Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger monopolized world headlines in the late 1960s and early 1970s like few others in history, yet, according to historian Robert Dallek, both were troubled men who often seemed overwhelmed by events and by deep-seated jealousies of each other.
In his new book, “Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power,” Dallek portrays both men as paranoid about how they were perceived, both at home and abroad. And both were willing to use their power to promote themselves and excoriate their enemies, which were many. But at the heart of their relationship, was their own personal contretemps.
Nixon, as president, saw Kissinger first as an asset for his intelligence, but later as someone who knew too much to get rid of. Kissinger, first as national security adviser and later as both national security adviser and secretary of state, saw Nixon as a means to an end, as a way to make himself one of the most powerful men in the world. This symbiotic relationship worked well for both, giving them both what they wanted.
It’s been said that politics is a ruthless game, and no one brought more to the table than these two, Dallek shows. As Dallek puts it, “Nixon was overwhelmingly self-interested, but he was someone who shrewdly presented himself as a wise president always putting the larger national interest ahead of self-serving ends.”
It was this self-interest that would prove to be Nixon’s downfall; his hubris and willingness to go after enemies, both real and imagined, would lead to the Watergate scandal, which, in turn led to his resignation in the face of impeachment and certain conviction.
But Nixon wasn’t alone in the way he operated, running roughshod over enemies, according to Dallek. “Like Nixon’s,” he said, “Kissinger’s ambition was a ceaseless force that moved him to rationalize cutting corners with assertions that he was serving the national interest or saving Nixon from himself.”
Cynical about Vietnam
At the same time, the two men were responsible for some of the most compelling changes in the mid-20th century political landscape – detente with the Soviet Union and the opening of relations between China and the United States, both highly regarded examples of statesmanship.
But the overriding issue of their time was the Vietnam War, and Dallek paints both Nixon and Kissinger as cynical participants in the efforts to end the war, but only on their time frame and only with an eye toward how their actions would impact Nixon’s chances for re-election in 1972.
Dallek’s take on the Vietnam War and the administration’s approach to it, without saying so in so many words, draws eerie similarities to the current administration and how it is approaching the war in Iraq.
“Antiwar sentiment had become majority opinion,” he writes. “In the winter of 1970, 84 percent of Americans favored some kind of plan to withdraw U.S. troops from the fighting: While 38 percent were willing to do this slowly or to wait until the South Vietnamese were ready to take over the war, nearly half the public wanted it done immediately or, at most, within eighteen months.”
And, writing about Nixon’s public take on the war, Dallek says, quoting the president, “A quick withdrawal was not the answer. It ‘would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.’ It would amount to what Nixon described as the ‘first defeat in our nation’s history and would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership … throughout the world.”‘
Scathing words
Dallek describes Nixon as being contemptuous of his critics, unwilling to accept criticism. Although he could be placating in public, behind the scenes he was scathing: “‘They hate us, the country, themselves, their wives, everything they do – these liberals,”‘ Dallek quotes Nixon as telling Kissinger. “‘They are a lost generation. They have no reason to live anymore.”‘
While Nixon and Kissinger did some things that history has proved were beneficial to the country, it is Dallek’s opinion that they will be remembered by the personal demons that drove them to overreach.
As Dallek puts it: “To advance themselves and their policies, they had few qualms about making bargains with the devil – Nixon deceiving himself, the Congress, the courts, the press, and the public; Kissinger endorsing or acquiescing in many presidential acts of deception and engaging in many of his own …
“It was partly the product of arrogance,” he continues, “they believed they knew better than anyone else what best served the nation – and partly an aversion to criticism that any open debate was sure to bring.”
Fresh sources
To write this book, Dallek used 20,000 pages of newly released transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations, some of Nixon’s tapes of the 2,800 available hours and thousands of pages from Nixon’s and Kissinger’s papers, along with those of other aides. It shows: Some of the detail will be daunting for all but the most dedicated policy wonks when it comes to missile treaties, turmoil in the Middle East, the ascension of Salvador Allende in Chile, summit meetings both here and abroad and, of course, discussions about how to end the war in Vietnam “with honor.”
But it all adds to the often alarming and always intriguing relationship between these two political titans who shared so much of the world stage at a particularly tumultuous time.
Books editor Tom Walker can be reached at 303-954-1624 or twalker@denverpost.com.
