The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has agreed to pay a $10,000 fine and implement a series of corrective actions as the result of a plutonium contamination spill at NIST’s Boulder facility on June 9, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced late Tuesday.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission said that in addition to the fine, a former radiation safety officer at the NIST Boulder facility will be prohibited from engaging in any NRC-licensed activities for one year for “deliberate misconduct” involving failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC.
The NRC said that it appeared the former NIST radiation safety officer deliberately failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC in a 2007 license amendment application.
“This misinformation and misconduct led to the plutonium spill that later followed,” said the NRC.
The NRC said the settlement with NIST was reached under the NRC’s alternative dispute resolution process, which was initiated at the request of NIST.
The objective was to reach a preliminary settlement agreement and address 10 apparent violations identified in an inspection report after the spill, said the NRC.
At the time of the plutonium spill, NIST was conducting a project to enhance the United States’ ability to detect “dirty bombs.”
According to a NIST internal investigation, after a 30-year-old glass bottle broke and plutonium spilled, a researcher at the facility handled the materials, significantly spreading the contamination in the work area and on his body.
He then left the area, spreading the contamination outside the lab including into the Boulder sewer system.
The NRC said that after it made its findings, NIST requested that the matter be resolved through the alternative dispute resolution process.
As a result of the mediation session on Jan. 5, 2010, an agreement was reached which led to the $10,000 fine and the action against the former NIST safety officer.
In addition, NIST is to do the following:
Complete an independent assessment of the radiation safety program at the Boulder facility.
Submit copies of the required annual radiation safety audit to the NRC.
Develop and implement a procedure for training new employees on radiation safety policy.
Develop a radiation hazards analysis process.
Revise the NIST radiation safety program policy to indicate that all individuals are required to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC.
Develop a clearly define process for acquiring radioactive materials.
NIST said plutonium was detected in about half of the 29 people who were near the plutonium spill. But none of them were expected to experience any clinically significant health impacts, NIST said in August 2008.
NIST investigators found that three plutonium sources were acquired without adequate hazard analysis or management approval.
In addition, investigators found that when the plutonium was received, all protective barriers were removed except the screw-topped glass bottle in a sealed plastic bag. Further, the investigation revealed that inexperienced and untrained researchers worked on the project.
NIST said that the amount of plutonium that may have washed into Boulder’s wastewater system after the plutonium spill was well below federal and state limits.
Howard Pankratz: 303-954-1939 or hpankratz@denverpost.com
