The Russians exploded what’s being called “the dad of all bombs” in September. It’s more powerful than the biggest one we have, nicknamed “the mother of all bombs.” Not to worry, though, both are nonnuclear and are touted as “eco-friendly.”
If it wasn’t so deadly, and couldn’t end life as we know it, one might be tempted to call this a little boy’s game – my toy is bigger than your toy.
But this saber-rattling is pretty tame compared with what we now know happened during the Cold War, from the mid-1940s to the early 1990s, when an extraordinary and deadly game was being played out on our behalf. Often hidden from view, this Cold War sometimes got lava-hot and brought each of us close to being blown to bits or melted down in the gruesome scenario that would follow a nuclear holocaust.
For real-life terror – not the kind you get in video games – walk through “Arsenals of Folly,” the latest book by Richard Rhodes, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for “The Making of the Atomic Bomb.”
It’s of huge importance, a well-written history of recent times, chronicling how the U.S. and Soviet Union developed and stockpiled nuclear weapons that would have killed every one of us countless times over. Winston Churchill predicted in 1954: “If you go on with this nuclear arms race, all you are going to do is make the rubble bounce.” We did continue the race, and came perilously close to dying in that rubble.
Both countries were operating under the theory of “mutual assured destruction,” with the belief that both had such a large cache of bombs that neither would use them.
Every top leader was against using nuclear weapons. When Nikita Khrushchev first realized what they had, he said he couldn’t sleep for days. Then he thought nobody could possibly use them, and that let him get some rest. The Soviet Union first proposed limiting weapons tests at the United Nations in 1955.
Smaller nations were terrified. Finally, some treaties were signed that dictated that the nuclear nations wouldn’t transfer nuclear weapons to others and that those who hadn’t developed nuclear capacity, wouldn’t do so in the future.
The discrepancy between the countries was astonishing. In 1951, the U.S. had 438 nuclear weapons; the Soviets had 25. By 1960, “the U.S. arsenal had increased to 18,638 bombs and warheads yielding 20,500 megatons (1.4 million Hiroshimas) of which 3,127 were strategic weapons deployed” on bombers. The Soviets had 1,700 bombs with only about 350 strategic weapons.
The huge build-up was a reaction to the “threat of inflation and fear mongering” by militant conservatives, both within the government and out, Rhodes says. For instance, in 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson deliberately exaggerated the Soviet threat to boost defense spending.
The ante continued to be raised through every administration. President Carter enlarged the defense budget, and President Reagan’s administration doubled it.
According to Reagan’s budget director, Richard Stockman, “They laid out a plan for a five-
year defense budget of $1.46 trillion!” and he described the squeals of delight “throughout the military-industrial complex.” Reagan spent almost as much on defense in the first five years as had Ford, Nixon and Carter combined, more than the cost of both Korean and Vietnam wars.
One scholar wrote, “It is one of history’s great ironies that at the very moment when the United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, possessed most of the world’s gold, produced half the world’s goods on its own territory, and laid down the rules for allies and adversaries alike, it was afraid.”
Despite treaty after treaty, and despite the private reservations of every president, the arms race galloped unabated until Mikhail Gorbachav took office in 1985.
Rhodes gives us a fascinating look at what shaped Gorbachev, and his portrait of Reagan is just as revealing. Even while calling Russia “the Evil Empire,” Reagan was horrified at the thought of nuclear war. Still, those who counseled him advised more stockpiling.
Reagan is seen as well-meaning but very limited, with almost no knowledge or understanding of foreign or public policy. His advisers put news into movie form to brief him. But he began considering a plan to save the world – what we know as Star Wars. He envisioned a big shield that could protect us and eliminate the need for arms buildup. But this Strategic Defense Initiative didn’t originate in scientific laboratories, “it was instead a political concept.”
Carl Sagan put the total cost of the arms race close to $10 trillion. Rhodes and others pointed out that we didn’t get peace or safety during that time and the money spent on “defense” was money not spent on infrastructure, health care, housing, education or medical research.
Rhodes has come through again with an up-close look at people we elected to lead us and the advisers they trusted, the theories we believed in, how they worked and the consequences we bear today.
We’re left with no predictions for the future – which obviously still includes bombs and armaments – but Rhodes provides lessons we can learn (or not) from our past
Diane Hartman is a principal with .
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NONFICTION
Arsenals of Folly
The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race,
by Richard Rhodes, $28.95
