The governor of Louisiana was “blistering mad.” It was the third night after Hurricane Katrina drowned New Orleans, and Gov. Kathleen Blanco needed buses to rescue thousands of people from the fetid Superdome and the convention center.
But only a fraction of the 500 vehicles promised by federal authorities had arrived.
Blanco burst into the state’s emergency center in Baton Rouge.
“Does anybody in this building know anything about buses?” she recalled crying out.
They were an obvious linchpin for evacuating a city where nearly 100,000 people had no cars.
Yet the federal, state and local officials who had failed to round up buses in advance were now in a frantic hunt. It would be two more days before they found enough buses to empty the shelters.
The official autopsies of the flawed response to the catastrophic storm have already begun in Washington and may offer lessons for dealing with a terrorist attack or even another hurricane this season.
But an initial examination of Katrina’s aftermath demonstrates the extent to which the federal government failed to fulfill the pledge it made after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to face domestic threats as a unified, seamless force.
Instead, the crisis in New Orleans deepened because of a virtual standoff between hesitant federal officials and besieged local and state authorities, interviews with dozens of officials show.
Federal Emergency Management Agency officials expected the state and city to direct their own efforts and ask for help as needed.
Leaders in Louisiana and New Orleans, though, were so overwhelmed by the scale of the storm that they were not only unable to manage the crisis but also not always exactly sure what they needed.
While local officials assumed that Washington would provide rapid and extensive aid, federal officials, weighing legalities and logistics, proceeded at a deliberate pace.
Russ Knocke, press secretary at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, said that any detailed examination of the response to Katrina will uncover shortcomings by many parties.
“I don’t believe there is one critical error,” he said. “There are going to be some missteps that were made by everyone involved.”
FEMA appears to have underestimated the storm despite an extraordinary warning from the National Hurricane Center that it would cause “human suffering incredible by modern standards.”
The agency dispatched seven of its 28 urban search-and- rescue teams before the storm hit and sent no workers into New Orleans until after Katrina passed on Aug. 29, a Monday.
On Aug. 30, a FEMA official who had just flown over the ravaged city by helicopter seemed to have trouble conveying to his bosses the degree of destruction, according to a New Orleans city councilwoman.
“He got on the phone to Washington, and I heard him say, ‘You’ve got to understand how serious this is, and this is not what they’re telling me, this is what I saw myself,”‘ the councilwoman, Cynthia Hedge-Morrell, recalled the FEMA official saying.
State and federal officials had spent two years working on a disaster plan to prepare for a widely devastating storm, but it was incomplete and had failed to deal with two issues that proved most critical: moving evacuees and imposing law and order.
The Louisiana National Guard, already stretched by the deployment of more than 3,000 troops to Iraq, was hampered when its New Orleans barracks flooded.
It lost 20 vehicles that could have carried soldiers through the watery streets and had to abandon its most advanced communications equipment, Guard officials said.
Partly because of the shortage of troops, violence raged inside the New Orleans convention center, which interviews show was even worse than previously described.
Police SWAT team members found themselves plunging into the darkness, guided by the muzzle flashes of thugs’ handguns, said Capt. Jeffrey Winn.
“In 20 years as a cop, doing mostly tactical work, I have never seen anything like it,” Winn said.
Three officers quit, he said, and another disappeared.
Oliver Thomas, the New Orleans City Council president, expressed a view shared by many in city and state government: A national disaster requires a national response.
“Everybody’s trying to look at it like the city of New Orleans messed up,” Thomas said. “But you mean to tell me that in the richest nation in the world, people really expected a little town with less than 500,000 people to handle a disaster like this? That’s ludicrous to even think that.”
Andrew Kopplin, Blanco’s chief of staff, took a similar position: “This was a bigger natural disaster than any state could handle by itself, let alone a small state and a relatively poor one.”
Federal officials seem to have belatedly come to the same conclusion. Michael Chertoff, the homeland security secretary, said future “ultra-catastrophes” such as Katrina would require a more aggressive federal role.
Richard Falkenrath, a former homeland-security adviser in the Bush White House, said the chief federal failure was not anticipating that the city and state would be so compromised.
He said the response exposed “false advertising” about how the government has been transformed after the 2001 attacks.
“Frankly, I wasn’t surprised that it went the way it did.”