London – In the weeks before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, as the United States and Britain pressed for a second U.N. resolution condemning Iraq, President Bush’s public ultimatum to Saddam Hussein was blunt: Disarm or face war.
But behind closed doors, the president was certain that war was inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made it clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade Iraq without the second resolution, or even if international arms inspectors failed to find unconventional weapons, said a confidential memo about the meeting written by Blair’s top foreign policy adviser and reviewed by The New York Times.
“Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning,” David Manning, Blair’s chief foreign policy adviser at the time, wrote in the memo that summarized the discussion between Bush, Blair and six of their top aides.
“The start date for the military campaign was now penciled in for 10 March,” Manning wrote, paraphrasing the president. “This was when the bombing would begin.”
The timetable came at an important diplomatic moment. Five days after the Bush-Blair meeting, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell was scheduled to appear before the United Nations to present the American evidence that Iraq posed a threat to world security by hiding unconventional weapons.
Although the United States and Britain aggressively sought a second U.N. resolution against Iraq – which they failed to obtain – the president said repeatedly that he did not believe he needed it for an invasion.
Stamped “extremely sensitive,” the five-page memorandum, which was circulated among a handful of Blair’s most senior aides, had not been made public. Several highlights were first published in January in the book “Lawless World,” which was written by a British lawyer and international law professor, Philippe Sands. In early February, Channel 4 in London first broadcast several excerpts from the memo.
The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated but manageable. Bush predicted that it was “unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups.” Blair agreed with that assessment.
The memo also shows that the president and the prime minister acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found inside Iraq.