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American soldiers wade ashore from a landing craft in Normandy on D-Day during the Allied invasion of France in World War II.
American soldiers wade ashore from a landing craft in Normandy on D-Day during the Allied invasion of France in World War II.
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Olivier Wieviorka’s “Normandy” is a revisionist history, but its impact on the reader seems somewhat less revolutionary than that: a “let’s-re-examine-insufficiently-observed-factors history,” perhaps. Whatever you want to call it, it is possibly the best summary of the Normandy campaign I have yet read.

Wieviorka, a prominent French historian, says of the monumental three-month campaign, “soldiers and historians alike have often preferred its heroic charms to the harsh realities of the day, in relegating to the margins of silence everything that contradicts the legend.” He brings the contradictory, harsh realities out from the margins into the center of the page.

He refers, for instance, to the “myth of inevitability,” that the “arsenal of democracy” would without question be able to crush the Germans. The Allies (the United States, Britain and Canada) were not so sure at the time, nor does a later examination of events support the notion.

The D-Day landing itself was not as bloody as was expected or as it has been made out to be. This despite the fact that pre-landing exercises revealed grave shortcomings in motivation and performance of U.S. troops. On the other hand, the difficulty of the subsequent combat through the infamous hedge- rows of Normandy has not been sufficiently emphasized, Wieviorka believes.

Nor was it a holy war fought only for principles. In deciding policy and strategy, each nation was constantly watching out for the effects on its own national interests. Wieviorka reminds us of the dictum of Karl von Clausewitz, the Prussian writer on military strategy, “War is a continuation of politics by other means.”

Soldiers fought not mainly for glory or principle, but to get it over with and go home. As Paul Fussell, man of letters and historian and an American veteran, has said, the war has been “sanitized and romanticized almost beyond recognition by the sentimental, the loony patriotic, the ignorant and the bloodthirsty.” And there was more reluctance toward the war effort, at home and in the ranks, than is generally admitted.

Among American forces, few liked being in the Army, as compared with attitudes in other branches, which perhaps is not a startling disclosure. An official report in late 1945 found that “American soldiers’ motivation was less than that of most other large nations involved in the war. The American fought mainly because he had to.” More than one survey of officers and men revealed that they felt they had not been adequately trained for the task at hand.

The Allies faced German troops who were, in the author’s opinion, more battle-hardened and experienced; he praises the Germans’ courage and discipline. Some German equipment — notably, tanks — also was better. The Germans’ greatest area of weakness was in intelligence — it was extremely poor, while the Allies’ was excellent, thanks to the breaking of German codes.

They used three methods to keep the Germans from shifting troops to fend off a perceived attack: bombing, a Soviet offensive in the east and a campaign of deception. The first two kept the enemy occupied, the third kept them fooled — until D-Day most German military leaders thought any invasion would come at the Pas de Calais.

Finally, while the Allied coalition held up until Germany was defeated, it was always shaky and the degree of cooperation has been markedly overstated. Throughout, Wieviorka lavishes great praise on the Allied supreme commander, Dwight D. Eisenhower, but not for the “idyllic picture of unselfish cooperation” that Ike described in his book, “Crusade in Europe.”

Wieviorka does have this startling revelation: When it was decided that a French unit would march in to liberate Paris, American and British commanders insisted that it be made up entirely of white troops.

“Normandy” is a well-organized, solidly documented overview of the campaign. The overall impression is of a writer thoroughly in command of all aspects of his subject. It is not at all dry or slow-moving, and seems to be smoothly translated.

Roger K. Miller, author of the novel “Invisible Hero,” writes the blog .


Nonfiction

Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris, by Olivier Wieviorka; translated from French by M.B. DeBevoise, $29.95

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