On the eve of his death, U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens was ebullient as he returned for the first time in his new role to Benghazi, the eastern Libyan city that embraced him as a savior during last year’s civil war. He moved around the coastal town in an armored vehicle and held a marathon of meetings, his handful of bodyguards trailing discreetly behind.
But as Stevens met with Benghazi civic leaders, U.S. officials appear to have underestimated the threat facing the ambassador and other Americans. They had not reinforced the American mission to meet strict safety standards for government buildings overseas. Nor had they posted a U.S. Marine detachment, as at other missions in high-threat regions.
A U.S. military team assigned to establish security at the new embassy in Tripoli, in a previously undisclosed detail, was never instructed to fortify the temporary hub in the east. Instead, a small local guard force was hired by a British private security firm as part of a contract worth less than half of what it costs to deploy a single U.S. soldier in Afghanistan for a year.
The two U.S. compounds where Stevens and three other Americans were killed the night of Sept. 11 proved to be strikingly vulnerable targets in an era of barricaded embassies and multibillion-dollar security contracts for missions in conflict zones.
Days before the ambassador’s visit, a Libyan security official had warned an American diplomat that foreigners should keep a low profile in Ben-ghazi because of growing threats.
Despite the security inadequacies and the warning, Stevens traveled to Benghazi to meet openly with local leaders. Eager to establish a robust diplomatic presence in the cradle of the rebellion against Moammar Khadafy, U.S. officials appear to have overlooked the signs that militancy was on the rise.
U.S. officials investigating the assault say their preliminary assessment indicates that members of Ansar al-Sharia, a fundamentalist group with deep roots in Benghazi, carried out the attack with the help of a few militants linked to al-Qaeda’s offshoot in Africa.
When bullets and rocket-propelled grenades started raining on the main U.S. compound, the small guard force was overrun. The attack could hardly have been further from the message Stevens had traveled to Benghazi to spread: America was there to stay.
The Benghazi mission was not a formal consulate but rather a liaison office established before Khadafy’s ouster. It was staffed by the Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations, a State Department office. Instead of signing a costly security contract, the State Department awarded a contract to Blue Mountain, a small British security firm, to provide local guards. The year-long contract, which took effect in March, was worth $387,413, a minuscule sum. Blue Mountain and the State Department declined to comment for this story.
