In Honduras, Barack Obama’s foreign policy team finally rediscovered the first law of holes: When you find yourself stuck in one, the first thing to do is stop digging.
The U.S. State Department has been busily digging a diplomatic crater since June 28. That’s when the Honduran Congress and Supreme Court ousted then-President Manuel Zelaya from office due to his unconstitutional bid to eliminate term limits.
Rather than side with the democratic institutions of the land, our State Department surprisingly backed Zelaya’s demand for a return to power. For four months, U.S. diplomats bullied and hectored the interim government of Robert Micheletti to return Zelaya to power — despite an August report from the Law Library of Congress that concluded that the Honduran government had every right to depose him.
Despite the pressure, which included suspension of U.S. aid and being dropped from the Organization of American States, defiant Hondurans held their ground, refusing to allow an unrepentant Zelaya to return to executive office. Polarization between pro- and anti-Zelaya factions intensified.
Thankfully, State laid aside its tactics of isolation and punitive sanctions at the end of October. Instead, Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon brokered talks between the factions. On Oct. 30, they produced an eight-point accord that may (repeat, may) end the crisis.
The agreement opens a pathway for Zelaya to return to office temporarily under a variety of restrictions and conditions. Or, maybe not. According to the accord, the Honduran Supreme Court must make recommendations on how to accomplish the reinstatement and then the Congress must approve it. For now, considerable uncertainty prevails.
If the Congress shuts the door on Zelaya’s return, will the accord hold? The ball is plainly in Honduras’ court. A deal has been signed. There is no room for backsliding.
Ray Walser is senior policy analyst for Latin America at The Heritage Foundation.
