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An effort to enhance the United States’ ability to detect “dirty bombs” went terribly awry at the Boulder campus of the National Institute of Standards and Technology where dangerous plutonium sources were obtained without management approval and handled by inexperienced and untrained researchers, a scathing report released today said.

The result, said the 62-page report by the NIST Ionizing Radiation Committee, was the spread of plutonium contamination at the NIST lab and into the Boulder sewer system.

Specifically, the investigators found that in trying to conduct tests and experiments that would enhance dirty bomb detection:

  •  Three plutonium sources were acquired without adequate hazard analysis or management approval. The wrong conclusions were reached regarding the hazards posed by the sources.
  •  When the plutonium sources were received, all protective barriers were removed except the screw-topped glass bottle in a sealed plastic bag. Further inadequate and inappropriate controls were established.
  •  Inexperienced and untrained researchers began work on the detector project using the radioactive sources.
  •  Researchers developed an inappropriate work plan, which involved the removal of glass-bottled sources from their secondary barriers, directly manipulating the glass-bottled source with ungloved hands, and taping the bottled source to a fixed device in order to achieve a desired instrumental response.

    After the glass bottle broke and the plutonium spilled, the researcher handled the materials, significantly spreading the contamination in the work area and on his body. He then left the area, spreading the contamination outside the laboratory.

    In statements and letters released today along with the report, NIST said that it is taking immediate actions.

    Among those is that the U.S. Commerce Department, NIST’s parent agency, is establishing a “blue ribbon” panel to examine safety matters at NIST.

    NIST has informed the city of Boulder that it has suspended the use of all radioactive materials at its Boulder facility and “will not be reapplying to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for permission to use plutonium or any other special nuclear materials at any time in the foreseeable future.”

    Further, said the agency, NIST will pay the costs of additional testing required to test and monitor the sanitary sewer system for effects from the plutonium discharge.

    NIST told the city of Boulder that it is currently developing a detailed plan for decontaminating the laboratory room where the plutonium spilled occurred.

    “The plan involves contracting for decontamination services with a contractor licensed by the NRC,” said Thomas O’Brian, director of the NIST Boulder facility. “In addition, the NRC must approve the NIST plan before any decontamination efforts can begin.”

    The spill occurred on June 9 and involved a sample of plutonium sulfate tetrahydrate, according to the report. The spreading of the contamination began with the researcher and his supervisor directly handling the broken vial on at least two occasions without adequate controls.

    “The most probable direct cause of the spread of the contamination outside the laboratory area is the multiple, uncontrolled entries into and exits from the contaminated laboratory after the spill,” said the report.

    The report said that the release of plutonium into the sanitary sewer system was probably caused by the researcher washing his hands in the sink and failing to make sure the water didn’t flow out of the sink.

    The report noted that the researcher didn’t report washing his hands in the sink until seven days after the spill, or on June 16.

    Among other findings:

  •  The researchers had no significant previous experience with radioactive materials.
  •  The researchers were unfamiliar with NIST policies covering the use of radioactive materials.
  •  The facilities to conduct the experiments were inadequate for this type of activity. They were overcrowded and poorly laid out.
  •  The work area was not restricted or controlled for radiological work and was in a busy, multi-use laboratory.
  •  The glass bottle containing the source may have been weakened from its age and long exposure to the radiation from the source (over 30 years).

    NIST said today that as a direct result of the report it will re-evaluate its organizational lines of responsibility and accountability for safety programs, seek independent assessments of its safety management, expand and strengthen its safety office, and develop a comprehensive plan for corrective action with dates for completing specific measures.

    Further, because of concerns by the city of Boulder, NIST said it plans to conduct an assessment and inspection of hazardous materials on the NIST Boulder campus; and audit safety and training procedures for hazardous materials.

    “We are developing a comprehensive plan and putting in place actions that address the committee’s recommendations,” said James M. Turner, NIST deputy director.

    Howard Pankratz: 303-954-1939 or hpankratz@denverpost.com

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