfair advantage, and further harmed by having the legitimacy of their fairly-earned accomplishments frequently questioned. The clean major-league players deserve far better than they have had to endure.

E. We Need to Look to the Future

All of these recommendations are prospective. The onset of mandatory random drug testing, the single most important step taken so far to combat the problem, was delayed for years by the opposition of the Players Association. However, there is validity to the assertion by the Players Association that, prior to 2002, the owners did not push hard for mandatory random drug testing because they were much more concerned about the serious economic issues facing baseball.

To prolong this debate will not resolve it; each side will dig in its heels even further. But it could seriously and perhaps fatally detract from what I believe to be a critical necessity: the need for everyone in baseball to work together to devise and implement the strongest possible strategy to combat the illegal use of performance-enhancing substances, including the recommendations set forth in this report.

I was asked to investigate the use of performance-enhancing substances by major-league players and to report what I found as fairly, as accurately, and as thoroughly as I could.

I have done so.

Only the Commissioner is vested with authority to take disciplinary action. Any such determination is properly for the Commissioner to make, subject to the players’ right to a hearing.

I urge the Commissioner to forego imposing discipline on players for past violations of baseball’s rules on performance-enhancing substances, including the players named in this report, except in those cases where he determines that the conduct is so serious that discipline is necessary to maintain the integrity of the game. I make this recommendation fully aware that there are valid arguments both for and against it; but I believe that those in favor are compelling. …

XII. Conclusions

There has been a great deal of speculation about this report. Much of it has focused on players’ names: how many and which ones. After considering that issue very carefully I concluded that it is appropriate and necessary to include them in this report. Otherwise I would not have done what I was asked to do: to try to find out what happened and to report what I learned accurately, fairly, and thoroughly.

While the interest in names is understandable, I hope the media and the public will keep that part of the report in context and will look beyond the individuals to the central conclusions and recommendations of this report. In closing, I want to emphasize them:

1. The use of steroids in Major League Baseball was widespread. The response by baseball was slow to develop and was initially ineffective. For many years, citing concerns for the privacy rights of the players, the Players Association opposed mandatory random drug testing of its members for steroids and other substances. But in 2002, the effort gained momentum after the clubs and the Players Association agreed to and adopted a mandatory random drug testing program. The current program has been effective in that detectable steroid use appears to have declined. However, that does not mean that players have stopped using performance-enhancing substances. Many players have shifted to human growth hormone, which is not detectable in any currently available urine test.

2. The minority of players who used such substances were wrong. They violated federal law and baseball policy, and they distorted the fairness of competition by trying to gain an unfair advantage over the majority of players who followed the law and the rules.

They – the players who follow the law and the rules – are faced with the painful choice of either being placed at a competitive disadvantage or becoming illegal users themselves. No one should have to make that choice.

3. Obviously, the players who illegally used performance-enhancing substances are responsible for their actions. But they did not act in a vacuum. Everyone involved in baseball over the past two decades – Commissioners, club officials, the Players Association, and players – shares to some extent in the responsibility for the steroids era. There was a collective failure to recognize the problem as it emerged and to deal with it early on. As a result, an environment developed in which illegal use became widespread.

4. Knowledge and understanding of the past are essential if the problem is to be dealt with effectively in the future. But being chained to the past is not helpful. Baseball does not need and cannot afford to engage in a never-ending search for the name of every player who ever used performance-enhancing substances. …

5. But it is now time to look to the future, to get on with the important and difficult task that lies ahead. Everyone involved in Major League Baseball should join in a well-planned, well-executed, and sustained effort to bring the era of steroids and human growth hormone to an end and to prevent its recurrence in some other form in the future. That is the only way this cloud will be removed from the game. The adoption of the recommendations set forth in this report will be a first step in that direction.

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The rules of the game

Major League Baseball initiated its first drug testing program in 2001 in the minor leagues. However, as Sen. George Mitchell’s report stated Thursday, rules long have been on the books regarding use of drugs. Major League Baseball blamed the union for not agreeing to a policy until forced to by Congress.

1971: A drug policy is written that prohibits using any prescription medicine without a prescription, according to Mitchell.

1991: Steroids are first listed as a prohibited substance, according to former commissioner Fay Vincent.

2001: MLB unilaterally implements its first random drug-testing program, in the minor leagues.

June 18, 2002: Congress orders MLB to negotiate a strict drug testing program.

Aug. 30, 2002: MLB and the union unveil Major League Baseball’s Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program as an addendum to the new Basic Agreement. The new policy calls for “survey testing” in 2003 to gauge the use of steroids among players on the 40-man roster.

March 1, 2003: Drug testing begins at major-league camps.

Oct. 29, 2003: The FDA bans THG. The next day MLB places the designer drug on its testing list for the 2004 season.

Nov. 13, 2003: MLB announced that 5 to 7 percent of 1,438 tests were positive during the 2003 season, setting in motion mandatory testing for performance- enhancing drugs with punishments for the first time in major-league history.

Jan. 13, 2005: New punitive measures for major-leaguers are a 10-day suspension for the first positive test, 30 days for the second, 60 days for the third, and one year for the fourth. All are without pay.

March 5, 2005: Selig announces the results of the 2004 drug tests in Mesa, Ariz. Selig says he’s “startled” by the drop in positive test results from 5 to 7 percent in 2003 to from 1 to 2 percent in 2004.

Nov. 15, 2005: Major League Baseball and the players association reached agreement on a plan that significantly strengthens penalties for steroid and other illegal drug use. Penalties for steroid use will be 50 games for a first offense, 100 games for a second and a lifetime ban for a third. The plan also includes testing and suspensions for amphetamine use.