With President Bush apparently inclined to accept some of the recommendations released by the Iraq Study Group this week and reject others, there’s an important consideration to keep in mind. Although it’s widely assumed that the president alone is empowered to decide what military option the U.S. should pursue in Iraq, that is not the case. Congress did not, as many believe, write the president a blank check in 2002 with regard to the use of force in Iraq. It still has a lot to say on the subject.
Since its earliest days, the Supreme Court has recognized a president’s obligation to respect congressional restrictions when Congress has authorized “imperfect war” – a war fought for limited purposes. Congress in 2002 authorized imperfect war in approving the use of force in Iraq for specific, limited objectives. As those objectives are achieved, or different ones are pursued, legislative reauthorization will be required.
Congress specified two objectives: to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,” as its resolution put it, and to “enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”
When Bush signed the 2002 authorization, he said that “Iraq will either comply with all U.N. resolutions, rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, and end its support for terrorists, or it will be compelled to do so.”
Iraq has now done so. Saddam Hussein’s regime is history, and the threat posed by it is gone.
What options, then, would require renewed congressional approval? Negotiation is an exclusive presidential prerogative; a decision to talk directly with Syria or Iran would be for the executive alone. But military options are another matter. The options to “go big” or to “go long” – to increase the magnitude or duration of the U.S. effort by systematically taking on enemies not part of Hussein’s regime – would not fit within Congress’ existing authorization.
