“Will the U.S. keep President Obama’s promises?” was the question I was repeatedly asked last week in India after the president left.
He had unequivocally endorsed India’s elevation as a permanent member in the U.N. Security Council, agreed to conduct joint military training exercises, and work together on counterterrorism issues. The president and the prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, also signed a memorandum of understanding on nuclear security activities. Among other issues, the leaders agreed on joint and cooperative action on cybersecurity, export controls, clean energy, and climate change.
The president’s statement that India has already emerged as a global power and his promise to work together as strategic partners were music to the ears of most of India’s influential leaders. Opposition leader L.K. Advani and former chief justice of India P.K. Bhagwati were both effusive. “The change in tone has obviously happened because now the U.S. needs India more than we need it,” was Advani’s observation.
The only note of discord was from Communist leaders, formerly coalition partners in the government and now a small minority in the Parliament. A member of Parliament and a Politburo member of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Sitaram Yechury, found Obama “drawing India further into the U.S. geopolitical strategic framework, apart from advancing U.S. commercial interests.”
Although the president said in addressing India’s Parliament, “We will continue to insist to Pakistan’s leaders that terrorists’ safe haven within their borders are unacceptable and that the terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks be brought to justice,” Indians are irked that the U.S. funnels billions of dollars’ worth of military aid to Pakistan. They also perceive America as giving priority to its continuing close relationship with Pakistan’s army and intelligence services to support its Afghan policy while India’s interest in halting terrorism emanating from Pakistan is given short shrift.
Added to these foreign policy differences are other irritants, mainly over trade and climate change. The U.S. urges India to open its markets to U.S. business by lifting restrictions in several sectors, including defense, finance, information technology and pharmaceuticals. India objects to U.S. agricultural subsidies, export controls and tariffs. On climate change, India has persistently resisted the U.S. call to accept firm targets and timetables to control its emissions.
Pragmatic considerations — both on the economic and geopolitical fronts — have drawn these countries closer, as there is increasingly a mutual recognition of interdependence. Immense scope exists for increased commercial engagement between them, as U.S.-India trade stands at only $36.6 billion in 2009-10. But a free trade agreement hoped for by several industrial leaders on both sides will take several more years.
In the political arena, both India and the U.S. have a love-hate relationship with China and share apprehension about aggressive behavior. Their interests similarly converge as they seek stability on India’s western border — Pakistan/ Afghanistan — without which south Asia will never know real peace.
The U.S. alone cannot make India’s permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council happen because amending the U.N. Charter requires two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and no veto by another permanent member. And China’s vote is not assured. But the other promises are likely to be kept. The trajectory of Indo-U.S. relations will not be reversed.
Ved P. Nanda (vnanda@law.du.edu) is Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and director of the International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
