So, it turns out that it’s not crazy to worry that the color-coded Homeland Security National Threat Advisory system could be used for political purposes.
Top Bush administration officials apparently tried to use the system to help the former president in his 2004 re-election bid, according to a new book by former security chief Tom Ridge.
With Election Day fast approaching, Ridge claims, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Attorney General John Ashcroft pressured him to raise the threat level. (Raise it to an ominous orange, perhaps?)
The idea was that if Bush looked stronger on terrorism than his opponent, Sen. John Kerry, a frightened public might stick with Bush.
Ridge claims he refused and soon submitted his resignation.
We’ve been critical of the threat level system, saying that because the color-coded warnings have been stuck for years at very high danger levels, the system has become background noise and therefore ineffective — like the boy in the fable who cried “wolf” one too many times.
The general threat level has long remained at “yellow,” which is defined as a “significant risk of terrorist attacks.” At airports, it continues to hold steady at “orange,” which means a “high risk of terrorist attacks.”
Yet, for years, we have lived and worked and played and traveled without another domestic terror attack.
As we’ve said, let’s just leave the flashing lights to Captain Kirk’s difficult “red alert” moments on “Star Trek.”
Presently, a task force of experts is working on suggestions for a new system for Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano.
The new security chief wants to craft a system that can be targeted to areas and industries.
Many suspected the Bush administration used the color-coded system to steal Kerry’s thunder following the 2004 Democratic National Convention when it raised the alert level.
Ridge says that isn’t true.
But Ridge’s claims about the Election Day pressure ought to be proof enough that the threat system as constructed is too vulnerable to manipulation.
Today’s communications systems are robust and varied — from cellphones to Twitter feeds to reverse 911 calls to Internet news to cable and public news and emergency broadcast systems. And more technologies come online every day.
With such a wealth of information systems available, Napolitano ought to consider dropping the threat advisory system altogether.
When an actual threat exists or is likely, she could get the word out easily.
Otherwise, the system risks becoming useless in its senseless repetition, or dangerous if it falls into the wrong hands.
