How did the United States come to hold so many farmers and goat herders among the real terrorists at Guantanamo? Among the reasons:
• After conceding control of the country to U.S.-backed Afghan forces in late 2001, top Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders escaped to Pakistan, leaving the battlefield filled with volunteers and conscripts who knew nothing about global terrorism.
• The majority of the detainees taken to Guantanamo came into U.S. custody indirectly, from Afghan troops, warlords, mercenaries and Pakistani police who often were paid cash by the number and alleged importance of the men they handed over. Foot soldiers brought in hundreds of dollars, but commanders were worth thousands. There was financial incentive for locals to lie about the detainees’ backgrounds. Only 33 percent of the former detainees — 22 out of 66 — whom McClatchy interviewed were detained initially by U.S. forces.
• American soldiers and interrogators were susceptible to false reports passed along by informants and officials looking to settle old grudges in Afghanistan. This meant that Americans were likely to arrest Afghans who had no significant connections to militant groups.
• Detainees at Guantanamo had no legal venue in which to challenge their detentions. The only mechanism set up to evaluate their status, an internal tribunal in the late summer of 2004, rested on the decisions of rotating panels of three U.S. military officers. The tribunals made little effort to find witnesses who weren’t present at Guantanamo, and detainees were in no position to challenge the allegations against them.
