Washington – Two days before he resigned from the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent to the White House a classified memo recommending “a major adjustment” in Iraq strategy and acknowledging slow progress there.
“Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough,” Rumsfeld wrote in the Nov. 6 memo.
Rumsfeld has made similar comments in public about insufficient progress in Iraq, both before and immediately after his resignation Nov. 8. But the defense secretary’s unusually expansive memo also laid out a series of 21 possible courses of action regarding Iraq strategy, including many that would transform the U.S. occupation.
Michael O’Hanlon, a defense analyst at the Brookings Institution, said the revelation of the memo would undercut any attempt by President Bush to defend anything resembling a “stay the course” policy in Iraq. “When you have the outgoing secretary of defense, the main architect of Bush’s policy, saying it’s failing, that puts a lot more pressure on Bush.”
The memo makes clear Rumsfeld understood the political implications of changing strategy.
“Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis,” he wrote in one of the bulleted options. “This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not ‘lose.”‘
Similarly, Rumsfeld advocated announcing “a set of benchmarks” for the Iraqi government – “to get them moving,” he added parenthetically, as well as to “reassure” the U.S. public that progress can be made.
The existence of the memo was first reported Saturday night by The New York Times. The Pentagon confirmed the memo’s authenticity.
Asked about the memo, White House spokeswoman Eryn Witcher said: “The president has said he’s been dissatisfied with the progress in Iraq, so the right thing to do is re-evaluate our tactics. There are a number of reviews underway, and the president is open to listening to a wide array of options.”
Rumsfeld’s ideas did not depart radically from the alternative strategies emerging so far from the bipartisan Iraq Study Group or from other military and governmental Iraq policy reviews initiated in recent weeks.
For example, Rumsfeld called for significantly increasing the number of U.S. military trainers embedded with Iraqi forces and, in a twist, for “a reverse embeds program” that would place Iraqi soldiers with American squads, partly to boost the Arabic- language skills of U.S. troops.
Several options Rumsfeld raised involve withdrawing or pulling back the 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq as a way to pressure the Iraqi government to take greater responsibility for its security. This idea, favored by many Democrats in Congress, has not been publicly embraced by Rumsfeld to such a degree. Still, Rumsfeld wrote that he opposed setting a firm withdrawal date.
“Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start ‘taking our hand off the bicycle seat’), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up, and take responsibility for their country,” Rumsfeld wrote.
Rumsfeld suggested using the security provided by U.S. troops in a carrot-and-stick approach, providing security only for provinces and cities that fully cooperate with U.S. forces. Similarly, reconstruction aid should go only to “those parts of Iraq that are behaving,” he wrote.
Options the defense secretary characterized as “less attractive” involved U.S. troop increases. The only place he recommended a U.S. troop increase was along Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran.
Rumsfeld’s well-known frustration with other branches of the U.S. government comes through repeatedly in the memo, albeit far more bluntly than he has voiced in public. He called for reaching out to U.S. military retirees and reservists to “aggressively beef up” Iraqi ministries, adding, “i.e. give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.”
Similarly, he called for a “massive program for unemployed youth” but said it would have to be run by U.S. forces, “since no other organization could do it.”
People in Washington familiar with the workings of the Pentagon and the media were suspicious of the motives behind the leak of the memo.
Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, an Iraq veteran who has been critical of Rumsfeld, said he was bothered by the timing and the substance of the memo.
“For Mr. Rumsfeld to write this leaked memo, saying things aren’t going well, is disingenuous and self-serving,” Eaton said.
Following is the text of a classified Nov. 6 memorandum that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld sent to the White House suggesting new options in Iraq. The memorandum was sent one day before the midterm congressional elections and two days before Rumsfeld resigned.
Nov. 6, 2006
SUBJECT: Iraq – Illustrative New Courses of Action
The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of options:
ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS
Above the Line:
(Many of these options could and, in a number of cases, should be done in combination with others) – Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. – political, economic and security goals – to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
- Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.
- Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units’ language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.
- Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF – the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. – by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.) – Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
- Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target al-Qaida, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.
- Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.
- Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior.
- Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, “If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.” No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.
- Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.
- Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions – cities, patrolling, etc. – and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
- Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start “taking our hand off the bicycle seat”), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.
- Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.
- Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.
- Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not “lose.” – Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) – go minimalist.
Below the Line (less attractive options):
- Continue on the current path.
- Move a large fraction of all U.S. Forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it.
- Increase Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially.
- Set a firm withdrawal date to leave. Declare that with Saddam gone and Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people can govern themselves. Tell Iran and Syria to stay out.
- Assist in accelerating an aggressive federalism plan, moving towards three separate states – Sunni, Shia, and Kurd.
- Try a Dayton-like process.
– The New York Times
